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This report describes the European Union's anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard 
activities during 2017, pursuant to Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (‘basic anti-
dumping Regulation’) and Article 34 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 (‘basic anti-subsidy 
Regulation’). 
The report, as in previous years, gives an overview of the EU legislation in force with regard 
to the trade defence instruments: anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguards. 
The report also summarises the developments in general policy. In this respect, two important 
legislative files merit particular attention. In December 2017, the European Parliament and the 
Council adopted a regulation introducing a new methodology for calculating dumping 
margins for countries in which significant distortions occur in the economy owing to state 
interference. It also introduces changes to strengthen the anti-subsidy legislation.  
A breakthrough has also been achieved regarding the modernisation of the trade defence 
instruments, a file introduced by the Commission back in 2013. After a complex legislative 
process, the European Parliament and the Council reached in December 2017 a compromise, 
which paved the way for the entry into force of the new rules in June 2018.  
It should be noted that the reporting provisions in Article 23 and Article 34 of the basic anti-
dumping and basic anti-subsidy Regulations respectively were modified in December 2017 as 
part of substantive changes to those regulations (described in detail under Section 8 below). 
Given that none of the EUs anti-dumping and anti-subsidy proceedings in 2017 were affected 
by the changes, this report provides no information in that regard. Worth noting is that the 
Commission's reporting obligations have been further changed as from 8 June 2018 following 
the entry into force of the amendments of the basic Regulation modernising trade defence 
rules. 
The report also gives an overview of all investigations together with the most essential 
information such as, for instance, the rate of individual duties imposed. Cases which merit 
special attention are treated in more detail. Consequently, the report covers the essential facts 
pertaining to the activity in 2017. 
The detailed annexes give a complete overview of all case-related information for the past 
year. These are broken down into various categories e.g. initiations, imposition of measures 
etc. and are designed to complement the narrative of this report by providing details of all 
cases including references to publications.  
With regard to anti-dumping and anti-subsidy, the year 2017 saw a slight decrease in the 
number of new cases initiated when compared to the previous year (11, as compared to 15 in 
2016). However, while only two provisional measures were imposed compared to nine last 
year, the number of definitive measures imposed reached 12 compared to seven in 2016. Only 
two investigations were terminated without measures (compared to eight in 2016).  
As regards review investigations initiated, there was a significant increase in number - from 
16 in 2016 to 28 in 2017. These included nine expiry reviews, ten interim reviews, six new 
exporter reviews and three anti-circumvention investigations. During 2017, 19 expiry reviews 
were concluded with confirmation of the measures and one interim review was concluded 
with the measures being amended. One anti-circumvention investigation was concluded with 
an extension of duty. 
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In short, while the focus of the investigative work may shift somewhat from one year to 
another, the aforementioned figures show the overall importance and intensity of the 
Commission's trade defence activity. Moreover, the reality of trade defence work goes beyond 
a simple comparison of yearly figures. Indeed, some of the investigations such as on tyres and 
electric bikes from China are technically very complex and affect a wide array of economic 
interests. 
As in previous years, this report provides an overview of the Court cases relating to the trade 
defence policy instruments. In 2017, the Court of Justice and the General Court rendered 29 
judgments in total relating to the areas of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy.  
The relevant activities in the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are also 
reported, including dispute settlement procedures initiated against the EU.  
In general terms, therefore, the year 2017 has again been a very challenging as well as 
particularly intense year in the trade defence area. 
As in previous years, the European Parliament's INTA Committee continued to be informed 
about major developments in the EU's trade defence activities. 
The annexes to this report provide easy access to the case information in table form. 
This report is also available to the general public under the following link.:  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-defence/  
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1. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATION 
Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
1.1.1. The international framework 
On an international level, unfair trading practices such as dumping and the granting of 
subsidies were identified as a threat to open markets as early as 1947, when the first 
GATT agreement was signed. The agreement contained specific provisions allowing 
GATT members to take action against these practices if they caused material injury to 
the domestic industry of a GATT member. Today's globalised trade environment is 
characterized by quicker and cheaper communication and transportation, as well as the 
coexistence of different models of economic governance. In such a world, trade defence 
instruments are more relevant than ever. Indeed, trade distortions that underlie the 
application of these instruments are widespread. 
Since the beginning of the GATT in 1947, considerable efforts have been made to 
harmonise the rules relating to trade defence instruments. During the last GATT round 
(the « Uruguay Round »), which led to the creation of the WTO and the detailed Anti-
Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements, much of the attention was focused on the 
procedural and material conditions to be fulfilled before measures can be adopted. The 
EU played an active role in the negotiation of these agreements, which are reflected in 
its own legislation. The EU applies its anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation with 
rigour and consistency. Unfortunately, many WTO Members lack this type of restraint, 
thereby affecting negatively also EU operators. The role that the EU plays as a prudent 
user has therefore also an exemplary function at WTO level. Against this backdrop, the 
EU also continues to play a leading active role in any efforts to update the WTO 
rulebook. 
1.1.2. The EU legislation 
The EU’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation was first enacted in 1968 and has 
since been modified several times. The current basic texts, which form the legal basis of 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations in the EU, entered into force in March 
1996 and October 1997 respectively. These are in line with the Anti-Dumping and Anti-
Subsidy Agreements adopted during the GATT/WTO negotiations.  These texts were 
codified in 2016 to reflect changes previously made. The basic texts are: 
– Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on protection against dumped imports from countries not 
members of the European Union – Codified Version1 
– Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on protection against subsidised imports from countries not 
members of the European Union – Codified Version.2 
These regulations will overall be referred to as the "basic Regulation(s)". Both 
regulations were recently modified by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 of 12 December 
2017
3
 and Regulation (EU) 2018/825 of 30 May 2018.
4
   
                                                 
1 OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p.21. Codified version as last amended by Regulation (EU) No 37/2014 (OJ L 
18, 21.01.2014, p. 1) 
2 OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p.55. Codified Version as last amended by Regulation (EU) No 37/2014 (OJ L 
18 21.01.2014, p. 1) 
3 OJ L 338, 19.12.2017, p. 1. 
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The EU's legislation contains a number of provisions aimed at ensuring a balanced 
application of the EU’s Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy rules on all interested parties. 
These provisions include the “EU interest test” and the “lesser duty rule”, which go 
beyond the Union's WTO obligations. 
The EU interest test is a public interest clause and provides that measures can only be 
taken if they are not contrary to the overall interest of the EU. This requires an analysis 
of all the economic interests involved, including those of the EU industry and its 
suppliers, downstream users, consumers and traders of the product concerned.  
The lesser duty rule requires the measures imposed by the EU to be lower than the 
dumping or subsidy margin, if such lower duty rate is sufficient to remove the injury 
suffered by the EU industry. Such a “no-injury” rate is usually determined by using the 
cost of production of the EU industry and a reasonable profit margin. In almost half of 
the cases the anti-dumping measures for individual exporting companies are set at the 
level of the injury margin instead of the higher dumping margin. The EU is one of the 
few investigating authorities on a world-wide level that applies the lesser duty rule in 
such a coherent and comprehensive way.  
Safeguards 
1.2.1. The international framework 
The principle of liberalisation of imports was set under the GATT 1947 and 
strengthened under the 1994 WTO Agreements. As safeguard measures consist of the 
unilateral withdrawal or suspension of a tariff concession or of other trade liberalisation 
obligations formerly agreed, they have to be considered as an exception to this 
principle. Article XIX GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards do not only 
impose strict conditions for the application of this "escape clause”, but also put in place 
a multilateral control mechanism under the WTO Committee on Safeguards. 
Under WTO rules, safeguard action has to be viewed as a temporary defence measure 
that applies to all imports of the product covered by a measure, irrespective of origin. 
As regards non-WTO members, safeguard measures may be selective and apply to 
products originating in a specific country. WTO Accession Protocols may also provide 
for such selective safeguard mechanisms as was the case in China's Protocol of 
Accession, although the provision has now expired.  
WTO safeguards should only be adopted after a comprehensive investigation which 
provides evidence of the existence of a) unforeseen developments leading to b) 
increased imports, c) the existence of a serious injury for EU producers and d) a causal 
link between the imports and the injury. 
1.2.2. The EU legislation 
The above-mentioned principles are all reflected in the relevant EU regulations, except 
for the “unforeseen development requirement” (which is not found explicitly in the EU 
legislation nor in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards but has been confirmed as a self-
standing condition by WTO jurisprudence). Additionally, the adoption of measures in 
the EU requires an analysis of all interests concerned, i.e. the impact of the measures on 
producers, users and consumers. In other words, safeguard action can only be taken 
                                                                                                                                               
4 OJ L 143, 07.06.2018, p. 1. 
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when it is in the EU’s interest to do so. The current EU safeguard instruments are 
covered by the following regulations: 
- Regulation (EU) 2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 March 2015 on common rules for imports (codification),
5
  
- Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 




- Regulation (EU) 2015/936 on common rules for imports of textile products 
from certain third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or 
other arrangements, or by other specific EU import rules (recast). 
The first two regulations are referred to as the "basic safeguard Regulation(s)". 
Anti-subsidy and unfair pricing instrument for airline services 
Regulation No 868/2004 dealing with the effect of subsidisation and unfair pricing for 
air services from third countries was adopted by the EP and the Council in 2004. 
However, the Regulation has never been used in practice. Therefore, following public 
consultations in 2013 and a study the following year, the Commission presented, in June 
2017, a proposal for a new regulation, aiming at addressing, in a more effective way, 
practices affecting competition on air transport market. The Commission proposal is 
now under discussion by the Council and the Parliament as co-legislators.  
2. BASIC CONCEPTS 
2.1. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
2.1.1. What is dumping and what are countervailable subsidies - the material 
conditions for the imposition of duties? 
2.1.1.1. Dumping and subsidies 
Dumping is traditionally defined as selling below cost of production, plus profit. The 
EU’s anti-dumping legislation (mirroring relevant WTO rules) defines anti-dumping as 
selling a product in the EU at a price below its “normal value”. This “normal value” is 
usually the actual sales price on the domestic market of the exporting country. 
Therefore, a country is selling at dumped prices if the prices in its home market are 
higher than its export prices (i.e. price discrimination). This price discrimination can 
have many different causes and is normally only possible if the domestic market of the 
exporting producer is in some way segregated from its overseas market, e.g. by the 
existence of high import duties into the country of origin or non-tariff barriers. As a 
result, exporters are shielded, at least to a certain extent, from international competition 
on their home market and can hence charge higher prices. 
Another case in point is the existence of state-induced distortions of the cost of 
production through the main production factors, i.e. the cost of capital, raw materials, 
labour or energy, or other kinds of intervention into the operation of market forces, such 
as the lack of appropriate enforcement of bankruptcy procedures. These distortions have 
the potential to alter cost and price structures and therefore make it impossible to 
                                                 
5 OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, p.16. 
6 OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p.33. 
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establish in a meaningful manner the normal value on the domestic market and justify 
the use of out-of-country benchmarks to establish the normal value. 
Where sales in the domestic market are not representative, for instance, because they 
have only been made in small quantities, the normal value may then be established on 
another basis, such as the cost of production, plus profit. In the latter case, a company is 
selling at dumped prices if its export prices are below the cost of production, plus profit. 
Subsidies can have similar effects to sales at dumped prices in that they allow exporters 
to operate from a distorted home base. Subsidies involve a direct support from a 
government or a government-directed private body which has the effect of conferring a 
benefit to producers or exporters (e.g. grants, tax and duty exemptions/reductions, 
preferential loans at below commercial rates, export promotion schemes, etc.). This 
allows exporters to sell at low prices in the EU. Only subsidies which are “specific”, i.e. 
targeted at individual companies or certain sectors of the economy, can be subject to 
trade defence measures. 
Both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures are only second-best solutions in the 
absence of internationally agreed and enforced rules that ensure full market integration 
(for instance like in the EU internal market). Indeed, while such measures can re-
establish a level playing field on the EU market, they leave the unfair competition 
unaddressed in the exporter's home country market and third country markets. 
2.1.1.2. Material injury and causation 
For measures to be taken against these unfair trading practices, it is not sufficient that 
companies are exporting their products to the EU at dumped or subsidised prices. 
Measures can only be taken if these exports cause material injury to EU producers. 
Typical indicators of injury are that the dumped and/or subsidised import volumes 
increase over a certain period and import prices undercut the sales prices of the EU 
industry. As a consequence, the latter is forced to decrease production volumes and 
sales prices thus losing market shares, making losses or having to make employees 
redundant. In extreme cases, exporters may try to eliminate viable EU producers by 
using a predatory, below cost, pricing strategy. In any event, the injury analysis requires 
that all relevant factors be taken into account before deciding whether the EU industry is 
in fact suffering “material injury”. 
A further condition for the imposition of measures is the need for “a causal link”: the 
injury must be caused by the dumping or the subsidy. This condition is often fulfilled 
when the injury to the EU industry coincides with the increase in dumped and 
subsidised imports. It is important to note that the dumped or subsidised imports do not 
have to be the only cause of the injury. 
2.1.1.3. EU interest 
Finally, it has to be established whether there are compelling reasons according to 
which measures would be contrary to the overall interest of the EU. In this respect, the 
interests of all relevant economic operators which might be affected by the outcome of 
the investigation must be taken into account. These interests typically include those of 
the EU industry and their suppliers, industrial users, consumers and traders of the 
product concerned and the analysis assesses the positive impact measures will have on 
some operators as opposed to the negative impact on others. Measures should not be 
imposed only if it can be clearly concluded that their negative impact would be 
disproportionate. 
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2.1.2. Procedure 
Investigations are carried out in accordance with the procedural rules laid down in the 
basic Regulations. These rules guarantee a transparent, fair and objective proceeding by 
granting significant procedural rights to interested parties. In addition, the results of an 
investigation are published in the Official Journal of the European Union (hereafter 
“Official Journal”), and the EU is obliged to justify its decisions in this publication. 
Each case is decided on its merits and the Commission does not hesitate to terminate a 
case if the conditions to impose measures are not met. 
Whereas each investigation is different depending on the products and countries 
involved, all cases follow the same procedural rules. However, certain preferential rules 
apply to candidate countries, such as Turkey. The rules relating to a new case (as 
opposed to a review investigation) are summarised below. 
Initiation 
A case normally starts with a sufficiently substantiated complaint from the EU industry 
manufacturing the same or a similar product to the one referred to in the complaint. 
Then, the Commission assesses whether the complaint contains sufficient evidence to 
allow for the initiation of the case. A case is opened by a notice of initiation published 
in the Official Journal. In this notice, all interested parties, including users, exporting 
country authorities in anti-subsidy investigations in particular and, where appropriate, 
consumer organisations are invited to participate and co-operate in the proceedings. 
Detailed questionnaires are sent to producers in the exporting countries, in anti-subsidy 
investigations also to the exporting country authorities, and in the EU to the producers, 
traders (in particular importers) and other interested parties, such as users. These 
questionnaires cover all different conditions to be fulfilled, i.e. dumping/subsidy, injury, 
causation and EU interest. The parties are also informed that they can request a hearing 
and ask for access to the non-confidential files which will help them defend their case. 
The investigation up to the provisional measures 
Following receipt of the replies to the questionnaire, on-spot verifications are carried 
out by Commission officials at the premises of the co-operating parties. 
The main purpose of these visits is to verify whether the information given in the 
questionnaires is reliable. The verified information is subsequently used to calculate or 
determine the dumping margin and the injury factors, in particular the price 
undercutting margin and injury elimination level, as well as for the EU interest analysis. 
The respective calculations and analysis often involve the processing of thousands of 
transactions, the complex examination of production costs and the assessment of the 
economic situation of numerous economic operators. 
The results of the calculations and other findings are summarised in a draft 
implementing act, on the basis of which it is decided whether to impose provisional 
measures, whether to continue the investigation without proposing duties or whether to 
terminate the proceedings. In either eventuality the decision is the Commission's 
responsibility. 
The investigation up to the definitive stage 
Following the publication in the Official Journal of a Commission regulation imposing 
provisional duties, interested parties, which so request, receive a full disclosure which 
allows them to review the Commission’s findings and to submit comments. Comments 
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can also be made at a hearing. Any submissions and comments in reaction to 
provisional disclosure are taken into account in a second, so-called final disclosure.  
After final disclosure, the Commission assesses the comments of interested parties and 
subsequently sends a draft implementing act to Member States. After receiving the 
opinion of the Member States via the Trade Defence Instruments Committee, the 
Commission decides whether or not to adopt definitive measures. At definitive stage, 
Member States can block the adoption of a draft implementing act by qualified majority. 
The Commission may also accept undertakings offered by exporters, which undertake to 
respect minimum prices. In the latter case, no duties are generally imposed on the 
companies from which undertakings are accepted. The Commission regulation imposing 
definitive duties/accepting undertakings, and deciding on the collection of the 
provisional duties, is published in the Official Journal. 
As set out above, throughout the process and at various specific steps, the procedure - 
consisting e.g. of requests for information, hearings, access to the file and disclosure - 
ensures that the rights of defence of interested parties are fully respected in this quasi-
judicial process. In this regard it is important to note that the interested parties can avail 
themselves of a Hearing Officer for trade proceedings. This official, independent from 
the investigating service, can hear the parties, verify that their procedural rights have 
been respected and issue recommendations to the investigating service. 
If one or more of the conditions for imposing measures are not met, the Commission 
will decide to terminate a case without the imposition of measures. The same procedure 
(disclosure, comments, hearing, draft implementing act) as described above applies. The 
termination of the case is made by a Commission Decision after consultation of the 
Member States. 
Timing 
The procedure described above is subject to strict statutory time limits. A decision to 
impose provisional duties must be taken within nine months of the initiation and the 
total duration of an investigation is limited to fifteen months in anti-dumping cases and 
to thirteen months in anti-subsidy cases. This leads to significant time constraints, 
taking into account, inter alia, internal consultations and the necessity to publish 
regulations and decisions in all EU languages at the same time. 
Anti-dumping or countervailing measures will normally remain in force for five years, 
and may consist of duties or undertakings concluded with exporters. Measures are taken 
on a countrywide basis, but individual treatment, i.e. the application of a company-
specific duty, can be granted to exporters which have co-operated throughout the 
investigation. During the five-year period, interested parties may, under certain 
conditions, request a review of measures or the refund of anti-dumping duties paid. 
Measures may also be suspended for a certain period, subject to criteria set out in the 
basic Regulations. 
2.1.3. Review of measures 
The basic Regulations provide for administrative reviews and distinguish between 
interim reviews, newcomer reviews and expiry reviews.  
The expiry review can be initiated at the end of the five year life-time of the measures. 
Initiation of such a review requires a request by the EU industry evidencing that the 
expiry of the measures would lead to the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of 
dumping and injury. Expiry reviews are subject to strict deadlines, i.e. they should 
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normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review, but in all 
cases not later than within 15 months. 
During the five year life-time of measures, the Commission may conduct an interim 
review. In such procedure, the Commission will consider whether the circumstances 
with regard to subsidy/dumping and/or injury have changed significantly or whether 
existing measures are achieving the intended results in removing the injury. The 
deadline for concluding an interim review is set at 12 months, but no later than 15 
months. 
Finally, the basic Regulations provide that a review shall be carried out to determine 
individual margins for new exporters in the exporting country concerned. The deadline 
for conclusion of newcomer reviews is nine months.  
Last but not least, anti-absorption and anti-circumvention investigations need to be 
mentioned here as they are special types of reviews. 
During these reviews, the main procedural rules outlined in chapter 2.1.2 are also 
applicable. However, in reviews there is no provisional stage.  
2.1.4. Judicial reviews 
The procedural rights of the parties, including hearings and access to non-confidential 
files, as well as the substantive rules, are to be respected in the course of the proceeding, 
and a system of judicial review is in place to ensure their correct implementation. The 
competence to review anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases lies with the General Court 
('GC') and the Court of Justice ('CJ') in Luxembourg. Furthermore, WTO members may 
have recourse to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
2.2. Safeguards 
2.2.1. What are safeguard measures? 
Safeguard measures allow temporary protection against the adverse effects of import 
surges. Under the EU legislation
7
 implementing the WTO Safeguards Agreement, they 
can be applied under the following conditions: if, as a result of unforeseen 
developments, a product is being imported into the EU in such increased quantities 
and/or on such terms and conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to 
EU producers of like or directly competitive products. Safeguard measures may only be 
imposed to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the 
injury.  
2.2.2. Procedure 
Investigations are carried out in accordance with the procedural rules laid down in the 
basic safeguard Regulations. These rules guarantee a transparent, fair and objective 
proceeding. In addition, the results of safeguard investigations are published in the 
Official Journal, and the EU is obliged to justify its decisions in this publication. 
Initiation 
One or more Member States should inform the Commission if trends in imports of a 
certain product appear to call for safeguard measures. This information must contain 
evidence available, of the following criteria: a) the volume of imports, b) the price of 
                                                 
7 Regulation (EU) 2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on 
common rules for imports (codification - OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, p.16.) 
 EN 13 EN 
imports, c) trends in certain economic factors of the Union industry such as production, 
capacity utilisation, stocks, sales, market share, prices, profits, employment, etc. Where 
there is a threat of serious injury, the Commission must also examine whether it is 
clearly foreseeable that a particular situation is likely to develop into actual serious 
injury. 
This information is passed on by the Commission to all other Member States. If there is 
sufficient evidence to justify an investigation, the Commission publishes a notice of 
initiation in the Official Journal within one month of receipt of the information and 
commences the investigation, acting in co-operation with the Member States. 
Provisional measures 
Provisional measures may be imposed at any stage of the investigation. They shall be 
applied in critical circumstances where delay would cause damage which would be 
difficult to repair, making immediate action necessary, and where a preliminary 
determination provides clear evidence that increased imports have caused, or are 
threatening to cause, serious injury. 
The duration of the provisional measures can, however, not exceed 200 days (i.e. 
slightly more than six months). 
Definitive measures 
If, at the end of the investigation, the Commission considers that definitive safeguard 
measures are necessary, it will take the necessary decisions no later than nine months 
from the initiation of the investigation, at which stage the results of the investigation are 
published in the Official Journal. In exceptional circumstances, this time limit may be 
extended by a further maximum period of two months. 
Safeguard measures shall be applied only to the extent to prevent or remedy serious 
injury, thereby maintaining as far as possible traditional trade flows. As to the form of 
the measures, the EU will choose the measures most suitable in order to achieve these 
objectives. These measures could consist of quantitative quotas, tariff quotas, duties, 
etc. 
Duration and review of the measures 
The duration of safeguard measures must be limited to the period of time necessary to 
prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustments on the part of the EU 
producers, but should not exceed four years, including the duration of the provisional 
measures, if any. Under certain circumstances, extensions may be necessary but the 
total period of application of safeguard measures should not exceed eight years 
(including provisional measures). 
If the duration of the measures exceeds one year, the measures must be progressively 
liberalised at regular intervals during the period of application. If the duration of the 
measures exceeds three years, the Commission will examine, mid-way through their 
duration, the appropriateness of further liberalisation and necessity for their continued 
application. This will be done either on the Commission's own initiative or at the 
request of a Member State. Where the Commission considers that the application of the 
measure is still necessary, it shall inform the Member States accordingly. Where the 
Commission considers that any surveillance or safeguard measure should be revoked or 
amended, it shall do so after having received the approval of the Member States.  
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3. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY INVESTIGATIONS 
AND MEASURES 
The number of new investigations initiated in 2017 somewhat decreased compared to 
the previous year, with 11 initiations compared to 15. In addition, however, the 
Commission reopened two cases to implement findings following judicial review (see 
"Other reviews"). The number of definitive measures imposed in 2017 increased 
substantially when compared to 2016 (12 as compared to seven). Two provisional 
measures were imposed. In other words, in 2017 an important number of investigations 
have come to a conclusion. Below are details on new investigations and review 
investigations.  
3.1. Measures in place 
At the end of 2017, the EU had 97 definitive anti-dumping measures (which were 
extended
8




The anti-dumping measures covered 67 products and 17 countries (see Annex O); the 
countervailing measures covered 13 products and four countries (see Annex P). The 
large majority of measures was in the form of duties. However, in a number of cases, 
undertakings were in place. 
Of the 97 anti-dumping measures and 29 extensions in force at the end of 2017, the 
main countries affected were China (85), Russia (nine), India (five), Indonesia and USA 
(four each), Republic of Korea (three), Belarus, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Ukraine (two each), Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Japan, South Africa and Turkey (one each).  
Of the 13 anti-subsidy measures and three extensions in place, half concerned imports 
from China (eight) whereas India was subject to five measures, USA to two measures 
and Turkey to one measure.  
Information about the number of measures becomes more meaningful if it is 
complemented by the total trade volume of the products subject to measures. It should 
be noted that in 2017, 0.31%
10
 of total imports into the EU was affected by anti-
dumping or anti-subsidy measures. It should also be noted that the trade volume can 
vary considerably from one measure to another. This is not, however, a criterion which 
is taken into account when assessing cases – all decisions on cases are exclusively based 
on the compliance with substantive and procedural conditions. Although comprehensive 
data are not available, the expiry review investigations show in many cases that the 
imposition of measures leads to a significant reduction of the imports of the product 
concerned. 
3.2. Review investigations 
Anti-dumping measures, including price undertakings, may be subject, under the basic 
anti-dumping Regulation, to five different types of reviews: expiry reviews (Article 
11(2)), interim reviews (Article 11(3)), newcomer investigations (Article 11(4)), 
absorption investigations (Article 12) and anti-circumvention investigations (Article 
13).  
                                                 
8 Measures have been extended to other third countries if circumvention in these countries had been 
found. 
9 The measures are counted per product and country concerned. 
10 Source: Comext. 
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Also anti-subsidy measures may be subject, under the basic anti-subsidy Regulation, to 
five different types of reviews: expiry reviews (Article 18), interim reviews (Article 19), 
absorption investigations (Article 19(3)), accelerated reviews (Article 20) and anti-
circumvention investigations (Article 23). 
These reviews continue to represent a major part of the work of the Commission's TDI 
services. In the period from 2013 to 2017, a total of 135 review investigations were 
initiated. These review investigations represented 64% of all investigations initiated in 
that period.  
In 2017, 28 reviews were initiated. These comprised nine expiry reviews, ten interim 
reviews, six new exporter reviews and three anti-circumvention investigations. 
An overview of the review investigations in 2017 can be found in Annexes F to K. 
Table 1 below provides statistical information for the years 2013 – 2017. 
TABLE 1 
Reviews of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations 
during the period 1 January 2013 - 31 December 2017
11
 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Reviews in progress at the beginning of the period 26 23 18 15 7 
Reviews initiated during the period 36 22 33 16 28 
Reviews in progress during the period 62 45 51 31 35 
Total reviews concluded during the period12 39 27 36 24 29 
Reviews in progress at the end of the period 23 18 15 7 6 
4. OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITIES IN 2017 
4.1. New investigations 
4.1.1. Initiations 
In 2017, nine new anti-dumping investigations and two new anti-subsidy investigations 
were initiated. The anti-dumping investigations involved five different products (most 
of which were related to chemicals and allied sectors) from seven different countries. 
Details of these investigations are given in Annex A. The country most affected by the 
anti-dumping investigations was China, with three investigations. The anti-subsidy 
investigations also concerned China. The most noteworthy cases against imports from 
China were related to transport equipment, with one case on tyres and one case on 
electric bikes. No safeguard investigation was initiated in 2017. 
In the five-year period from 2013 to 2017, 65 new investigations were initiated on 
imports from 19 countries. The sectors concerned by the investigations were: 'iron and 
                                                 
11 The simultaneous initiation of a case concerning several countries but the same product is accounted 
as separate investigation/proceeding per country involved. 
12 Investigations which were conducted and concluded under the specific provisions of the regulation 
imposing the original measures are not counted as there was no publication of the initiation. 
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steel' – 29  investigations, 'chemical and allied industries' – 15  investigations, 'other 
metal products' – five investigations, 'textiles and allied industries' – three 
investigations, the 'mechanical engineering' sector and the 'wood and paper' sector – one 
investigation each, and finally 'other products' – 11  investigations. A breakdown of the 
product sectors is available in Annex B(A). 
The breakdown of the countries concerned by initiations during the period from 2013 to 
2017 include China – 29  investigations, India – six, Russia – five, Turkey – four, Brazil 
and  Korea – three each, Taiwan and Ukraine – two each, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Egypt, Iran, Georgia, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Serbia, USA and 
Vietnam – one each. A table showing all the investigations initiated over the last five 
years broken down by country of export is available at Annex B(B). 
Table 2 below provides statistical information on the developments regarding new 
investigations for the years 2013 – 2017.  
 
TABLE 2 
Evolution of new anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations 
during the period 1 January 2013 - 31 December 2017
13
 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Investigations in progress at the beginning of the 
period 
28 11 20 20 20 
Investigations initiated during the period 9 16 14 15 11 
Investigations in progress during the period 37 27 34 35 31 
Investigations concluded : 























Total investigations concluded during the period 26  7  14  15 14 
Investigations in progress at the end of period 11 20 20 20 17 
Provisional measures imposed during the period 6 2 10 9 2 
 
The list of cases initiated in 2017 can be found below, together with the names of the 
complainants. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal publications 
to which reference is given in Annex A. 
 










                                                 
13 The simultaneous initiation of a case concerning several countries but the same product is accounted 
as separate investigation/proceeding per country involved. 
14 Investigations might be terminated for reasons such as the withdrawal of the complaint, de minimis 
dumping or injury, lack of causal link etc. 





New and retreaded tyres for buses or 
lorries (AD) 
China Coalition against unfair 
tyres imports 










New and retreaded tyres for buses or 
lorries (AS) 
China Coalition against unfair 
tyres imports 




4.1.2. Provisional measures 
In 2017, provisional duties were imposed in two anti-dumping investigations. No 
provisional measures were imposed in anti-subsidy investigations. It has to be noted that 
the latter run often in parallel to anti-dumping investigations, where the provisional anti-
dumping duty already provides some relief to the Union industry. 
The list of cases where provisional measures were imposed during 2017 can be found 
below, together with the measures imposed. More information can be obtained from the 
Official Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex C. 
 
Product Originating from Type
15
 and level of measure  
Corrosion resistant steels China AD 17,2 – 28,5% 
Cast iron articles China AD 25,3 – 42,9% 
 
4.1.3. Definitive measures 
During 2017, definitive duties were imposed in 11 anti-dumping investigations and in 
one anti-subsidy investigation. The list of cases where definitive measures were 
imposed during 2017 can be found below, together with the measure(s) imposed. More 
information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in 
Annex D. 
 
                                                 
15 AD = anti-dumping duty, CVD = countervailing duty, UT = undertaking. 
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Product Originating from Type
16
 and level of measure  
Stainless steel tube and 




China 30,7 – 64,9% 
Taiwan 5,1 – 12,1% 
Heavy plates China AD:  65,1 – 73,7% 
Hot-rolled flat products China AD: 18,1 – 35,9% 
Hot-rolled flat products 
Brazil, Iran, Russia 
and Ukraine 
AD: 
Brazil 53,4 – 65% 
Iran 57,5% 
Russia 17,6 – 96,5% 
Ukraine 60,5% 
Thermal paper Rep. of Korea AD: 104,46 EUR per tonne 
Seamless pipes and tubes 
of iron or steel of an 
external diameter 
exceeding 406,4 mm 
China AD: 29,2 – 54,9% 
Rebars Belarus AD: 10,6% 
Hot-rolled flat products China AS: 4,6 – 35,9% 
 
4.1.4. Details on individual cases with application of new provisional or definitive 
duties 
Hot-rolled flat products from China (AD) 
In February 2016, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation on imports of 
certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy originating in China, 
following a complaint lodged by the European Steel Association (Eurofer) on behalf of 
producers representing more than 90 % of the total Union production of the product 
concerned. In October 2016 the Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on the product. In the further course of 2016, the Commission also initiated the 
following two investigations on the basis of a complaint lodged by Eurofer: 1) an anti-
subsidy investigation on imports of the same product originating in China
17
; 2) an anti-
                                                 
16 AD = anti-dumping duty, CVD = countervailing duty, UT = undertaking. 
17 The anti-subsidy investigation led to the adoption of the Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2017/969 and it amended the Commission Implementing Regulation 2017/649 imposing anti-
dumping measures.  
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dumping investigation on imports of the same product originating in Brazil, Iran, 
Russia, Serbia and Ukraine (see below).  
Dumping 
As no market economy treatment claim was introduced, the normal value for China was 
determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in an analogue country, 
namely the US, in accordance with Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation. The 
Commission then compared the normal value and the export price (adjusted to ensure 
fair comparison). The definitive dumping margins are as follows: a) Bengang Steel 
Plates Co., Ltd: 97,3%; b) Hesteel Group Co., Ltd: 95,5 %; c) Jiangsu Shagang Group: 
106,9 %, d) Other cooperating companies: 100,5 %; e) All other companies: 106,9 %. 
Threat of Injury and causation 
On the basis of the analysis of the relevant economic parameters
18
 the Commission 
concluded that the Union industry was in a weak situation at the end of the investigation 
period but not to the extent that the Union industry has suffered material injury. In these 
circumstances, the Commission then examined whether a threat of material injury was 
present. While the Union industry was recovering during 2014 and the first two quarters 
of 2015, almost all injury indicators started to fall dramatically during the second half of 
2015. This negative trend continued during the first half of 2016. As a result, all factors 
assessed, in particular the significant rate of increase of dumped imports in 2015 at 
further decreasing prices, the huge excess capacity in China and the negative 
developments in profitability of the Union industry pointed to the conclusion that there 
was a threat of a clearly foreseeable and imminent injury to the Union industry at the 
end of the investigation period. 
Regarding the causality analysis, it was found that despite the relatively small market 
share of the Chinese imports, a causal link existed between the Chinese dumped imports 
and the threat of material injury of the Union industry. The Commission distinguished 
and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry 
from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. The other identified factors
19
 were not 
found to break the causal link between the threat of material injury and the Chinese 
dumped imports. 
Union interest and definitive measures 
The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the 
Union interest to adopt measures in this case. The determination of the Union interest 
was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the 
Union industry, importers, and users.  
The Union industry underwent already significant restructuring in the (recent) past. If 
no measures were imposed, the threat of imminent injury at the end of the investigation 
period was likely to materialise. Some Union producers might have to close 
down/reduce their hot-rolled flat steel products activities, dismiss employees and leave 
many Union users with limited sources of supply. 
As regards the interest of unrelated importers and users, the Commission concluded that 
the imposition of measures would have only a limited impact. More specifically, the 
                                                 
18 Among which: the Union consumption, the imports from the country concerned, and the economic 
situation of the Union industry. 
19 The economic crisis, the cost of the raw materials, imports from third countries, and the export sales 
performance of the Union producers. 
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prices, their profitability and the employment in the user's industry would not be 
disproportionately affected. Hence, the imposition of measures at the proposed level 
would only have a limited impact on the prices of the supply chain and the performance 
of users. The level of measures would lead to a level playing field but still allow for 
imports from the country concerned, at fair prices. 
Weighing and balancing the strong interests of an important Union industry to be 
protected against unfair practices, on the one hand, and the limited likely effects of 
measures on unrelated importers and users, which continue to benefit from a wide array 
of supply in the Union, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling 
reasons not to impose measures on imports from China. 
Hot-rolled flat products from Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine (AD) 
In July 2016, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to 
imports into the Union of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other 
alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine, following a complaint 
lodged by the European Steel Association (Eurofer) on behalf of more than 90 % of the 
total Union production of the product concerned. In February 2016, the Commission 
already initiated an anti-dumping investigation on imports of the same product 
originating in China on the basis of a complaint lodged by Eurofer. 
Registration of imports 
The complainant submitted a request for registration of imports of the product 
concerned. Accordingly, on 6 January 2017, the Commission made the imports 
originating in Brazil and Russia (the only countries for which the conditions for 
registration were fulfilled) subject to registration as of 6 January 2017 onwards. 
Dumping 
The normal value was determined on the basis of the sales done on the domestic market 
or when there were no or insufficient sales of a product type of the like product in the 
ordinary course of trade or where a product type was not sold in representative 
quantities on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value in 
accordance with the provisions of the basic Regulation. Then the Commission compared 
the normal value and the export price of the exporting producers on an ex-works basis. 
On this basis the following dumping margins were calculated: a) Brazil: between 16,3% 
and 73%; b) Iran: 17,9%; c) Russia: between 5,3% and 33%; d) Serbia: 38,7%; e) 
Ukraine: 19,4%. 
Injury and causation 
The injurious effect of imports from Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine was examined 
cumulatively for the purposes of the injury determination. By contrast, it was found that 
the Serbian exports to the Union were negligible. In addition, the analysis of the price 
setting, combined with the negligible volume, suggested that the Serbian exporting 
producer is rather a price follower than a price setter for the product concerned. 
Therefore, the Commission concluded that the imports from Serbia should not be 
cumulatively assessed with the imports from the four other countries. In addition and as 
a consequence of the finding that imports from Serbia were negligible, protective 
measures were considered unnecessary. Thus, the proceeding was terminated with 
regard to the imports from Serbia. 
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Regarding the injury analysis related to the remaining four countries concerned (Brazil, 
Iran, Russia and Ukraine), their imports increased significantly during the period 
considered, while the average unit price of the dumped imports decreased by 27%. At 
the same time, the Union industry's economic indicators declined. These developments 
coincided in time with an increase of consumption and increasing dumped imports in 
the Union market, which highlighted the deterioration of the competitive position of the 
Union steel producers. Despite the concrete actions by the Union industry to improve 
efficiency, its economic situation deteriorated significantly: losses increased during the 
investigation period and despite a 5% increase in the Union consumption, the sales 
volumes of the Union industry decreased, its market share went down by more than 8%, 
sales unit prices dropped by more than 20%, and production decreased by 2%. As a 
consequence, also the other injury indicators developed negatively. The Commission 
concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury.  
The Commission then examined whether the injury to the Union industry was caused by 
the dumped imports from Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine and also whether other 
known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission 
ensured that any possible injury caused by other factors was not attributed to the 
dumped imports. It was found that the increasing volumes and the sharp decrease in the 
prices of imports from the countries concerned caused injury to the Union industry. This 
is because, faced with the aggressive pricing strategy of the exporting producers, Union 
producers had no choice but to also decrease prices and to sell at a loss (or otherwise 
lose even more sales) which impacted their profitability. The other factors considered 
by the Commission for the assessment of the causality were: the economic crisis, Union 
producers not being sufficiently competitive, imports from third countries, the export 
sales performance of the Union producers, the "overcapacity" of the European steel 
industry, and the correlation between the prices in the Union market, on the one hand, 
and raw material and the product concerned prices worldwide, on the other hand. The 
Commission concluded that these factors combined or separately could not break the 
causal link between dumped imports and the material injury found to the Union industry 




With regard to the imports from China
21
, the Commission concluded that it is likely that 
the imports from China have contributed to the material injury suffered by the Union 
industry. However, it did not break the causal link between the injury caused to the 
Union industry and the dumped imports of the four other countries because of their 
significant volumes and comparatively low prices. 
Union interest and definitive measures 
The specific circumstances of this case (steep increase of prices of the product 
concerned and a shortage on the market of certain product types) explain the 
Commission's decision to, exceptionally, investigate post-IP developments in the 
context of its assessment of Union interest. 
The most important consumption/uses of the product concerned relate to the following 
segments: the steel tube industry (32 %), construction (20 %), automotive (15 %) and 
mechanical engineering (15%). Given that the profitability of the users in the steel tube 
                                                 
20 The imports from Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine constituted the vast majority of all imports into 
the Union during the investigation period, and their volume increased by 77 % during the period 
considered. 
21 An anti-dumping investigation on the same product was initiated against China in February 2017. 
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businesses was modest during and after the investigation period the Commission 
concluded that there was a considerable risk that duties in the form of ad-valorem duties 
would drive the steel tube sector into losses while the impact on other sectors would be 
less significant. After a careful analysis the Commission considered it in line with the 
Union interest to change the form of the measures to adequately strike the balance 
between the interests of Union producers and users in this particular case. Therefore, the 
Commission decided to impose ad valorem duties, capped by a Minimum Import Price 
(MIP) which takes into account the rise in raw material prices after the investigation 
period. In view of the dumping margins found and the resulting injury, definitive anti-
dumping duties ranging between 17,6% and 96,5% were imposed. The MIP was fixed at 
472,27euro/tonne. The anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into the Union of 
the product concerned originating in Serbia was terminated as these imports were 
considered negligible. 
As all the necessary conditions were not met, the Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2017/5 of 5 January 2017 making imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of 
iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Russia and Brazil subject to 
registration was definitively repealed without the retroactive collection of duties. 
Lightweight thermal paper from the Republic of Korea (AD) 
The investigation was initiated in February 2016 following a complaint lodged by the 
European Thermal Paper Association (ETPA) on behalf of producers representing more 
than 25% of the total Union production of certain lightweight thermal paper (LWTP). In 
November 2016, the Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
originating in the Republic of Korea. 
Dumping 
For one of the exporting producers the normal value was based on its domestic sales 
while for the second one the normal value was calculated on the basis of its cost of 
production as there were product types with no or unrepresentative domestic sales. The 
dumping margin established for the exporting producers was a weighted average of the 
dumping margins established for the sales of different types of rolls. The weighting was 
based on the exporting producer's Union sales volume to related and unrelated 
customers during the investigation period. The definitive weighted average dumping 
margin was 10,3 %. The residual dumping margin was set at the same level. 
Injury and causation 
The Union producers experienced a deterioration of their economic situation that 
coincided in time with the surge of imports from the Republic of Korea. The Union 
industry sales volume on the Union market remained relatively stable, but since this 
occurred in the context of a significant increase in the Union consumption, the Union 
producers' market share was actually declining. The volume of imports from the country 
concerned during the investigation period was well above negligible levels and their 
market share increased from 0,7 % in 2012 to 13,6 % in the investigation period. The 
Commission concluded that over the period considered, the Union industry's injury was 
material. Due to the drop in selling prices, concrete actions to improve efficiency and a 
tight grip on costs could not prevent Union producers from becoming loss-making in the 
investigation period. 
The Commission examined and concluded that the dumped imports from the country 
concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. The effects of all known factors 
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on the situation of the Union industry were distinguished and separated from the 
injurious effects of the dumped imports. The other identified factors such as the export 
performance of Union producers, the anti-dumping duties in the USA, higher costs and 
a series of rationalisation processes were carefully analysed. The Commission 
concluded that the material injury to the Union industry was caused by the dumped 
imports from the country concerned and the other factors considered individually or 
collectively, did not break the causal link. 
Union interest and definitive measures 
The Government of Korea claimed that measures are not in the Union interest on the 
grounds that many European converters and importers expressed their objections at the 
hearing in September 2016 to imposition of measures. However, the investigation did 
not find that there is a majority of converters and importers in the Union against 
measures. Hansol Group (an exporting producer) claimed that the Union downstream 
industries are almost unanimously against the imposition of measures and that at least 
36 unrelated converters and end-users expressed their strong opposition. The claim was 
rejected as many Union downstream industries remained silent during the investigation 
and no downstream industry made any representation following provisional or definitive 
disclosure. The investigation also revealed that in terms of purchase volume of the 
product concerned the converters that came forward and expressed to be in favour of 
measures represented a larger consumption of the product concerned than the ones that 
did not express views or were opposing the measures. The Hansol Group claimed also 
that the measures are against the interest of European businesses because the Union 
market can be defined as a "duopoly/oligopoly" and competition should be promoted. 
The claim was rejected as the mere existence of a few producers in the Union is 
irrelevant, there is no evidence on file of any anti-competitive practices and there are 
several sources of supply inside and outside the Union. 
Therefore, after analysis of the different interests at stake, the Commission concluded 
that the impact of anti-dumping duties on the parties opposing measures did not 
outweigh the positive effect of measures to the Union industry. Hence, there were no 
compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports 
of the concerned product originating in the Republic of Korea. 
The Commission concluded that it would be more appropriate that the anti-dumping 
duty should be imposed as a fixed amount per tonne instead of an ad valorem duty as 
provisionally imposed. The definitive fixed anti-dumping duty was 104,46 euro per 
tonne.  
Rebars from Belarus (AD) 
In March 2016, the Commission initiated an investigation following a complaint lodged 
by the European Steel Association (EUROFER) on behalf of producers representing 
more than 25 % of the total Union production of rebars. In December 2016, the 
Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain concrete 
reinforcement bars and rods originating in the Republic of Belarus 
Sampling 
It was considered necessary to sample Union producers and unrelated importers. The 
first sample consisted of five Union producers accounting for 22,4 % of the total Union 
production of the product concerned. The sampled companies are located in France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain, covering a broad geographic variety. With regard to 
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unrelated importers, a sample of three operators was selected on the basis of the largest 
volume of imports into the Union representing 80 % of the unrelated imports of the 
product concerned originating in Belarus. 
Dumping 
According to Article 2(7)(a) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, Belarus is not 
considered as a market-economy country. Therefore, the normal value in respect of 
Belarusian exports to the Union was determined on the basis of data obtained from a 
producer in a market-economy third country. The Commission concluded that the USA 
is an appropriate analogue country for this investigation. The only known Belarusian 
manufacturer cooperated with the investigation and replied to the questionnaire. 
The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the exporting 
producer on an ex-works basis. The resulting level of definitive dumping margin is 
58,4%.  
Injury and causation 
Import volumes from Belarus almost tripled over the investigation period for injury and 
their market share increased from 1,8 % in 2012 to 5 % in 2015. During the 
investigation period the prices of imports from Belarus were lower than prices of the 
Union producers and average prices of imports from any of the other major third 
countries present on the Union market. 
The Commission considered that the data of one of the sampled Union producers is not 
reliable for the purpose of the injury analysis as a result of price-fixing (the product 
concerned was subject to an antitrust investigation on the Italian market). As a result, 
the Commission excluded the data pertaining to the Italian market from its 
investigation. 
The investigation showed that the Union industry did not benefit from the increase in 
consumption, but to the contrary, suffered a drop in its sales volumes and market share. 
At the same time the volume of Belarusian imports and their market share increased 
rapidly. The Union production volume also decreased. The costs of the Union industry 
decreased by 20% which however was less than the decrease in prices during the same 
period. As a result, over the period considered profitability of the Union industry 
deteriorated. These trends correlate with the highest volumes of the imports from 
Belarus and its lowest price level. On this basis it was concluded that the Union industry 
suffered material injury caused by the dumped imports from Belarus within the meaning 
of the basic Regulation.  
The Commission has found that the only other factor that may have had an impact on 
the situation of the Union industry was imports from third countries. However, the 
Commission concluded that those imports could not break the causal link between 
Belarusian dumped imports and the material injury found to the Union industry because 
the individual market shares of the other third countries increased only marginally with 
the exception of Ukraine where the increase in market share was substantial in relative 
terms but in absolute terms remained negligible. In addition, the prices of imports from 
third countries other than Belarus were on average always higher than the prices of the 
Union industry. The only exporting country with lower average prices than the Union 
industry was Belarus. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports 
from Belarus remained the main cause of injury. 
Union interest and definitive measures 
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The Commission concluded that there are no compelling reasons against the imposition 
of measures on imports of the product concerned from Belarus. Any potential negative 
effects on the unrelated users and importers are mitigated by the availability of 
alternative sources of supply. When considering the overall impact of the anti-dumping 
measures on the Union market, the positive effects, in particular on the Union industry, 
appeared to outweigh the potential negative impacts on the other interest groups. 
Therefore, a definitive anti-dumping duty of 10,6% was imposed.  
Hot-rolled flat products from China (AS) 
In May 2016, the Commission initiated an anti-subsidy investigation with regard to 
imports into the Union of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other 
alloy steel originating in the China. The Commission initiated the investigation 
following a complaint lodged by the European Steel Association (Eurofer) on behalf of 
Union producers representing more than 90 % of the total Union production. In 
February 2016 the Commission had already initiated an anti-dumping investigation on 
imports of the same product originating in China (the parallel anti-dumping 
investigation) and in April 2017 a definitive anti-dumping duty was imposed. In July 
2016, the Commission also initiated, an anti-dumping investigation on imports of the 
same product originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine.  
Sampling 
The final sample of Union producers consisted of six operators located in five different 
Member States. It accounted for over 45 % of Union production. The Commission 
selected a sample of four groups of exporting producers on the basis of the largest 
representative volume of exports to the Union, which could reasonably be investigated 
within the time available. The sampled companies represented 68% of the total imports 
of the product concerned to the Union. 
Subsidisation 
The following subsidies and subsidy programmes were investigated: 1) Preferential 
policy loans, credit lines, other financing, and guarantees; 2) De facto guarantee on the 
continuity of operations for companies in the hot rolled flat steel industry that face 
difficulties to repay loans; 3) Grant Programmes; 4) Direct Tax Exemption and 
Reduction programmes; 5) Indirect Tax and Import Tariff Programmes; 6) Government 
provision of goods and services for less than adequate remuneration; 7) "Foreign Trade 
Transformation and Upgrading Demonstration Bases" and "Common Service 
Platforms"; 8) Subsidisation of the provision of hot-rolled flat products to the EU during 
the investigation period. Given the partial non-cooperation from the Government of 
China and the sampled exporting producers the Commission had to use the best facts 
available in relation to Government preferential lending and grants. 
The investigation showed that the following subsidies and subsidy programmes were 
countervailable subsidies: 1) preferential lending: all sampled exporting producers 
benefited from it during the investigation period; 2) land provision and acquisition in 
China: the situation is non-transparent and the prices are arbitrarily set by the 
authorities. There is no functioning market for land and the use of an external 
benchmark demonstrates that the amount paid for land-use rights by the sampled 
exporting producers was well below the normal market rate; 3) Enterprise Income Tax 
(EIT) privileges: allows companies to deduct the income earned from manufacturing 
from its taxable income; 4) EIT offset for research and development expenses: entitles 
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companies to preferential tax treatment for their R&D activities in certain high 
technology priority areas determined by the State and when certain thresholds for R&D 
spending are met; 5) Land use tax: two of the sampled companies benefited from 
rebates or exemptions, even though they did not fall under any of the exempted 
categories; 6) VAT exemptions and import tariff rebates: equipment imported in order 
to develop domestic or foreign investment projects in line with the policy of 
encouraging foreign or domestic investment projects may be exempted from payment of 
the VAT and/or import duty. Some of the sampled companies were found to benefit 
from these exemptions; 7) Tax exemption for policy-based relocation: some sampled 
companies benefited from this scheme as they relocated for environmental reasons; 8) 
Grant programmes: some of the sampled companies were found to benefit from energy 
saving and conservation programmes and from grants related to technological upgrading 
or transformation.  
Threat of injury and causation 
A detailed description of the situation in terms of threat of injury and causation could be 
found above, under the section dealing with the anti-dumping investigation into hot-
rolled flat products from China. 
Union interest and definitive measures 
Weighing and balancing the strong interests of an important Union industry to be 
protected against unfair practices, on the one hand, and the limited likely effects of 
measures on unrelated importers and users, which continue to benefit from a wide array 
of supply in the Union, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling 
reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on subsidised imports 
of the product concerned. 
The definitive countervailing duty rates ranged between 4,6% and 35,9%. As the anti-
subsidy investigation was carried out in parallel with an anti-dumping investigation and 
in view of the use of the lesser duty rule, the Commission amended the definitive anti-
dumping duty up to the relevant injury elimination level
22
.  
4.1.5. Investigations terminated without measures 
In accordance with the provisions of the respective basic Regulations, investigations 
may be terminated without the imposition of measures if a complaint is withdrawn or if 
measures are unnecessary (i.e. no dumping/no subsidies, no injury resulting from 
dumped or subsidised imports, measures not in the interest of the Union). In 2017, two 
new proceedings (both were anti-dumping investigations) were terminated without 
measures, as compared to eight in 2016. 
The list of cases which were terminated without the imposition of measures during 2017 
can be found in the following table. More information can be obtained from the Official 
Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex E. 
 
                                                 
22 The Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 was amended by the Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969. 
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Product (type of investigation
23
) Originating from Main reason for termination 
Purified terephthalic acid (AD) Rep. of Korea Dumping margin below 2% 
Hot-rolled flat products (AD) Serbia Lack of material injury 
 
4.1.6. Details on some individual cases of termination without measures 
Hot-rolled flat products from Serbia (AD) 
Regulation 2017/1795 has already been discussed above under chapter 4.1.4. 
4.2. Review investigations 
4.2.1. Expiry reviews 
Article 11(2) and Article 18 respectively of the basic Regulations provide for the expiry 
of measures after five years, unless an expiry review demonstrates that they should be 
maintained in their original form. 
In 2017, five anti-dumping measures (and no anti-subsidy measure) expired 
automatically. The references for these measures are available in Annex N. 
Since the expiry provision of the basic Regulations came into force in 1985, a total of 
508 measures have expired automatically. 
4.2.1.1. Initiations 
During 2017, nine expiry reviews of anti-dumping measures in place were initiated 
(none concerning anti-subsidy measures). The list of the expiry reviews initiated in 
2017 can be found in the following table, together with the name of the complainant. It 
should be noted that some expiry reviews may be carried out in parallel with interim 
reviews. Where there are interim reviews and expiry reviews ongoing at the same time, 
these are indicated by an asterisk in the table below. More information can be obtained 
from the Official Journal to which reference is available in Annex F.  
Product (type of investigation – AD 
or AS) 
Originating from Complainant 
Steel ropes and cables China 
Liaison Committee of E.U. 
Wire Rope Industries 
Oxalic acid China, India Oxaquim S.A. 
Tartaric acid China 
Distillerie Bonollo S.r.l., 
Caviro Distillerie S.r.l., 
Industria Chimica Valenzana 
S.p.a., Alvinesa Alcoholera 
Vinicola SA, and Comercial 
Quimica Sarasa SL 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or 
steel 
Russia 
Defence Committee of the 
Seamless Steel Tubes 
                                                 
23 AD = anti-dumping investigation; AS = anti-subsidy investigation, AD + AS = parallel anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy investigation. 
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Industry of the European 
Union 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or 
steel 
Ukraine 
Defence Committee of the 
Seamless Steel Tubes 
Industry of the European 
Union 
Lever arch mechanisms China 
Lever Arch Mechanism 
Manufacturers Association 
Aluminium Radiators China 
Association of Aluminium 
Radiator Manufacturers 
Limited Liability Consortium 
Chamois leather China UK Leather Federation 
 
4.2.1.2. Expiry reviews concluded with confirmation of duties 
During 2017, 19 expiry reviews were concluded with confirmation of the duties for a 
further period of five years.  
The list of the measures which were renewed during 2017, together with the results of 
the investigations, can be found below. More information can be obtained from the 
Official Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex F. 
Product Originating 
from 
Result of the investigation/ Type
24
 and level of 
measure 
Sodium gluconate China 
Confirmation of duty (AD). 
Individual duty rates: 5,6 – 27,1% 
Residual: 53,2% 
Aluminium road wheels China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Duty rate: 22,3% 
High tenacity yarn of 
polyester 
China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rates: 5,1 – 9,8% 
Residual: 9,8% 
Solar panels (crystalline 
silicon photovoltaic 
modules and key 
components) 
China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rates: 27,3 – 64,9% 
Residual: 53,4% 
Confirmation of duty (AS) 





Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rate: 9,4% 
Residual: 8,5% 
Confirmation of duty (AS) 
Individual duty rates: 6,3 – 7% 
Residual: 7,2% 
Okoume plywood China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rates: 6,5 – 23,5% 
                                                 
24 AD = anti-dumping duty, CVD = countervailing duty, UT = undertaking. 
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Residual: 66,7% 
Filament glass fibre 
products 
China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rates: 14,5 – 19,9% 
Residual: 19,9% 
Tungsten carbide China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Duty rate: 33% 
Stainless steel bars and 
rods 
India 
Confirmation of duty (AS) 
Individual duty rates: 3,3 – 4% 
Residual: 4% 
Melamine China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rate: 1 153 EUR per tonne 
Residual: 415 EUR per tonne 
Coated fine paper China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rates: 8 – 35,1% 
Residual: 27,1% 
Confirmation of duty (AS) 
Individual duty rates: 4 – 12% 
Residual: 12% 
Barium carbonate China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rates: 6,3 – 8,1% 
Residual: 56,4% 
Open mesh fabrics of 
glass fibres 
China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rates: 48,4 – 62,9% 
Residual: 62,9% 
Ceramic tiles China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rates: 13,9 – 36,5% 
Residual: 69,7% 
Hand pallet trucks and 
their essential parts 
China 
Confirmation of duty (AD) 





Confirmation of duty (AD) 
Individual duty rates: 3,2 – 40,5% 
Residual: 42,6% 
 
4.2.1.3. Details on some individual cases concluded by confirmation of duty  
Aluminium road wheels from China (AD) 
Following an anti-dumping investigation (the original investigation), the Council 
imposed, by means of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 964/2010
25
 a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium wheels originating in China. In October 
2015, the Commission initiated an expiry review of the measures imposed. The request 
was lodged by Association of European Wheels Manufacturers (EUWA) on behalf of 
producers representing more than 25 % of the total Union production. 
Sampling 
                                                 
25 The measures took the form of an ad valorem duty established at 22,3%. 
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The Commission selected a sample of four groups of exporting producers on the basis 
of the largest declared production and sales volume which cover around 40% of the total 
Chinese exports to the Union. With regard to Union producers, the Commission selected 
a sample of seven operators on the basis of the largest representative volume of sales 
and production, taking also into account the geographical spread. The sample accounted 
for over 30 % of total Union production. 
Dumping and continuation of dumping 
As no market economy treatment claim was introduced, the normal value for China was 
determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in an analogue country, 
namely Turkey
26
, in accordance with Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation. Turkey has 
the second largest production volume of aluminium wheels among the potential 
analogue countries identified by the Commission (Turkey, Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan, 
Korea and Malaysia) and has a satisfactory level of competition on its domestic market.  
Two Turkish exporting producers offered cooperation. 
The Commission found dumping margins ranging between 8,9% and 25,9%. 
The Commission further analysed whether there was a likelihood of continuation of 
dumping should the measures lapse. All four sampled Chinese exporting producers were 
found to be dumping during the review investigation period. Moreover, given the 
significant spare capacities
27
 found in China as well as the attractiveness of the Union 
market compared to some of the third markets and the domestic market it was 
considered likely that Chinese exporting producers would (re)enter the Union market 
with significant quantities of aluminium wheels at dumped prices in case the measures 
would be allowed to lapse. 
Injury and likelihood of recurrence of injury 
In a context of an increasing consumption, the Union industry was able to recover from 
the past dumping thanks to the anti-dumping measures in place. During the 
investigation almost all injury indicators showed a positive trend. The Union industry 
increased its sales volumes, production volumes, sales prices and improved its 
profitability. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the Union industry did not 
suffer material injury during the investigation period. Therefore it was assessed whether 
there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury should the measures against China 
be allowed to lapse. 
The Chinese prices to the other third country markets were on average around 30% 
lower than the Union industry prices in the Union market. As mentioned above, there 
are large spare capacities in China of the product concerned which cannot be absorbed 
by the Chinese domestic market. Trade defence measures for Chinese aluminium wheel 
imports had already been imposed in other important markets (Australia, India). 
Therefore, the Union market without measures would be an attractive target of Chinese 
exports because it would yield high profits due to higher prices than elsewhere 
combined with possible large sales volumes. In short, the incentive to re-direct these 
exports to the Union market should measures be repealed was high. On this basis the 
Commission concluded that the repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a 
recurrence of injury to the Union. 
                                                 
26 In the original investigation Turkey was also used as analogue country. 
27  The Global China Automotive Wheel Industry Report 2012/2013 estimated the total aluminium 
wheel capacity available in China at 180 million units with sales of only 120 million units, giving 
spare capacity of 60 million wheels at the end of 2012. 
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Union interest and definitive measures 
With regard to the interest of importers, the investigation showed that countries other 
than China delivered aluminium wheels to the Union market and it was considered that 
there were no indications that maintaining the measures would have a significant 
negative impact on the importers. After careful analysis, it was also concluded that 
maintaining the measures would not have any significant negative impact on the 
situation of users. As a consequence, the Commission concluded that there were no 
compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to maintain measures on imports 
of aluminium wheels originating in China. 
Therefore, the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain aluminium 
wheels originating in China, imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 964/2010 
were maintained. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, 
free-at-Union-frontier price before duty, remained at 22,3%. 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components) from 
China (AD)  
Following an anti-dumping investigation (the original investigation), the Council 
imposed in December 2013 by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1238/2013 a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and 
key components (i.e. cells) originating in or consigned from China. The measures took 
the form of an ad valorem duty ranging between 27,3 % and 64,9 %. In December 2015, 
the Commission initiated an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures requested by 
EU ProSun on behalf of Union producers representing more than 25 % of the total 
Union production. The request was ultimately supported by Union producers whose 
collective output constituted more than 50 % of the total production. At the same time, 
the Commission initiated ex officio a partial interim review limited to the examination 
of whether or not it is in the Union interest to maintain measures currently in force on 
cells of the type used in crystalline silicon photovoltaic module or panels. 
Sampling 
A sample of eight Union producers was selected, accounting for 38,8% of the total EU 
sales and 55% of total Union production of modules and for 76,6% of the total EU sales 
volume and 77% of the total Union production of cells. The identity and location of 
some sampled producers were not revealed for reason of confidentiality. With regard to 
exporting producers, the Commission selected a sample of three groups on the basis of 
the largest representative volume of exports to the Union. One interested party argued 
that the sample of the exporting producers is inappropriate as it differs significantly 
from the sample of Union producers in terms of the sampled companies' production and 
production capacity. According to Article 17 of the basic Regulation, the sample used is 
to be statistically valid on the basis of information available at the time of the selection, 
or include the largest representative volume of production, sales or exports which can 
reasonably be investigated within the time available. Therefore, the sample of exporting 
producers is to be representative of the exporting producers and not of their Union 
counterparts. As confirmed by the jurisprudence of the CJ, the sample of exporting 
producers does not have to mirror that of Union producers. 
Dumping and likelihood of continuation of dumping 
As no market economy treatment claim was introduced, the normal value for China was 
determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in an analogue country. The 
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Commission compared the normal value with the average export price for the sampled 
exporting producers and the dumping margin so established ranged from 23,5 % to 
31,5%. In light of the estimated significant spare capacity in China, combined with the 
attractiveness of the Union market in terms of size and sales price, in particular with 
regard to the price level of the Chinese exports to third countries, and the records of past 
circumvention practices, the Commission concluded that there is a strong likelihood that 
the repeal of the anti-dumping measures would result in continuation of dumping. 
Injury and likelihood of continuation of injury 
In overall terms, the Union industry continued to suffer from injury during the 
investigation period given the short period after the imposition of the original measures 
and the magnitude of dumping and the level of injury found in the previous 
investigation. In addition, the circumvention practices found have also contributed to 
the continuation of injury. However, from mid-2013 (the provisional measures entered 
into force on 6 June 2013), and especially during 2014 (the first full year with anti-
dumping measures in force) and during the investigation period the Union industry 
started gradually to recover from the past dumping by the Chinese exporters. However, 
this recovery was only partial, despite the efforts made and all the positive trends that 
resulted therefrom. 
The Commission found that there was significant spare capacity in China for both 
modules and cells, that the Union market remains attractive in terms of size and sales 
price, particularly in comparison with the price level of the Chinese exports to third 
countries, further proven by the records of past circumvention practices. Consequently, 
the Commission found that there was a strong likelihood that the repeal of the anti-
dumping measures would lead to the continuation of dumping resulting in the 
continuation of injury of the Union industry. 
Causation 
Several interested parties claimed that the injury suffered by the Union industry was 
caused by several other factors: 1) the abolition of the incentive schemes by many of the 
Member States, 2) the fact that the Union industry has not achieved yet economies of 
scale in order to be economically viable and to have an impact on the global market, 3) 
the injury is caused by imports from other countries as their prices were 25 % lower 
than the Chinese import prices, 4) the injury is caused by the fact that the prices of 
modules of the Union producers are constantly lower than the import prices of the 
Chinese producers.  
The Commission established that these claims were factually incorrect or 
unsubstantiated and these factors did not break the causal link between the injury and 
the Chinese imports. 
Union interest  
Weighing and balancing the competing interests, the Commission analysed whether the 
negative effect on unrelated importers, upstream and downstream industries and other 
effects would be disproportionate when compared to the positive effect on the Union 
manufactures of the product under review. The key consideration was to assess the 
likely impact of continued measures on the future of Union demand for solar modules. 
If the measures would significantly curb demand, it could be argued that protecting a 
relatively small Union industry might disproportionally affect significantly larger 
downstream and upstream industries. However, it was concluded that the measures had 
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only a limited impact on the Union demand for solar modules. The Commission 
considered, on the basis of the evidence available, that when balancing the likely 
negative effects on the upstream and downstream industry as well as the consumers 
against the benefits which Union industry would derive from the measures, a 
prolongation of the measures to 18 months constituted an appropriate resolution 
between the competing interests. Overall, the Commission concluded that there are no 
compelling reasons to terminate the measures on Union interest grounds. 
Definitive measures  
In view of the conclusions reached with regard to the likelihood of continuation of 
dumping and continuation of injury, it was concluded that the measures in force should 
be maintained.  
In view of the conclusions reached that there are no compelling reasons to terminate the 
measures on cells on Union interest grounds, the partial interim review initiated 
pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation was terminated. 
As the measures may have more impact on the demand in the future, once the transition 
of renewable support policies will be completed, the fiscal situation of self-consumption 
clarified and grid parity will be achieved across wider parts of Europe. This justified 
that the measures were exceptionally prolonged for 18 months only. 
Partial interim review regarding to maintaining cells in the product scope 
On the date of initiation of the present expiry review, the Commission initiated ex 
officio a partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation limited 
to the examination of whether or not it is in the Union interest to maintain measures 
currently in force on cells of the type used in crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules or 
panels.  
The review was opened as there was prima facie evidence that the circumstances on the 
basis of which the original measures were imposed had changed. The interests of the 
cell manufacturers, importers, and downstream industry were analysed. The 
Commission concluded that there are no compelling reasons to terminate the measures 
on cells on Union interest grounds. In particular, it found that the measures were 
effective in retaining and to some extent restoring cell production in the Union. 
Partial interim review regarding the form and the adjustment of the evel of measures 
During this investigation it was concluded that it is also appropriate to open an ex 
officio interim review on the form of the measure and the adjustment mechanism 
associated with it. 
In March 2017, the Commission initiated an interim review
28
 in order to examine 
whether the level of the measures should be gradually decreased. 
The original form of the measures was an ad valorem anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty. A price undertaking was offered by a group of cooperating exporting producers 
and accepted by the Commission. One of the core elements of the undertaking was a 
MIP which is subject to a quarterly adjustment mechanism. Under the price undertaking 
accepted by the Commission, the MIP for the modules and cells was adjusted quarterly 
by reference to international spot prices of modules including Chinese prices as reported 
by the Bloomberg database. 
                                                 
28 Commission Implementing Regulation 2017/1570, OJ L238, 16 September 2017, p.22. 
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However, when reviewing the interests of unrelated importers and non-vertically 
integrated Union module manufactures in the expiry review investigation, the 
Commission received complaints about the heavy administrative burden put on them, 
while the Union producers complained about ongoing circumvention. The Commission 
accepted these points and considered that a variable duty in the form of a MIP (‘variable 
duty MIP’) is a more appropriate form of measures than the previous ad valorem duty 
coupled with the price undertaking (‘undertaking MIP). The variable duty MIP means 
that eligible imports with a declared value at, or above, the MIP would not be subject to 
duties and customs authorities will levy duties immediately if the product is imported at 
a price below the MIP. 
Graphite electrode systems from India (AD) 
The Council, following an anti-dumping investigation, by Regulation (EC) No 
1629/2004, imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain graphite 
electrodes systems originating in India. In December 2015, the Commission initiated an 
expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to these imports. The request 
was lodged by SGL Carbon GmbH, TOKAI Erftcarbon GmbH and GrafTech 
Switzerland SA representing more than 25 % of the total Union production. 
Sampling 
The Commission selected a sample of four Union producers on the basis of the largest 
representative volume of sales which could reasonably be investigated within the time 
available, considering also the geographical location. The sampled Union producers 
accounted for more than 80 % of the total Union production.  
Dumping and likelihood of continuation of dumping 
The expiry review investigation showed that (i) Indian imports continued to enter the 
Union market at significant dumped prices and in significant quantities; (ii) both
29
 
Indian producers are export-oriented and have spare capacity which could be used to 
increase export volumes to the Union at dumped prices; (iii) consumption worldwide is 
following a decreasing trend, thus reducing the possibilities of Indian exporters to other 
third markets; (iv) the introduction of anti-dumping measures in Russia against Indian 
graphite electrode systems further restricts the export possibilities. As a consequence, it 
was concluded that there is a likelihood of continuation of dumping should the measures 
be repealed. 
Injury and likelihood of recurrence of injury 
The investigation showed that despite the measures in force most of the injury 
indicators developed negatively and the economic and financial situation of the Union 
industry deteriorated. While these negative developments may in part be explained by 
the decrease in consumption, Indian imports were still strongly present on the Union 
market at prices
30
 lower than the Union industry's prices. The Commission concluded 
that the Union industry was in an extremely fragile situation.  
To establish the likelihood of recurrence of injury, the following elements were 
analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in India, the exports from India to 
other third countries and the attractiveness of the Union market. The Indian spare 
                                                 
29 There are only two exporting producers of the product concerned in India. Only one of them 
cooperated with the expiry review investigation.  
30 Prices do not include anti-dumping/countervailing duties. 
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capacity was estimated to be between 29% and 36% of the Union consumption. The 
access to Russia (the third main export market) for Indian exporting producers was 
restricted via the imposition of anti-dumping measures. The attractiveness of the Union 
market was demonstrated by the fact that despite the anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties in force, Indian graphite electrode systems continued to enter the Union market. 
Therefore, should measures in the Union be repealed it is indeed likely that a large part 
of the available spare capacity will be used for export to the Union market. This would 
further deteriorate the economic situation of the Union industry. Based on the above, the 
Commission concluded that that there is a strong likelihood of recurrence of injury 
caused by dumped imports from India should the measures be repealed.  
Union interest and definitive measures 
The Commission analysis showed that the Union industry would be likely to experience 
a deterioration of its situation in case the measures were allowed to lapse. Therefore, it 
was concluded that the continuation of the measures would benefit the Union industry. 
As no importers cooperated or made themselves known in the current investigation, 
there were no indications that maintaining measures would have a negative impact on 
the importers outweighing the positive impact of the measures. The users did not submit 
any information showing that there have been difficulties in finding the necessary 
supply and none of them put forward any argument against maintaining of the measures. 
On this basis the Commission concluded that there are no compelling reasons of Union 
interest against the extension of the current anti-dumping measures. 
A definitive anti-dumping duty (between 0% and 9,4%) was hereby imposed on imports 
of graphite electrodes imported from India. 
Filament glass fibre products from China (AD) 
In 2011, by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 248/2011, the Council imposed 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain continuous filament glass fibre 
products originating in China. In March 2016 the Commission initiated an expiry 
review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to these imports. The request was 
lodged by the European Glass Fibre Producers Association (‘APFE’) on behalf of 
producers representing more than 25 % of the total Union production.  
Sampling 
The Commission sampled three exporting producers, based on the largest volume of 
exports. The Commission also sampled three company groups of Union producers 
representing around 74% of the total sales on the Union market. A sample of three 
importers was selected on the basis of the largest volume of imports into the Union. 
Dumping 
The Commission examined whether dumping was currently taking place and whether 
dumping was likely to continue or recur upon a possible expiry of the measures. As no 
market economy treatment claim was introduced and according to Article 2(7)(a) of the 
basic Regulation, normal value was determined on the basis of the price or constructed 
value in a market economy third country. For this purpose, the Commission selected 
Japan. The Commission did not receive a reply to the questionnaire from any of the 
sampled exporting producers in China. As a consequence of non-cooperation, pursuant 
to Article 18(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission established the export price on 
Eurostat imports statistics (COMEXT) and compared it with the normal value 
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established in Japan. On this basis, the Commission found a dumping margin of above 
70%.  
The excess capacity in China during the review investigation period was estimated at 
around 150 thousand metric tonnes (more than 15 % of the total Union consumption). 
The level of prices on the Union market and its importance for exports from China 
allowed the Commission to conclude that the Union market is attractive for the Chinese 
producers. In addition, India and Turkey extended their anti-dumping duties on imports 
of glass fibre from China. The Commission considered the existence of anti-dumping 
measures in other third countries to be an additional indication of dumping practices by 
the Chinese exporting producers.  
On this basis, the Commission concluded that the Chinese dumped exports would 
resume in larger volumes and exercise increased price pressure on the Union market 
should the current measures be repealed, i.e. that there was a likelihood of a 
continuation of dumping should measures be repealed. 
Injury and likelihood of recurrence of injury 
The investigation established a dumping margin of more than 70%. The Union industry 
started to benefit more fully from the anti-dumping measures since they were increased 
in 2014
31
. As a result of the measures
32
, Chinese imports stabilised and enabled the 
Union industry to maintain its market share. However, prices of the Union industry 
remained low. On this basis the Commission concluded that the Union industry, 
following the increase of measures in 2014 partially recovered from the injury caused 
by the past dumping and did not suffer material injury in the review investigation 
period. However, its situation remained vulnerable and is characterised by a persistence 
of depressed prices, volatile costs of production and high capital requirements. On this 
basis, should the anti-dumping measures be repealed and countervailing duty remains at 
a level which already proved ineffective to restrict the arrival of large quantities of 
imports at undercutting prices, the Commission concluded that there is a likelihood of 
recurrence of injury. 
Union interest and definitive measures 
The Commission examined the different interests at stake and concluded that it is in the 
interest of the Union industry to maintain the measures. The importers and traders have 
access to a large number of supply sources inside and outside the Union. The 
Commission's analysis also showed that the renewal of the measures would only have a 
limited impact on the situation of the users. The Commission concluded that on balance, 
no compelling reasons existed against the continuation of the current anti-dumping 
measures. Therefore the anti-dumping measures were maintained. 
Coated fine paper originating from China (AD) 
In 2011, following an anti-dumping investigation (the original investigation), by 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 451/2011, the Council imposed a definitive anti-
                                                 
31 By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1379/2014, following an anti-subsidy 
investigation and a partial interim review of the anti-dumping measures, the Commission amended 
the original anti-dumping duty to values ranging between 0% to 19,9 % and imposed an additional 
countervailing duty ranging between 4,9 % to 10,3 %. 
32 The measures in place are: anti-dumping duties (Council Implementing Regulation No 248/2011) 
and countervailing duties (Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1379/2014). The 
resulting combined countervailing and anti-dumping measures range between 4,9% and 30,2%. 
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dumping duty on imports of certain coated fine paper originating in China. In May 
2016, the Commission initiated an expiry review of these measures. The request was 
lodged by five Union producers (Arctic Paper Grycksbo AB, Burgo Group SpA, 
Fedrigoni SpA, Lecta Group and Sappi Europe SA), representing more than 25 % of the 
total Union production of coated fine paper. 
Sampling 
There was no cooperation from the exporting Chinese producers. With regard to the 
Union producers the Commission selected three operators (with the biggest volume of 
sales and production), accounting for over 30 % of the total Union production. 
Dumping and likelihood of recurrence of dumping 
The Commission examined whether dumping was currently taking place and whether or 
not the expiry of the existing measures would be likely to lead to a continuation or 
recurrence of dumping. As no Chinese exporting producer cooperated in the 
investigation, the Commission resorted to the use of facts available. For the 
investigation period, the data showed that only negligible volumes were imported into 
the Union from China. The Commission concluded that these quantities were not 
representative as they represented less than 1% of the total imports of the product 
concerned. Therefore no meaningful analysis of dumping based on the Chinese imports 
to the Union during the investigation period could be made. The investigation focused 
on the likelihood of a recurrence of dumping.  
As no market economy treatment claim was introduced, normal value was determined, 
in accordance with the basic Regulation, on the basis of the price or constructed value in 
a market economy third country. The USA was selected for this purpose. In the absence 
of any cooperation from the Chinese exporting producers, the export price was based on 
facts available in accordance with the basic Regulation. After a comparison of the 
normal value and export price the average dumping margin expressed as a percentage of 
the CIF Union frontier price was 58%. 
The Chinese spare capacity of the product concerned was found to be around 13% of 
total Union consumption while Chinese domestic demand is expected to decrease by 
more than 10% until 2021. The investigation has demonstrated that Union demand 
remained substantial and the Union market remains the largest market in the world, 
accounting for 25%-30% of global demand. Based on facts available, Chinese export 
prices to the third countries close to the Union were on average 7% lower than the 
prices in the Union during the review investigation period. Such a difference of price is 
significant. On this basis, the Commission concluded that shall the measures laps there 
is likelihood of recurrence of dumping.  
Injury and likelihood of recurrence of injury 
During the period under investigation, injury indicators showed a mixed picture. While 
financial performance indicators, such as profitability, cash flow and return on 
investment, improved, volume indicators, such as production and sales, continued to 
decline. The improvement of financial performance indicators was the result of both the 
drop in raw materials prices in 2014 and the Union producers' restructuring efforts. The 
negative trends in production and sales volumes were the result of the continuously 
falling demand.  
The foreseen further decrease in demand in the next 5-10 years supported the 
conclusion that the situation of the Union industry will remain challenging. The 
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investigation confirmed that the measures imposed by the original investigation have 
had a positive impact on the Union industry, which regained its market share.  
On the basis of the above, the Commission considered that the Union industry did not 
suffer material injury during the investigation, nevertheless, it was in a vulnerable 
situation. Therefore, it was concluded that the repeal of the measures would in all 
likelihood result in a recurrence of injury.  
Union interest and definitive measures 
After a careful analysis of the different interests at stake the Commission concluded that 
the continuation of the anti-dumping measures in force would be in the interest of the 
Union industry while their impact on the importers/traders and users will be limited. On 
this basis, the Commission concluded that there are no compelling reasons of Union 
interest against the extension of the current anti-dumping measures. Therefore the anti-
dumping measures applicable to imports of certain coated fine paper originating in 
China imposed by Regulation (EU) No 451/2011 were maintained. 
Ceramic tiles from China (AD) 
Following an anti-dumping investigation (the original investigation), the Council 
imposed, by means of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011, a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in China. In September 2016, the 
Commission initiated an expiry review. The request was lodged by the European 
Ceramic Tile Manufacturers' Federation on behalf of producers representing more than 
25 % of the total Union production of ceramic tiles. 
Sampling 
The Commission sampled four groups of exporting producers on the basis of their 
declared volume of exports to the Union and production capacity. The sample covered 
around 8% of the total Chinese exports to the Union according to Eurostat. The 
Commission selected a sample of nine Union producers on the basis of the largest 
representative volume of sales and production, taking into account geographical spread 
and also the high fragmentation of the ceramic tiles industry. The sampled Union 
producers accounted for over 7,7% of total estimated Union production in 2015. The 
final sample of the unrelated importers consisted of three unrelated importers, 
accounting for around 6 % of total imports from China. 
Dumping and likelihood of continuation of dumping 
The Commission examined whether the expiry of the existing measures would be likely 
to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping. As no market economy treatment 
claim was introduced, normal value was determined on the basis of the prices paid or 
payable on the domestic market or constructed value in an appropriate market economy 
third country (also referred to as "analogue country"). After having contacted the 
official representations and/or producers located in several possible analogue countries 
the Commission selected the US as appropriate analogue country.  The weighted 
average dumping margins were found to be between 66% and 231%. 
The Commission found that Chinese exporting producers continued to export ceramic 
tiles to the Union at dumped prices during the review investigation period. 
China has a large spare capacity available and thus the ability to increase its production 
volumes at short notice. There were no indications that the Chinese domestic 
consumption would be able to absorb the enormous quantities produced and in stocks. 
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Chinese export prices to the Union were significantly higher compared to the other main 
export markets. In other words, the Union market is more attractive for Chinese 
exporting producers than their other main export destinations. On that basis, the 
Commission considered it is likely that significant volumes of Chinese ceramic tiles 
would be exported to the Union at dumped prices in case the measures were allowed to 
lapse. 
Injury and likelihood of recurrence of injury 
The Union industry was able to recover from the past dumping. Its economic situation 
improved during the investigation period. The measures in force allowed the Union 
producers to maintain the market share, which had a positive impact on the economic 
development of the Union industry. All the injury indicators showed a positive trend: 
the production and the sales increased, the sales price remained relatively stable and 
they had a positive impact on the profitability of the Union industry. On this basis the 
Commission concluded that the Union industry did not suffer material injury during the 
investigation period. 
Since the Union industry did no longer suffer material injury the Commission assessed 
whether there was be a likelihood of recurrence of injury should the measures be 
allowed to lapse. There were high spare capacities of ceramic tiles in China. In addition, 
during the investigation period the average price of the Chinese exports to the Union 
market was on average 30% - 40% lower than the average price in the Union market. 
And as mentioned above, Chinese export prices to other destinations were even lower. 
On the basis of the above considerations, the Commission concluded that the repeal of 
the measures would in all likelihood result in a recurrence of injury to the Union 
industry. 
Union interest and definitive measures 
In weighing and balancing the competing interests, the Commission gave special 
consideration to the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping 
and to restore effective competition. While the continuation of measures would protect 
an important Union industry, including many small and medium enterprises, against a 
likely recurrence of injury, the rather low cooperation of the importers and users 
suggests that the continuation of measures would not have a disproportionate negative 
impact on them. On this basis the Commission concluded that there were no compelling 
reasons that it was not in the Union interest to maintain measures. Therefore, the anti-
dumping measures applicable to imports of ceramic tiles originating in China were 
maintained (the rate is between 13,9% and 69,7%). 
4.2.1.4. Reviews concluded by termination 
In 2017, one expiry review was concluded by the termination of measures in force.  
Product Originating from Reason for termination 
Polyethylene 
terephthalate (PET) 
China Withdrawal of complaint 
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4.2.2. Interim reviews 
Article 11(3) and Article 19 of the basic Regulations provide for the review of measures 
during their period of validity on the initiative of the Commission, at the request of a 
Member State or, provided that at least one year has lapsed since the imposition of the 
definitive measure, following a request containing sufficient evidence by an exporter, an 
importer or by the EU producers. In carrying out the investigations, it will be examined, 
inter alia, whether the circumstances with regard to dumping/subsidization and injury 
have changed significantly and whether these changes are of a lasting nature. Reviews 
can be limited to dumping/subsidization or injury aspects. 
During 2017, ten interim reviews were initiated (six anti-dumping and four anti-
subsidy). Two interim reviews were concluded during the same period, one by 
amending the duties and another by confirming the duties unchanged. The details of the 
case which was concluded during 2017 by amending the duties can be found below. 
More information can be obtained from the Official Journal publications to which 
reference is given in Annex G. 




Stainless steel wires India 
Duty levels amended within 
the range 0,7 – 16,2% (AD) 
Solar panels (crystalline 
silicon photovoltaic modules 
and key components) 
P.R. China 
Termination without 
amendment of duty 
 
4.2.2.1. Details on individual cases 
Stainless steel wires from India (AD) 
In 2013, by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1106/2013 the Council imposed a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain stainless steel wires originating in 
India. In December 2015 the Commission initiated a partial interim review of these 
measures, limited in scope to the examination of dumping. The Commission had 
received two requests from two Indian exporting producers (Venus and Garg) claiming 
that the circumstances on the basis of which anti-dumping measures were imposed have 
changed, that these changes are of a lasting nature and the continued imposition of the 
measures at the current level were no longer necessary to offset injurious dumping. 
After an analysis, the Commission concluded that the change in circumstances claimed 
by the two Indian exporting producers was of a lasting nature. 
Dumping 
The normal value for each of the applicants was calculated as a weighted average of 
their profitable sales on the Indian market, or, where a product type was not sold at all 
or not in representative quantities on the domestic market, the Commission constructed 
                                                 
33 AD = anti-dumping, AS = anti-subsidy, UT = undertaking. 
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the normal value. On this basis, the weighted average dumping margin of Venus was 
found to be 9,9 % and of Garg 19,2%. 
Definitive measures 
Following the initial investigation
34
 in 2013, a definitive anti-dumping duties of 8,6% 
and 8,4% were imposed respectively to Venus and Grag – two Indian exporting 
producers. In 2015 the two producers introduced requests for review. In their requests, 
the applicants claimed that the circumstances on the basis of which anti-dumping 
measures were imposed have changed and that these changes are of a lasting nature. 
The applicants provided prima facie evidence that the continued imposition of the 
measures at the current level was no longer necessary to offset injurious dumping. 
Following the review investigation, the revised anti-dumping duty rates that would be 
applicable to imports of the product concerned manufactured by Venus amounts to 
6,9% (a decrease compared to the initial investigation) and the revised anti-dumping 
duty applicable to Garg amounts to 10,3 % (an increase compared to the initial 
investigation). The dumping margin and duty rate for all other non-cooperating 
companies in the original investigation was not revised. 
Solar Panels (crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components) from 
China (AD) 
This review was described in detail above under the section on expiry reviews. 
4.2.3. “Other” reviews 
The Commission initiated in 2017 two "other reviews" i.e. reviews falling outside 
Article 11(3) or Article 19 of the basic Regulations. These investogations focus on the 
implementation of court rulings. In 2017, five “other” reviews were concluded with a 
confirmation or amendment of the duty. More detilas are to be found below. No "other" 
review was terminated with a repeal of the measures. A list of the cases concerned is 
given in Annex H. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal 
publications to which reference is given in that Annex. 
Footwear from China and Vietnam (AD) 
The following is a presentation of the following three regulations ('regulations at issue') 
that were adopted in 2017 in order to implement the CJ ruling annulling the Council 
Regulation (EC) 1472/2006: 1) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/423, 
2) Commission Implementing Regulation 2017/1982 and 3) Commission Implementing 
Regulation 2017/2232. 
By adopting the regulations at issue the Commission assessed the Market Economy 
Treatment and Individual Treatment ('MET' / 'IT') claims for the exporting producers 
falling under Council Regulation (EC) 1472/2006. 
Regulation 1472/2006 was adopted in October 2006 by the Council and imposed 
definitive anti-dumping duties ranging from 9,7 % to 16,5 % on imports of certain 
footwear with uppers of leather originating in Vietnam and in the People's Republic of 
China ('China') ('contested regulation'). The contested regulation and its subsequent 
                                                 
34 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1106/2013, OJ L298, 8 November 2013, p.1. 
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regulations
35
 were challenged by inter alia several Chinese exporters ('applicants'). The 
CJ annulled these regulations on the basis that the Commission did not examine the 
substantiated claims submitted by the applicants pursuant to Article 2(7)(b) and (c) of 
the basic Regulation for the purpose of claiming (MET).
36
  
By way of implementing the above mentioned CJ judgment, the Commission first 
adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/223. By this regulation, the Commission 
instructed the national customs authorities, which have to decide on an application for 
re-imbursement of anti-dumping duties, to forward requests for re-imbursements of paid 
duties under the annulled regulations to the Commission and await the Commission's 
assessment of the MET and IT claims and of the re-imposition of the anti-dumping duty 
at the appropriate rate before proceeding with re-imbursement. Subsequently, the 
Commission adopted the three regulations at issue in which it assessed the MET and IT 
claims from these exporting producers.  
Implementation 
By adopting the Implementing Regulations (EU) 2017/423, 2017/1982 and 2017/2232 
the Commission assessed the MET/IT claims for the concerned companies.
37
 
                                                 
35 Regulation (EC) No 388/2008 extending the definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of certain 
footwear with uppers of leather originating in China to imports consigned from the Macao Special 
Administrative Region (SAR), whether declared as originating in the Macao SAR or not and 
Implementing Regulation (EC) No 1294/2009. 
36 C-249/10 P Brosmann Footwear (HK) and Others v Council and C-247/10 P Zhejiang Aokang 
Shoes v Council. See also Joined Cases C-659/13 C & J Clark International Limited and C-34/14 
Puma SE. The regulations were annulled in so far they applied to the applicants concerned in those 
cases. 
37 By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/423: Fujian Viscap Shoes Co. Ltd, Vietnam 
Ching Luh Shoes Co. Ltd, Vinh Thong Producing-Trading-Service Co. Ltd, Qingdao Tae Kwang 
Shoes Co. Ltd, Maystar Footwear Co. Ltd, Lien Phat Company Ltd, Qingdao Sewon Shoes Co. Ltd, 
Panyu Pegasus Footwear Co. Ltd, PanYu Leader Footwear Corporation, Panyu Hsieh Da Rubber 
Co. Ltd, An Loc Joint Stock Company, Qingdao Changshin Shoes Company Limited, Chang Shin 
Vietnam Co. Ltd, Samyang Vietnam Co. Ltd, Qingdao Samho Shoes Co. Ltd, Min Yuan, Chau 
Giang Company Limited, Foshan Shunde Fong Ben Footwear Industrial Co. Ltd and Dongguan 
Texas Shoes Limited Co. By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1982: Dongguan 
Luzhou Shoes Co. Ltd, Dongguan Shingtak Shoes Co Ltd, Guangzhou Dragon Shoes Co. Ltd, 
Guangzhou Evervan Footwear Co. Ltd, Guangzhou Guangda Shoes Co. Ltd, Long Son Joint Stock 
Company and Zhaoqing Li Da Shoes Co. Ltd. By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2017/2232: Aiminer Leather Products Co., Ltd, Best Health Ltd, Best Run Worldwide Co. Ltd, 
Bright Ease Shoe Factory, Cambinh Shoes Company, Dong Anh Footwear Joint Stock Company, 
Dong Guan Bor Jiann Footwear Co., Ltd, Dongguan Hongguo Shoes Co. Ltd, Freetrend Industrial 
Ltd, Freeview Company Ltd, Dongguan Hopecome Footwear Co. Ltd, Dongguan Houjie Baihou 
Hua Jian Footwear Factory, Dongguan Qun Yao Shoe Co., Ltd, Dongyi Shoes Co., Ltd, Doozer 
(Fujian) Shoes Co., Ltd, Emperor (VN) Co., Ltd, Everlasting Industry Co., Ltd, Fu Jian Ching Luh 
Shoes Co., Ltd, Fu Jian Lion Score Sport Products Co., Ltd, Fujian Footwear & Headgear Import & 
Export (Holdings) Co., Ltd, Fujian Jinjiang Guohui Footwear & Garment Co., Ltd, Gan Zhou Hua 
Jian International Footwear Co., Ltd, Golden Springs Shoe Co., Ltd, Haiduong Shoes Stock 
Company, Hangzhou Forever Shoes Factory, Hua Jian Industrial Holding Co., Ltd, Huu Nghi 
Danang Company, Hwa Seung Vina Co., Ltd, Jason Rubber Works Ltd, Jinjiang Hengdali Footwear 
Co., Ltd, Jinjiang Xiangcheng Footwear and Plastics Co., Ltd, JinJiang Zhenxing Shoes & Plastic 
Co., Ltd, Juyi Group Co., Ltd, K Star Footwear Co., Ltd, Kangnai Group Wenzhou Lucky Shoes 
and Leather Co., Ltd, Khai Hoan Footwear Co., Ltd, Lian Jiang Ching Luh Shoes Co., Ltd, Li-Kai 
Shoes Manufacturing Co., Ltd, New Star Shoes Factory, Ngoc Ha Shoe Company, Nhi Hiep 
Transportation Construction Company Limited, Ophelia Shoe Co., Ltd, Ormazed Shoes (Zhao Qing 
City) Ltd, Ormazed Shoes Ltd (Dong Guan) Ltd, Pacific Joint — Venture Company, Phuc Yen 
Shoes Factory, Phuha Footwear Enterprise, Phuhai Footwear Enterprise, Phulam Footwear Joint 
Stock Company, Putian Dajili Footwear Co., Ltd, Right Rich Development VN Co., Ltd, Saigon Jim 
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MET Claims 
The burden of proof lies with the exporter claiming MET treatment under Article 
2(7)(c) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. In order for a MET claim to be successful, 
the exporter needs to show that all five criteria listed in Article 2(7)(c) are met. 
The Commission found that none of the companies in the regulations at issue were able 
to demonstrate that they met criterion 1 (business decisions). The Commission found 
that certain exporting producers could not freely determine their sales quantities for 
domestic and export markets. Furthermore, certain companies did not provide sufficient 
information to demonstrate that their business decisions were taken in accordance with 
market signals without significant State interference. 
Since the failure to meet at least one criterion under Article 2(7)(c) results in rejection 
of a MET claim, the Commission rejected the companies' MET requests. 
IT Claims 
The burden of proof lies with the exporting producer wishing to claim IT under Article 
9(5) of the basic Regulation. The exporting producer's claim needs to be properly 
substantiated and show that all five criteria listed in the article, prior to its amendment, 
are met.
38
 The failure to meet at least one of the criterions is enough to reject the IT 
claim. 
The Commission found that certain companies failed to prove that business decisions, 
such as export prices and quantities and conditions and terms of sale, were freely 
determined in response to market signals (criterion 2). The Commission also found that 
certain companies failed to provide the necessary information to demonstrate that they 
were sufficiently independent from State interference (criterion 3).  
In essence, the Commission found that none of the companies concerned were able to 
show that all of the conditions in Article 9(5) of the basic anti-dumping Regulations 
were met. Consequently, the Commission also rejected the IT claim. 
Conclusion 
Having taken account of the comments made by the interested parties, the Commission 
concluded that the residual anti-dumping duty applicable to imports from China and 
Vietnam, i.e. 16,5% and 10% respectively, should be re-imposed to the concerned 
exporting producers for the period of application of the contested regulation. 
Biodiesel from Argentina and Indonesia (AD) 
In November 2013, the Council imposed by Regulation (EU) No 1197/2013 a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of biodiesel originating in Argentina and Indonesia ('the 
definitive Regulation'). The product concerned is fatty-acid mono-alkyl esters and/or 
                                                                                                                                               
Brother Corporation, Shenzhen Harson Shoes Ltd, Shunde Sunrise (II) Footwear Co., Ltd, 
Splendour Enterprise Co., Ltd, Stellar Footwear Co., Ltd, Sung Hyun Vina Co., Ltd, Synco 
Footwear Ltd, Thai Binh Shoes Joint Stock Company, Thang Long Shoes Company, Thanh Hung 
Co., Ltd, Thuy Khue Shoes Company Ltd, Truong Loi Shoes Company Limited, Wenzhou Chali 
Shoes Co., Ltd, Wenzhou Dibang Shoes Co., Ltd, Wenzhou Gold Emperor Shoes Co., Ltd, Xiamen 
Sunchoose Import & Export Co., Ltd, Xingtaiy Footwear Industry & Commerce Co., Ltd, Zhuhai 
Shi Tai Footwear Company Limited, and Zhuhai Shun Tai Footwear Company Limited. 
38 The five criteria of the Regulation 1225/2009 were the following: Free repatriation of capital and 
profits, export conditions and terms of sales freely determined, company – key management and 
shares – is sufficiently independent from State interference, market based exchange rate and absence 
of State interference to permit circumvention. 
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paraffinic gasoils obtained from synthesis and/or hydro-treatment, of non-fossil origin, 
in pure form or as included in a blend originating in Argentina and Indonesia. 
Argentina claimed the measures to be inconsistent with several provisions of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement of the WTO. The Appellate Body found, inter alia, that the 
European Union had acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement (‘ADA’) by failing to calculate the cost of production of the product under 
investigation on the basis of the records kept by the producers. In addition, the Panel 
found, inter alia, that the European Union had acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 
3.4 of the ADA in its examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic 
industry, insofar as the examination related to production capacity and capacity 
utilisation is concerned. On 20 December 2016, the Commission initiated a review 
under Article 1(3) of the Regulation (EU) 2015/476 ('WTO enabling Regulation') in 
order to bring the measures into conformity with the above ruling. 
Determination of the normal value and calculation of the dumping margins  
In order to implement the findings of the Reports (both the reports by the Panel and the 
Appellate Body are collectively referred to as the 'Reports'), the Commission 
recalculated the normal value for exporting producers in Argentina based on the costs of 
the main raw material (soybean oil and soybeans) as reported in the records of those 
exporting producers.  
The Commission acknowledged that the Appellate Body did not preclude, per se, the 
possibility that an investigating authority could, in certain specific circumstances, depart 
from recorded costs if the investigation would demonstrate that costs had been, e.g. 
over- or understated or if non-arm length transactions or other practices had affected the 
reliability of the reported costs (para. 6.41 of the Appellate Body report). However, the 
Appellate Body also stated that the Argentine export tax system was not, in itself, a 
sufficient basis for concluding that the producers' records did not reasonably reflect the 
costs of raw material associated with the production and sale of biodiesel, or for 
disregarding the relevant costs in those records when constructing the normal value of 
biodiesel (paragraph 6.55 of the Appellate Body report). The Commission therefore 
rejected the European Biodiesel Board's ('EBB') claim during the investigation that the 
Reports do not preclude the Commission from making in these circumstances an 
adjustment to the raw material costs when constructing the normal value claim, since 
accepting it would not be in line with the findings of the Reports.  
The revised duty rates in respect of all Argentine exporters in light of the findings and 
recommendation in the WTO reports, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs 
duty unpaid, ranged between 4,5% and 8,1%. 
Revised injury findings based on the reports  
In the Reports, it was found, inter alia, that the EU acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 
and 3.4 of the ADA in its examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the 
domestic industry, insofar as it relates to production capacity and capacity utilisation. 
The Reports did not, however, invalidate the conclusion that the Union Industry 
suffered material injury during the period considered. The Panel found that the EU 
authorities acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the ADA by accepting 
revised data submitted by the EU domestic industry at a late stage of the investigation 
without assuring themselves of its accuracy and reliability (paragraph 7.395 of the Panel 
report). The revised data concerned ‘idle capacity’. At the same time, the Panel stated 
that the revised data did not have a significant role in the EU authorities' conclusion in 
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the definitive Regulation on overcapacity as an ‘other factor’ causing injury (confirmed 
in paragraph 6.147 of the Appellate Body report).  
In order to implement the findings of the Reports, the Commission sent out a 
questionnaire to the EBB requesting explanations as to (i) which methodology was 
applied to calculate both production capacity and capacity utilisation of the Union 
industry during the period considered, and (ii) why in the course of the original 
investigation this data was revised and on what basis the new figures were produced. 
The Commission also asked the EBB to explain what their understanding of ‘idle 
capacity’ was; why in their view it had to be excluded from the total production 
capacity of the Union industry for the period considered and how the idle capacity was 
calculated for the non-EBB members. The Commission received the questionnaire 
reply, analysed it and subsequently carried out a verification visit at the premises of the 
EBB. The Commission verified the supporting documents, cross-checked the reported 
data for the period considered at their source and was able to reconcile the information 
in the management and accounting records with the revised data submitted in the 
original investigation on production capacity and capacity utilization covering the 
period from 1 January 2009 to the end of the investigation period.  
On the basis of the above reassessment, the Commission concluded that the injurious 
dumping determined in the original investigation is confirmed.  
Inclusion of Indonesia  
Not only Argentina but also Indonesia had also claimed the measures to be inconsistent 
with several provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement of the WTO and has brought 
the case to the WTO. Some claims made by Indonesia are similar to those made by 
Argentina in particular as far as the cost adjustment is concerned. The dispute brought 
by Indonesia was still ongoing at the time this review was concluded.   
The Commission therefore proposed to examine also the anti-dumping measures 
imposed on imports of biodiesel from Indonesia in a concurrent review conducted under 
Article 2(1) of the WTO enabling Regulation, in particular as far as the definitive 
Regulation was found inconsistent with Article 2.2.1.1 of the ADA.  
After the Commission has disclosed its finding, interested parties submitted comments 
questioning the Commission's analysis with regard to Indonesia, challenging, inter alia, 
the applicability of the Appellate Body's interpretation as well as the Commission's 
authority to act ex officio on that interpretation under the WTO enabling Regulation 
while the dispute is still ongoing. In light of the comments received, the Commission 
decided not to terminate the review concerning Indonesia at that point in time, but 
instead to continue its analysis because it considered that it needed more time in 
analysing the applicability of the findings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body insofar 
as it concerns Indonesia. The review initiated under Article 2(1) of the WTO enabling 
Regulation therefore remained open insofar as it concerns Indonesia.  
4.2.4. New exporter reviews 
As far as anti-dumping measures are concerned, Article 11(4) of the basic Regulation 
allows for a review ("newcomer" review) to be carried out in order to determine 
individual margins of dumping for new exporters located in the exporting country in 
question which did not export the product during the investigation period.  
Such parties have to show that they are genuine new exporters, i.e. that they are not 
related to any of the exporters or producers in the exporting country, which are subject 
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to the anti-dumping measures, and that they have actually started to export to the EU 
following the investigation period, or that they have entered into an irrevocable 
contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the EU. 
When a review for a new exporter is initiated, the duties are repealed with regard to that 
exporter, though its imports are made subject to registration under Article 14(5) of the 
basic Regulation in order to ensure that, should the review result in a determination of 
dumping in respect of such an exporter, anti-dumping duties may be levied retroactively 
to the date of the initiation of the review. 
As far as anti-subsidy measures are concerned, Article 20 of the basic Regulation allows 
for a review (accelerated review) to be carried out in order to establish promptly an 
individual countervailing duty. Any exporter whose exports are subject to a definitive 
countervailing duty but who was not individually investigated during the original 
investigation for reasons other than a refusal to co-operate with the Commission can 
request such review. 
In 2017, four new exporter reviews were initiated relating to anti-dumping measures 
and two accelerated reviews, i.e. relating to anti-subsidy measures. Since the 
Commission carried out the first reviews of this type in 1990, a total of 77 such 
investigations have been initiated so far. There were no new exporter reviews concluded 
or terminated during 2017. 
4.2.5. Absorption investigations 
Where there is sufficient information showing that, after the original investigation 
period and prior to or following the imposition of measures, export prices have 
decreased or that there has been no or insufficient movement in the resale prices or 
subsequent selling prices of the imported product in the EU, an absorption review may 
be opened to examine whether the measure has had effects on the above-mentioned 
prices. The duty may be increased to take account of such lower export prices. The 
possibility of absorption reviews is included in Articles 12 and 19(3) of the basic 
Regulations. 
In 2017, one anti-absorption investigation was terminated without increase of duties 
(Annex J). 
4.2.6. Anti-circumvention investigations 
The possibility of investigations being re-opened in circumstances where evidence is 
brought to show that measures are being circumvented was introduced by Article 13 and 
Article 23 of the basic Regulations. 
Circumvention is defined as a change in the pattern of trade between third countries and 
the EU which stems from a practice, process or work for which there is insufficient due 
cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty. The duties may be 
extended to imports from third countries of like products, or parts thereof, if 
circumvention is taking place. Duties may also be extended to imports of a slightly 
modified like product from the country subject to current measures. 
In 2017, three anti-circumvention investigations were initiated. One anti-circumvention 
investigation was concluded with an extension of the anti-dumping duty, and one 
terminated without extension. More information can be obtained from the Official 
Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex K. 
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4.3. Safeguard investigations 
Safeguard measures have always been and remain an instrument which the Commission 
would only apply in truly exceptional circumstances. Indeed, they are only used where 
it is clear that, applying the highest standards, such measures are necessary and justified 
because, due to unforeseen circumstances, there has been a surge in imports and this has 
caused or threatens to cause serious damage to the EU industry.  
The Commission expects the EU’s commercial partners to follow a similarly strict 
approach. However, more and more countries are adopting safeguard measures, often in 
circumstances which do not appear to be entirely in line with Article XIX of the GATT 
1994, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards and other WTO rules. Consequently, the 
activities of the Commission in relation to safeguards is more and more driven towards 
the defence of the export interests of EU producers, if necessary at WTO level. 
There was no safeguard activity by the EU in 2017 and no measures in place (Annex L).  
5. ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-DUMPING/COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
Globalisation of trade led to greater possibilities for circumventing or otherwise 
reducing the effectiveness of anti-dumping and countervailing measures. To address this 
problem, throughout 2017 the TDI services continued their follow-up activities aimed at 
ensuring that measures were effectively enforced. In the framework of an integrated 
approach measures were considered in all their forms - duties and undertakings – and 
synergy was sought between the TDI services and enforcement-oriented services 
(OLAF, DG Taxud and customs authorities in Member States).  
5.1. Follow-up of measures 
The follow-up activities concerning measures in force are centred on four main areas: 
(1) to pre-empt fraud, by defining risk-related areas, alerting customs authorities and 
assessing the feedback from customs and economic operators; (2) to monitor trade flows 
and market developments; (3) to improve the effectiveness with the appropriate 
instruments (new investigation, interim review, newcomer review, contact with national 
administrations) and (4) to react to irregular practices by enhancing the co-operation 
with enforcement-related services (OLAF and national customs) and by initiating anti-
absorption or anti-circumvention investigations. 
5.2. Monitoring of undertakings 
Monitoring of undertakings forms part of the enforcement activities, given that 
undertakings are a form of AD or AS measures. They are accepted by the Commission 
if it is satisfied that they can effectively eliminate the injurious effects of dumping or 
subsidisation. 
At the beginning of 2017, there were 102 undertakings in force. During 2017, the 
following changes to the portfolio of undertakings took place: The undertakings of five 
companies were withdrawn as it was established that breaches had occurred or that the 
monitoring of the undertakings became impracticable. The undertakings of seven 
companies were withdrawn as these companies had notified the Commission that they 
wished to withdraw from the undertaking. The undertakings of 87 companies were 
repealed. No new undertaking was accepted. This brought the total number of 
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undertakings in force at the end of 2017 to three. More information is available in 
Annexes M and Q. 
6. REFUNDS  
Articles 11(8) and 21(1) of the basic Regulations allow importers to request the 
reimbursement of the relevant collected duties where it is shown that the 
dumping/subsidy margin, on the basis of which duties were paid, has been eliminated or 
reduced to a level below that of the duty in force. 
During 2017, 75 new refund requests were submitted. At the end of 2017, four refund 
investigations were on-going, covering 61 requests. In 2017, 26 Commission 
Implementing Decisions granting partial refund or rejecting refund requests were 
adopted. 
7. TDI MODERNISATION  
In April 2013, the Commission adopted a proposal and a communication in order to 
modernise the EU’s trade defence instruments (‘TDI’). The aim of the proposal was to 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU’s TDI for the benefit of all 
stakeholders, including producers, importers or users. Increasing transparency, finding 
practical solutions to real problems and making the TDI more accessible, so that these 
instruments would provide a more adequate response to the proliferating unfair trade 
practices, was at the heart of the proposal.  
The European Parliament largely supported the Commission proposal and voted a 
legislative resolution as early as April 2014. The amendments voted by the Parliament 
were essentially in favour of the Union industry and a sustainable production in the EU.  
In the Council discussions were lengthy but a mandate was finally adopted by the end of 
2016. The legislative procedure then entered in trilogue mode.  
On 5 December 2017, the Council and the European Parliament reached an agreement 
on the Commission's proposal. Following the formal approval in the Council and the 
European Parliament's plenary vote, the modernisation legislation will enter into force 
on the 8 June 2018. Together with the new anti-dumping calculation methodology (see 
below), this is the first major overhaul of the EUs anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
instruments since 1995. 
The compromise found in trilogues represents a balanced result, taking into account the 
interests of EU producers, users and importers alike. When the corresponding legislative 
changes enter into force, the EU's trade defence instruments will be more effective, 
transparent and more adapted to face the challenges of the global economy. At the same 
time, the modernisation brings these instruments closer to the needs of small and 
medium sized companies ('SME'). Finally, trade unions that represent workers whose 
jobs are at stake due to unfair competition can also now fully participate in 
investigations, including as co-complainants together with the Union industry. 
The overhaul covers a broad range of aspects relating to the way the Commission 
carries out trade defence investigations. The changes deliver concrete solutions to 
practical problems raised by businesses. They benefit EU industry but also importers 
and downstream users who depend on imports.  
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Amongst the most important changes to the modernised EU's anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy legislation are:  
 An improved injury margin calculation method will be applied: the new rules 
concerning the non-injurious price for the EU industry are better adapted to 
economic reality. They now allow reflecting the profitability needed to cover full 
costs and investments, research as well as development and innovation. Moreover, 
the injury margin will include future expenses related to social and environmental 
standards, for example under the Emissions Trading System, if the Union industry 
presents sufficient evidence to this effect.  
 More certainty will be achieved: in the future, the non-injurious price will include a 
minimum profit of 6%. However, higher profit margins are always possible on a 
case-by-case basis. This ensures a better recovery of the industry from unfair trade.  
 Anti-dumping investigations will become even more efficient: provisional 
measures will be imposed within 7 to 8 months, in comparison to the current 9 
months. 
 More transparency and predictability will be ensured towards economic 
operators: the Commission will be issuing an early warning on the imposition of 
provisional anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. This will include a grace period 
of three weeks during which provisional duties will not be applied. This will allow 
all operators to adapt to the new situation. After two years, the Commission will 
review the three weeks early warning system with the option to go up to 4 weeks or 
down to 2 weeks of such pre-disclosure. The non-imposition of provisional measures 
will also be signalled ahead. 
 Additional support will be granted for EU small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs): an SME helpdesk as well as streamlined procedures will make it easier for 
SMEs to participate in trade defence investigations. 
 The EU will better respond to raw material distortions or subsidisation in 
exporting countries: the EU's "lesser duty rule" will be adapted so as to take into 
account the existence of serious distortions regarding raw materials with the 
imposition of duties reflecting the full amount of dumping in such cases. Measures 
against unfair subsidies will be based on the subsidy margin. The new disciplines 
will be subject to a Union interest test 
 Social and environmental aspects will now have a role in trade defence 
proceedings: As mentioned above, the future higher costs of EU industry for 
complying with EU social and environmental standards will be taken into account. 
Furthermore, the EU will normally not accept price undertakings from third countries 
with an insufficient implementation record of key International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) conventions and multilateral environmental agreements. The Commission also 
intends to review the measures in place in case of changed circumstances concerning 
social and environmental standards. This increased activity on Social and 
Environmental Standards will also have a dedicated part in the Commission's annual 
report on trade defence instruments.  
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8. AMENDMENT OF THE EU'S AD AND AS LEGISLATION IN 2017 
On 9 November 2016, the Commission adopted a proposal to change the EU's anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy legislation with the aim to introduce a new anti-dumping 
methodology to capture State-induced market distortions in third countries and to 
strengthen the anti-subsidy instrument. 
The proposal followed an Impact Assessment and included an online public 
consultation and a dedicated public event in March 2016 on the matter. All parties 
affected by trade defence investigations were invited to participate. There was active 
engagement from parties representing industry, trade, users and third countries at every 
level from individuals to representative associations. The social partners 
(representatives of trade unions and employer's organisations) were also consulted.  
The amendments to the EU's basic anti-dumping and anti-subsidy Regulations entered 
into force on 20 December 2017. On the same day, DG Trade published on its website a 
report on market distortions in the Chinese economy. The Commission also announced 
that the next country report will concern Russia.  
Main changes 
 The main changes to the legislation are: 
(a) The introduction of a new dumping calculation methodology to capture market 
distortions linked to State intervention in third countries. These distortions can 
exist in a country as a whole or in a given sector. The purpose of the new 
methodology is to address any pervasive influence of a State over the economy 
and to address new economic realities.  This new methodology is country-
neutral and is applicable equally to all WTO countries. The legislation makes it 
clear that the adoption of a new dumping methodology is without prejudice to 
the treatment of any country as a non-market economy. Where it will be 
established that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices or costs due to 
significant State-induced distortions, the new methodology would apply. 
 
(b) A clear timeframe for the application of the new methodology to requests for 
reviews to ensuring a smooth transition to the new methodology for measures 
already in place. 
 
(c) The strengthening of the anti-subsidy instrument to increase the Union's ability 
to capture the full magnitude of subsidisation by making it possible to address 
also subsidies which were identified only in the course of an investigation. 
 In order to 'trigger' the application of the new methodology it must be 
established that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices or costs due to significant 
distortions. In determining the existence of distortions, several criteria will be 
considered, such as: whether "the market in question being served to a significant 
extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy 
supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country", whether there is 
"state presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs", 
whether "public policies or measures [are] discriminating in favour of domestic 
suppliers or otherwise influencing free market forces", whether there is "lack, 
discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or 
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property laws", or whether "wage costs [are] being distorted", or "access to finance 
[is] granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise 
not acting independently of the state". 
 The Commission as an investigating authority is responsible for establishing 
whether significant distortions exist in a particular country. The legislation 
safeguards all the rights of defence of the interested parties, including the possibility 
to demonstrate the existence or absence of distortions. The Commission may rely on 
any information regarding distortions brought by industry or which comes to light in 
the context of an investigation. In addition, the Commission will be entitled to 
prepare and issue reports describing the specific circumstances of the market in any 
given country or sector (see following two points). Any information concerning 
distortions in an exporting country will be part of the evidence on file in the anti-
dumping investigation concerned.  
 Reports prepared by the Commission on countries/sectors where distortions are 
identified may be used by the EU industry, which will be able to rely on the evidence 
contained in these reports to make their case concerning cases where prices or costs 
are distorted. The Commission selects the countries for report scrutiny by reference 
to their relative importance in the EU's overall anti-dumping activity as well as 
indications that significant distortions may exist. In this context, China was chosen 
for the first report, with Russia being second.  
 The country reports are technical, fact-based documents which draw on many 
sources, in particular official public records in the countries concerned. Information 
from international organisations is also included e.g. IMF, OECD.  The reports, 
which are Commission Staff Working Documents, are descriptive in nature and do 
not pass judgement on the economies in question.  
 Where it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs due to significant 
distortions, the normal value will be based on "out-of-country" undistorted costs of 
production, instead of being based on domestic prices and costs in the exporting 
country.   
 The new rules apply to all new cases initiated after 20 December 2017. In these 
investigations, if the Commission finds that it is not appropriate to use domestic 
prices and costs due to significant distortions in the country/sector concerned by the 
case, the new methodology will apply. The legislation provides for a transition 
period, i.e. the new methodology will be applied to all new investigations and expiry 
reviews initiated after 20 December 2017. Interim reviews initiated after that date 
will be based on the new methodology if the measure itself is based on the new 
methodology. If the measure subject to review is still based on the old methodology, 
that methodology will continue to apply to any interim review initiated after 20 
December 2017 until the initiation of the first expiry review. 
 The new dumping methodology allows for social and environmental standards to 
be taken into account in a trade defence context. Indeed, in choosing undistorted 
benchmarks to establish normal value preference will normally be given to countries 
which adhere to these standards.  
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REPORT ON MARKET DISTORTIONS IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
The report examined the existence of significant distortions in the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) from three different angles, i.e. a macro-economic description of the 
Chinese economy; the main production factors used in all manufacturing processes and 
a description of four sectors of the Chinese economy. The report consists of three main 
sections, each covering one angle, all developed in a number of subsections.    
Summary of the report: 
Section 1 - Core features of Chinese economy: 
Section 1 examined the Chinese economy's core features (all closely interlinked), 
including: the concept of a ‘socialist market economy’; the role of the Chinese 
Communist Party (‘CCP’), in relation to the economy; the extensive system of plans 
issued and followed up by various levels of government under the leadership of the 
CCP; the extensive State-owned sector including the various supervision and control 
mechanisms; the financial market, the procurement market and the system of investment 
screening: 
 The unique economic system grants the State, as well as the CCP, a decisive 
role in the economy.  
 The leadership role of the CCP which sets the economic agenda and 
controls all aspects of its implementation is inherent in China's official 
designation as a socialist market economy.  
 The competence of the CCP goes far beyond a macroeconomic control, 
extending to the level of business decisions of individual enterprises, both 
SOEs and – at times – privately owned companies.  
 The basic features of the PRC socialist market economy are a dominant 
state-ownership, which the State and the CCP wish to further strengthen and 
expand, an interventionist government policy in the economy in order to 
implement plans e.g. 13
th
 Five Year Plan (FYP) by using a broad array of 
tools, including guiding catalogues, investment screening, financial 
incentives, etc. 
 Business decisions are very much influenced by the various public policy 
objectives pursued by the State and the CCP, often resulting in non-market 
based resource allocations and to the creation of overcapacities in many 
sectors.  
Section 2 – Factors of production 
Section 2 examined the allocation of various factors of production, in general, in PRC 
covering land, energy, capital, material inputs (e.g. raw materials) and labour:  
 Land: All land is owned by the State and allocation of land use rights is 
solely dependent on the state, which may pursue specific political goals 
rather than free market principles. The rules on land provision and 
acquisition in the PRC are often unclear and not transparent. Prices are often 
set by the authorities on the basis of non-market considerations. Many 
buyers (in particular SOEs) received their land for free or obtain land use 
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rights at a very low price. There are also significant discrepancies between 
different regions and individual cases.  
 Energy: China is currently the world's largest power producer with 50% of 
the generation capacity as well as 100% of the entire transmission grid 
being state-owned. Prices are differentiated for different industries and 
appear to favour certain industries which seems to be aimed at reducing the 
electricity costs of certain sectors (e.g. non-ferrous metals).   
 Capital: Access to capital for corporate actors in China is subject to various 
distortions including a bias for lending to SOEs, large well-connected 
private firms and firms active in key industrial sectors. This implies that the 
availability and cost of capital is not equal for all players in the market. The 
formal financial system is characterised by a strong State presence and 
regulatory controls. This is compounded by artificially low borrowing costs, 
which are not proportionate in comparison with actual returns and risk. 
Policy considerations concerning strategic sectors also play a role with 
Government directing investment into key projects and industries by, inter 
alia, offering loan interest subsidies, loan guarantees and other means of 
reducing capital costs. While nominal interest rate liberalization was 
achieved in October 2015, interest rates are still influenced by government-
induced factors. Indeed, the share of lending at or below the benchmark rate 
still represents 45% of all lending.  Non-performing loans have increased 
rapidly in recent years. Faced with a situation of increasing debt-at-risk, the 
Chinese government has opted to avoid defaults, by heavily influencing 
bankruptcy procedures. The problem of bad debt has been handled by 
rolling over more debt, resulting in the creation of so-called ‘zombie’ 
companies, or by transferring debts ownership (e.g. via mergers or debt-to-
equity swaps), without necessarily removing the overall debt problem or 
addressing its root causes. 
 Material inputs: The extensive planning including at the sectoral, provincial 
and municipal levels regulates basically every aspect of the Chinese 
economy including many key raw materials and - to some extent - other 
material inputs.  The distortions found in relation to the allocation of raw 
materials include: plans setting very specific and detailed targets of 
production thereby influencing the level of supply of specific raw materials 
on the market; influencing supply and prices by introducing export 
restrictions; setting prices of certain goods centrally in cases where the 
prices run against government policies; stockpiling impacting domestic and 
global prices (e.g. metals, including copper, nickel and tungsten, as well as 
cotton and agricultural commodities); and finally the State guidance of 
investments in certain sectors. All this allows the government to artificially 
influence the supply of specific goods. 
 Labour: Chinese workers have no possibility to freely choose or establish a 
trade union as there is only one legally recognized trade union, the ACFTU, 
which is closely intertwined with the CCP and the State. Senior positions in 
ACFTU are occupied by senior Party figures in SOEs or by managers in 
non-state enterprises hampering their ability to represent workers' interests 
independently. There is no official national-level right to strike. The 
Chinese workforce is impacted by the hukou household registration system. 
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Only hukou holders have access to the full range of social security and 
public welfare benefits. While collective bargaining of wages exists, it is not 
well developed. 
Section 3 – Distortions in selected sectors 
Section 3 examined a number of sectors looking at the specific rules and policy 
dynamics applicable. The sectors, selected because they have featured most in the EU’s 
trade defence investigations, are steel, aluminium, chemicals and ceramics.  
 Steel: Numerous plans, directives and other documents focus on steel, 
which are issued at national, regional and municipal level. Through them, 
the government intervenes to shape the development of the sector through a 
broad range of policy tools and directives related, inter alia, to: market 
composition and restructuring, raw materials, access to finance and 
investment, capacity elimination, product ranges, relocation, technical 
upgrading, etc. The government seeks to promote the creation of ever-larger 
steel producers ('national champions'). Financial institutions, in particular 
those that are state-owned, play a key role in channelling to Chinese steel 
producers' benefits from a wide array of State support measures. Other 
market distortive practices, such as export restrictions affecting raw 
materials and inputs and or the inadequate application of bankruptcy rules, 
exacerbate the phenomenon of State intervention into the sector. This has 
led to the current problem of overcapacity causing a depression of steel 
prices globally and a negative impact on, inter alia, the financial situation of 
steel producers worldwide. As a result the number of trade defence 
investigations against Chinese steel imports in different jurisdictions has 
increased.  
 Aluminium: China is the largest aluminium producer in the world. Its 
domestic market is served significantly by large SOEs, which account for a 
dominant share of Chinese aluminium production and production capacity. 
As in the case of the steel sector there are numerous plans, directives and 
other documents pertaining to aluminium, issued at the national, regional 
and municipal level, showing the high degree of intervention of the Chinese 
government in the market. Through these and other instruments, the 
government directs and controls virtually every aspect of the development 
and functioning of the sector. SOEs are a primary vehicle for implementing 
these government policies.  Government intervention in the sector includes, 
inter alia, export-related measures, including export duties, export quotas, 
export performance requirements, minimum export price requirements on 
different raw materials for aluminium production, as well as VAT rebate 
policies and export taxes on aluminium products (e.g. primary aluminium 
and scrap). The Chinese government also consistently granted different 
types of State support measures to aluminium producers.  The extensive 
intervention of the State in the sector has also led to overcapacity and the 
consequential negative effects that this brings for the Chinese and global 
economy.  
 Chemicals: Intervention in this sector is also carried out in a top-down 
manner through sequences of sectoral chemical plans at the central, 
provincial, local, even municipal levels across a broad geographical setting, 
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as chemical companies of all sizes are located in virtually the whole 
country. The State influence is more pronounced as the chemical sector's top 
players are predominantly SOEs, and while their overall sectoral share has 
decreased somewhat in recent years, this still gives authorities direct control 
over significant parts of the market. The State and the CCP seek to manage, 
in detail, not only production methods (as to achieve environmental and 
innovation goals) but also production capacity (and therefore market 
supply). At the same time, Chinese authorities manipulate the industrial 
fabric's structure and geographical location, and influence the product 
portfolio of companies. Intervention occurs through direct requirements or 
regulations (e.g. relocation requests, production targets or restraints) or 
specific support instruments, in most cases of a financial, fiscal or cost-
reducing nature. The latter include grants, preferential loans, tax rebates, 
land-use permits, energy price rebates or special access to inputs.  
 Ceramics: As in the case of other key sectors, State involvement in this 
traditional sector of the Chinese industry is visible through the ladder of 
planning documents issued at all levels – from national to municipal. Due to 
its labour-intensive character and traditional role, the State has been closely 
overseeing, steering and managing its development. The government's 
intervention into the sector aims, among others, at managing the excess 
production capacity of certain sub-sectors. This often translates into 
government requirements to develop large competitive conglomerates, 
which would also allow greater control of the sector in order to implement 
government policies. The sector is openly supported by the State, in the 
form of innovation funds, preferential loans, export incentives, financial 
transfers, tax relieves, land-use cost relief and employment-stabilisation 
schemes, among others. These have direct and indirect consequences on the 
cost structures of companies and product prices. 
9. MARKET ECONOMY STATUS (MES) 
In an anti-dumping investigation, Commission services usually compare the export 
price of a product with its 'normal value', which is the price paid in the domestic market 
of the exporting country or a constructed normal value (Article 2(1) of the basic anti-
dumping Regulation). However, this methodology can only be used if costs and prices 
in the exporting country are reliable and essentially the result of the play of supply and 
demand, i.e. set according to market economy rules. For TDI cases initiated before 20 
December 2017, for the specific purpose of applying the EU basic anti-dumping 
Regulation, the practice was that a country could be considered a market economy if it 
fulfilled five specific criteria.  
As from 20 December 2017, in the case of countries which are non-WTO members and 
feature on Annex 1 of EU Regulation 2015/755, the normal value will be calculated on 
the basis of costs and prices found in an appropriate market-economy third country, 
selected according to the same criteria as applied prior to the entry into force of the new 
rules on 20 December 2017. Today, these countries are: Azerbaijan, Belarus, North 
Korea, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.   
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10. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES / BILATERAL CONTACTS 
10.1. Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
During 2017, the SME helpdesk received and dealt with many requests for information, 
relating to specific cases as well as broader queries addressing procedural and 
substantive elements of proceedings. The TDI website also specifically highlights the 
SME's role in TDI proceedings and offers practical advice and help. The special 
helpdesk was set up in 2004 to help SMEs deal with the specific challenges they face in 
TDI investigations due to their small size, resource limitations and their fragmentation.  
10.2. Bilateral contacts/information activities – EU economic operators 
including their key stakeholder associations and third countries 
Explaining the legislation and practice of the EU's trade defence activity and 
exchanging views on third country practices continues to be an important part of the 
work of the TDI services. 
The Commission organises one week seminars for TDI officials from third countries. 
As an example, 20 officials from 6 different countries (Egypt, Japan, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey and Vietnam) and representatives from the WTO secretariat participated in the 
latest such seminar organised in November 2016. Given that this seminar was organised 
in late 2016, no such seminar was organised in 2017. In addition, bilateral meetings to 
exchange best practices with TDI officials from the US, China, Japan and Korea took 
place in 2017. 
During 2017, the trade defence services continued to entertain contacts with practically 
all key stakeholder organisations affected by trade defence. One of the key topics of 
these meetings was the legislative changes concerning TDI described above.  
11. JUDICIAL REVIEW: DECISIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE 
GENERAL COURT 
11.1. Overview of the judicial reviews in 2017. 
In 2017, the GC and the CJ rendered 29 judgments in the areas of anti-dumping or anti-
subsidy. 15 judgments were handed down by the GC. 12 concerned appeals of GC 
rulings which were decided by the CJ. Last but not least, the CJ also rendered two 
preliminary rulings in the TDI field. 
11.2. Cases pending 
A list of the anti-dumping/anti-subsidy cases before the GC and the CJ still pending at 
the end of 2017 is given in Annex S (34 pending before the GC and 22 before the CJ). 
11.3. New cases 
Twenty new cases were lodged in 2017 (compared to 34 in 2016, 20 in 2015, 37 in 
2014, 33 in 2013, 23 in 2012, and 16 in 2011). Eleven of these were lodged before the 
GC (ten actions for annulment and one application for taxation of costs) and nine before 
the CJ (six appeals and three preliminary rulings). 
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11.4. Judgments rendered by the General Court 
Imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate('PET') originating in India, Taiwan 
and Thailand - T-422/13 - Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate Manufacturers 
in Europe v Council – Judgment of 5 April 2017. 
Anti-dumping duties have been imposed on PET originating from Indian, Taiwan and 
Thailand since 2000. Following an expiry review, the Council in the contested decision 
rejected the Commission's proposal for a Regulation maintaining the anti-dumping 
measures on imports of PET originating in India, Taiwan and Thailand for another five-
year period. Contrary to the Commission, the Council found that it was unlikely that the 
removal of anti-dumping measures would lead to the continuation or recurrence of 
injurious dumping and injury, and that it was against the Union interest to impose anti-
dumping measures because the cost to the imports, users and consumers were 
disproportionate to the benefits for the Union industry. Consequently, by Implementing 
Decision 2013/226/EU, the Council rejected the Commission proposal for prolonging 
the definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate 
originating in India, Taiwan and Thailand ('contested decision'). 
The Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate Manufacturers in Europe (the applicant) 
lodged an application at the GC for the annulment of Council Implementing Decision 
2013/226/EU. The applicant also claimed that the GC should order the Council to 
compensate them for the damage suffered as a result of the contested decision. 
The applicant claimed, essentially, that the Council infringed Article 11(2) and Article 
21(1) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation by making manifest errors of assessment 
when it concluded, first that the expiry of the measures was unlikely to lead to the 
recurrence of material injury and second that the extension of anti-dumping duties was 
clearly not in the Union interest. The applicant argued that these conclusions were based 
on considerations that reflected a partial and distorted selection of the facts established 
by the Commission's investigation, and on other unsubstantiated and clearly erroneous 
assertions.  
The GC examined whether the considerations that were relied on in the contested 
decision made it possible to conclude, without making a manifest error of assessment, 
that it had not been demonstrated that the expiry of the anti-dumping duties would result 
in the recurrence of injury. The GC found that the Council failed to mention economic 
data that was relevant and identified by the Commission in its analysis. Furthermore, the 
GC found that the Council had drawn economic conclusions on market developments 
without giving adequate reasons for them. The GC also found that the Council had 
made findings that were not relevant to its analysis, and that it had drawn conclusions 
from the Commission's analysis that contradicted the Commission's conclusions without 
providing any explanation or reason. Therefore the GC found that the Council's analysis 
in the contested decision was vitiated by manifest errors of assessment and in certain 
respects by a lack of reasoning and contradictory reasons. Since the Council's 
conclusion on the Union interest was based on the unlikely recurrence of injurious 
dumping, the defects with regard to a recurrence of injury also affected the Council's 
conclusion on the Union interest. In conclusion, the GC annulled the contested decision. 
Lastly, the GC rejected the applicant's claim for damages. The GC found that the 
applicant failed to establish a direct and sufficient causal link to make the EU liable. 
More specifically, the GC found that the applicants failed to make a distinction, in the 
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reduction of their earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization, 
between the part which would be caused by the increase in imports at low prices and 
that resulting from other factors likely to cause or lead to a decrease in that single 
economic indicator. 
Imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (cells) 
originating in or consigned from China – T-783/14 – SolarWorld AG vs Commission 
– Judgment of 16 February 2017. 
SolarWorld AG (the applicant) sought annulment of the Commission's decision, 
contained in a letter of 15 September 2014 addressed to the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (CCCME) on 
the downward adjustment of the minimum import price for imports of photovoltaic 
modules and cells manufactured by Chinese exporting producers subject to a price 
undertaking with effect from 1 October 2014 for the last quarter of 2014 (the contested 
decision).  
In June 2013 the Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells and wafers) 
originating in or consigned from the People's Republic of China. In conjunction with the 
Regulation, the Commission adopted a decision accepting an undertaking by a group of 
Chinese companies. The Commission could not establish a correlation between prices of 
raw materials and those of final products manufactured in the EU. Therefore, it was 
examined whether an alternative methodology could be established in the undertaking 
in order to address changes in price levels on the market. The solution found was that 
the Commission, on its own initiative or that of the CCCME, shall adapt Minimum 
Import Prices (MIP) if there is an average price difference between the quarter 
preceding the given quarter as reported by the Bloomberg database (see Clause 3.5 of 
the undertaking).  
By the contested decision, the Commission approved a downward adjustment of the 
MIP pursuant to Clause 3.5 of the undertaking. The applicant submitted that the 
contested decision infringed Article 8(1) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. The 
applicant claimed that both the initial MIP and the adjusted MIPs must be set at levels 
that are such as to remove the injurious effects of the dumping and subsidies. According 
to the applicant, the methodology under Clause 3.5 did not allow for a prior assessment 
as to whether the adjusted MIP would remove the injurious effects of the dumping and 
subsidies, which is allegedly contrary to Article 8(1). 
The GC did not accept the applicant's point of vue. It found that the wording of Clause 
3.5 provides that it is an automatic adjustment of the MIP, leaving no room for a 
systematic verification of the elimination of the injurious effects of the dumping prior to 
the adjustment of the MIP. According to the GC, Article 8(1) of the basic anti-dumping 
Regulation does not require the Commission to conduct systematic monitoring of the 
elimination of the injurious effects of the dumping prior to every application of Clause 
3.5 leading to adaptation of the MIP. 
Furthermore, the GC found that the Commission concluded, by accepting the 
undertaking in its entirety in Decision 2013/707, that both the initial MIP and the 
adaptation mechanism ensured that the MIP were always at a level sufficient to 
eliminate the injurious effects of the dumping. It was therefore for the applicant to show 
that the adjustment mechanism did not allow for the objective pursued by Article 8(1) to 
be attained. 
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According to the GC, the applicant did not provide any evidence or argumentation 
capable of showing that the adjustment mechanism under Clause 3.5 was manifestly 
inappropriate for ensuring that the adjustment of the MIP would be sufficient to 
eliminate the injury caused by the dumped imports. Therefore, the applicant failed to 
show that the contested decision, which is based on the adjustment mechanism under 
Clause 3.5, is illegal. Accordingly, the GC dismissed the action as lacking any 
foundation in law. 
Imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (cells) 
originating in or consigned from China – cases T-162/14, T-160/14, T-157/14 and the 
joined cases T-158/14, T-161/14 and T-163/14 – Judgments rendered on 28 February 
2017.  
The following summaries are judgments rendered in annulment proceedings relating to 
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1238/2013 of 2 December 2013 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) 
originating in or consigned from the People's Republic of China ('contested regulation'). 
The applicants in these six cases sought the annulment of the contested regulation and 
raised more or less the same pleas in law. Only in case T-160/14, an additional 
argument was made. Therefore, this section describes case T-162/14 in detail and 
subsequently also describes the notable exception raised in case T-160/14.  
Note that the GC rejected all pleas and dismissed all of the actions brought by the 
applicants in all of the cases. The cases are summarized below. The following 
judgments were all delivered on 28 February 2017. 
Imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (cells) 
originating in or consigned from China – T-162/14 – Canadian Solar Emea GmbH 
and others v Council – Judgment of 28 February 2017. 
Canadian Solar Emea GmbH and four other companies established in China; Canadian 
Solar Manufacturing (Changshu), Canadian Solar Manufacturing (Luoyang) Inc, Csi 
Cells Co. Ltd (Suzhou) and Csi Solar Power (Suzhou) (the applicants) brought the 
present action. The applicants sought the annulment of the contested regulation, in so 
far as it applied to the applicants.  
The applicants claimed that the institutions infringed several provisions of the basic 
anti-dumping Regulation. Essentially, the applicants claimed that the contested 
regulation was adopted in breach of Article 2(7)(a), in so far normal value was 
calculated on the basis of the non-market economy methodology on products from 
market economies. Furthermore, the applicants claimed that the institutions made an ill-
defined definition of the products and thus violated Article 1(4). Moreover, the 
applicants claimed that the Commission infringed Article 2(7)(c) (as it provided at the 
material time) by exceeding the three month deadline for Market Economy Treatment 
('MET') determination. Lastly, the applicants claimed that the institutions infringed 
Article 3 and 9(4) by not examining the injury caused by the dumped imports and by 
other known factors separately, and that the level of duty imposed exceeded what was 
necessary to remove the injury caused by dumped imports. 
The GC noted it was common ground that the institutions only used the methodology 
under Article 2(7)(a) to establish normal value for all the categories of the product 
concerned, since the applicants claimed that they were exporting different kinds of 
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products to the EU. According to the GC, Article 2(7)(a) must be interpreted in 
accordance with Article 1(3) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation and "exporting 
country" could be both the country of origin and the intermediate country. The GC 
considered that the EU legislature has not provided a rule in Article 1(3) that the 
exporting country must be defined in the same way for all categories of the product 
concerned, irrespective of their origin. In the absence of this intention the institutions 
enjoy a wide margin of discretion. The GC therefore found that it is not contrary to 
Article 1(3) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation to regard the country of origin as the 
exporting country for some products and the intermediate country as the exporting 
country for others. The GC also rejected the applicants' argument that Article 2(7) of the 
basic anti-dumping Regulation has to follow the specific case law of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body, since according to the GC it cannot be established that it was the EU 
legislature's intention to implement particular obligations by Article 2 of the GATT by 
adopting Article 2(7).  
Furthermore, the GC noted that the institutions applied the basic criterion to define the 
product concerned in a consistent manner, and that the applicants failed to show that the 
institutions committed any manifest error of assessment of the factors which they 
applied. Consequently, the GC found that the applicants were not successful in showing 
that the institutions had made an error of assessment with regard to the factors they 
decided were relevant for the definition of the product concerned. Furthermore, the GC 
found that the institutions evaluated the criteria raised by the interested parties, but 
concluded that they did not impact the definition of the product concerned. 
The GC also noted that the institutions had established a causal link between the injury 
suffered by the EU industry and the dumped imports from China. The GC considered 
that the institutions had assessed in a detailed and comprehensive manner the other 
possible causes of injury, such as imports from third countries and overcapacity, but 
concluded that their impact is only limited and none of them was breaking the causal 
link mentioned above. 
Consequently, having rejected all of the applicants' claims, the GC dismissed the action. 
The below cases follow the same reasoning as case T-162/14:  
Imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (cells) 
originating in or consigned from China – T-157/14 –  JingAo Solar Co. Ltd and 
others v Council – Judgment of 28 February 2017. 
Imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (cells) 
originating in or consigned from China – Joined cases T-158/14, T-161/14 and T-
163/14 - JingAo Solar Co. Ltd and Others v Council – Judgment of 28 February 
2017. 
However, further aspects were dealt with in the following case:  
Imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (cells) 
originating in or consigned from China – T-160/14 – Yingli Energy and others v. 
Council – Judgment of 28 February 2017. 
Yingli Energy (China) Co. Ltd and others (the applicants) claimed in addition to the 
points described above that the Commission infringed Article 20(3) of the basic anti-
dumping Regulation by not supplying them with enough information on the increased 
injury margin and the exports in the final disclosure.  
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The GC found that the applicants were able to identify these factors by the information 
sent to them by the Commission in the administrative procedure, which the applicants 
actually acknowledged at the hearing. Thus, the GC concluded that the institutions had 
not infringed the obligation to disclose information in the final disclosure under Article 
20(3). 
In conclusion, the GC dismissed the action. 
Imports of tartaric acid originating in China – T-442/12 – Changmao Biochemical 
Engineering Co.Ltd v Council – Judgment of 1 June 2017. 
Changmao Biochemical Engineering Co. Ltd. sought the annulment of Council 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 626/2012 of 26 June 2012 amending Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 349/2012 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
tartaric acid originating in the People's Republic of China (the 'contested regulation'). 
In June 2006, the Council imposed definitive anti-dumping measures against China on 
tartaric acid. The measures were extended in April 2012 following an expiry review. 
Following an application for a partial interim review concerning the applicant and 
another exporting producer, the Council adopted the contested regulation in June 2012. 
In the contested regulation, the Council refused to grant Market Economy Treatment 
('MET') to the applicant and the anti-dumping duty on the applicant's exports to the 
Union was increased to 13.1%. Normal value was constructed on the basis of 
information received from a cooperating producer in the analogue country Argentina. 
Since the Argentinian producer did not manufacture one type of tartaric acid produced 
by Changmao, normal value of that type was constructed using the difference in price 
between the two tartaric types. However, when the applicant requested information on 
the method of calculating normal value, in particular the source of the prices of the two 
different tartaric types and the factors affecting the price comparison, the institutions 
refused its request because it constituted confidential information. 
The GC recalled that the obligation to provide information, which is incumbent in anti-
dumping measures, must be reconciled with the obligation to respect confidential 
information. According to the GC however, the obligation to respect confidential 
information cannot deprive the applicant's right to defence of its substance.  
According to the GC the contested regulation makes no reference to any valid 
justification warranting the refusal to communicate the information relating to the price 
difference between the two acids, and the difference was fundamental to the calculation 
of the normal value of DL tartaric acid. According to the GC the applicant would have 
been better able to defend itself in the absence of that procedural error.  
In sum, the GC found that the applicant's right of defence and Article 20(2) were 
infringed when the institutions, without a valid reason, refused to grant it access to the 
information it requested on the price difference between the two acids. Consequently 
the GC annulled the contested regulation in so far it applied to the applicant.  
Bicycles consigned from Pakistan - T-435/15 - Kolachi Raj Industrial (Private) Ltd v 
Commission – Judgment of 10 October 2017  
In this judgment, the GC annulled Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/776 of 18 May 2015 (the 'contested regulation') extending the definitive anti-
dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EU) No 502/2013., to the extent that it 
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applied to Kolachi Raj Industrial (Private) Ltd, the single exporter of bicycles from 
Pakistan.  
The contested regulation extended the duty of 48,5% on imports of bicycles from China 
to imports of bicycles consigned from Pakistan after an anti-circumvention 
investigation. Kolachi, was found to be circumventing the duties via assembly 
operations within the meaning of Article 13(2) of the basic Regulation. 
Kolachi claimed that the Commission failed to prove that the parts of the assembled 
product were "from" the People's Republic of China (the country subject to measures) in 
the meaning of Article 13(2) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation 
The issue at stake was the determination of where the parts used in the assembly of 
bicycles (frames, forks, alloy rims and plastic wheels) are from. Under Article 13(2)(b) 
an assembly operation in a third country is to be regarded as circumventing the 
measures in force where the parts constituting 60% or more of the total value of the 
parts of the assembled product are from countries subject to measures. Kolachi claimed 
that the parts it used for assembly in Pakistan were manufactured in Sri Lanka so they 
could not be considered as being from China. It relied on certificates of origin issued by 
the Department of Commerce in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to 
prove origin of the parts.  
The Commission found that the certificates were insufficient to prove the origin for 
various reasons. For instance, the certificates were issued not on the basis of 
manufacturing costs but on the basis of a mere projection of manufacturing costs for the 
future, valid for one year. Also, supporting cost statements were missing for some parts. 
On the basis of additional information regarding the manufacturing costs of all the parts 
(frames, forks, alloy rims and plastic wheels) in Sri Lanka the Commission calculated 
that more than 65% of the total raw materials used for the manufacture of bicycles parts 
in Sri Lanka came from China and less than 25% Sri Lankan value was added to those 
raw materials in the manufacturing process for those parts in Sri Lanka. Thus, by 
applying by analogy Article 13(2)(b) to the parts, the Commission concluded that the 
parts originate in China. 
The Court stated that under Article 13(2) it would be sufficient to refer simply to where 
the parts are from without the need to prove that those parts also originate in that 
country. The Court pointed out however that it may be necessary in case of doubt to 
verify whether the parts from a third country originate in another country. The Court 
held that in this case it was established that the parts came from Sri Lanka but that there 
was doubt whether the parts originate in this country indeed. 
The Court found that the Commission was right in the circumstances of this case to 
consider that the certificates did not constitute sufficient evidence to demonstrate the Sri 
Lankan origin of the bicycles parts and a sufficient statement of reasons was present. 
However, it disagreed with the application by analogy of Article 13(2)(b) to the 
manufacturing of the parts in Sri Lanka. It held that the provision could not establish 
origin and that its application to manufacture in Sri Lanka is outside the scope of the 
anti-circumvention investigation concerning Pakistan. Only on that basis the Court 
annulled the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/776 for Kolachi. 
The judgment is under appeal. 
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11.5. Judgments rendered by the Court of Justice 
Bicycles consigned from Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Tunisia, whether 
declared as originating in Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Tunisia or not – C-
248/15 P, C-254/15 P and C-260/15 P – Maxcom v City Cycle Industries (Appeal) - 
Judgment of 26 January 2017. 
Maxcom Ltd, the Council and the European Commission ('appellants') sought to set 
aside the judgment of the GC of 19 march 2015, City Cycle Industries v. Council (T-
413/13) in which the GC annulled Regulation (EU) No 501/2013 of 29 May 2013 in so 
far as it extended the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 990/2011 on imports of bicycles originating in China to imports of 
bicycles consigned from Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Tunisia ('regulation at 
issue').  
This case essentially concerned the burden of proof and the standard of proof required 
to establish circumvention in circumstances where some of the producer-exports 
insufficiently cooperated in the investigation. In essence, the appellants argued that the 
Council was entitled to conclude in the regulation at issue that City Cycle was not a 
genuine Sri Lankan producer of bicycles and was not involved in assembly operations 
exceeding the thresholds laid down in Article 13(2) of the basic Regulation. City Cycle 
is a company based in Sri Lanka which exports bicycles to the EU. Furthermore, the 
appellants argued that the burden of proof should lie with the individual exporting-
producers to establish that they were not engaging in transhipment practices. According 
to the appellants, the GC reversed the burden of proof in this aspect with its judgment. 
The CJ recalled that there is no provision in the basic anti-dumping Regulation 
preventing the EU institutions from, when there is sufficient evidence, establishing the 
existence of circumvention practices when producer-exporters accounting for a 
significant part of the imports of the concerned product to the EU have not cooperated 
sufficiently with the investigation. The CJ stated that the evidence establishing 
circumvention under these circumstances must nonetheless fulfil the four criteria under 
Article 13 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. According to the CJ, there is no legal 
presumption that would infer directly from an interested party's failure to cooperate that 
circumvention practices exist.  
In the regulation at issue, the Council's conclusion was based on two findings, i.e. that 
there had been a change in the pattern of trade and that some of the producer-exporters 
had failed to cooperate. The CJ found that this was not enough to constitute sufficient 
evidence to conclude under Article 13 that City Cycle engaged in transhipment 
operations. According to the CJ, the EU institutions must have in their possession 
evidence to show that the change in the pattern of trade stems from a practice, process 
or work for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the 
imposition of the duty.  
The CJ thus found that the GC did not reverse the burden of proof under Article 13(1) 
of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. The GC merely found that it was not possible 
based on the available information to the Council to conclude that transhipment 
operations were being engaged at a national level and did not constitute a factual basis 
for suggesting that City Cycle was involved in such operations.  
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In essence, the CJ rejected the appellants' claims and dismissed the action. 
Bicycles consigned from Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Tunisia, whether 
declared as originating in Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Tunisia or not – C-
247/15 P, C-253/15 P and C-259/15 P – Maxcom v Chin Haur Indonesia (Appeal) - 
Judgment of 26 January 2017. 
Maxcom Ltd, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (the 
appellants) sought to set aside the judgment of the GC of 19 March 2015, Chin Haur 
Indonesia v Council (T-412/13) by which the GC annulled Regulation (EU) No 
501/2013 of 29 May 2013 insofar as it extended the definitive anti-dumping duty 
imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 990/2011 on imports of bicycles 
originating in China to imports of bicycles consigned from Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka and Tunisia ('regulation at issue'). 
This case essentially concerns the burden of proof and the standard of proof required to 
establish circumvention in circumstances where some of the producer-exports 
insufficiently cooperated in the investigation. The GC had essentially found that there 
had been insufficient evidence to conclude that Chin Haur engaged in transhipment and 
that the mere lack of cooperation could not establish the existence of such practices. In 
essence, the appellants argued that the Council was entitled to conclude in the regulation 
at issue that City Cycle was not a genuine Indonesian producer of bicycles and was not 
involved in assembly operations exceeding the thresholds laid down in Article 13(2) of 
the basic Regulation. Furthermore, the appellants argued that the burden of proof should 
lie with the individual exporting-producers to establish that they were not engaging in 
transhipment practices. According to the appellants, the GC reversed the burden of 
proof in this aspect with its judgment. 
The CJ recalled that there is no provision in the basic anti-dumping Regulation 
preventing the EU institutions from, when there is sufficient evidence, establishing the 
existence of circumvention practices when producer-exporters accounting for a 
significant part of the imports of the concerned product to the EU have not cooperated 
sufficiently with the investigation. The CJ stated that the evidence establishing 
circumvention under these circumstances must nonetheless fulfil the four criteria under 
Article 13 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. According to the CJ, there is no legal 
presumption that would infer directly from an interested party's failure to cooperate that 
circumvention practices exist.  
The CJ also held that the EU institutions must have evidence to show that the change in 
the pattern of trade stems from a practice, process or work for which there is insufficient 
due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty. It does not 
follow from the simple fact that Chin Haur failed to provide evidence that it was in fact 
an Indonesian bicycle producer or that it met the criteria laid down in Article 13(2) of 
the basic Regulation that that company was engaged in transhipment operations. 
Therefore, the CJ found that the GC's finding was not vitiated by an error of law.  
As it was common ground that Chin Haur did not cooperate sufficiently in the 
investigation, the Council was entitled to rely on a body of consistent evidence in 
concluding that that company had circumvented anti-dumping measures. Indeed the 
Council relied on a certain amount of factual evidence gathered by the Commission’s 
agents in the course of the verification visit at Chin Haur’s premises, i.e. that Chin Haur 
did not have the machinery to produce the parts in the volumes that it was claiming to 
produce. The GC found that the evidence did not prove that Chin Haur was engaged in 
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transhipment operations, even though it acknowledged that some of the evidence, i.e. 
the fact that Chin Haur’s Chinese supplier was not mentioned anywhere or that certain 
boxes were filled with frames bearing no origin contributed to uncertainty as to that 
company's actual activities. Additionally, Chin Haur failed to justify the figures 
provided in the exemption forms.  
According to the CJ, the GC denied the Council by its judgment the possibility of 
basing its conclusion on a body of consistent evidence and required that institution to 
furnish direct evidence that Chin Haur was in fact engaged in transhipment operations, 
at odds with the standard of proof required to show circumvention where cooperation is 
not forthcoming from producer-exporters.  
It thus followed that the GC erred in the application of Article 13(1) in finding that the 
Council was not entitled to conclude that Chin Haur was engaged in transhipment. The 
CJ therefore set aside the judgment of the GC and gave a judgment itself in the matter, 
in which it found that the Council had established a causal link between the 
transhipment operations and the change in the pattern of trade between Indonesia and 
EU. Consequently, the CJ sided with Maxcom, the Council and the Commission and 
reversed the judgment of the GC and dismissed the action for annulment brought by of 
Chin Haur.  
Imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of 
China– C-376/15 P and C-377/15 P – Changshu City Standard Parts Factory v 
Council of the European Union (Appeal) - Judgment of 5 April 2017. 
By their appeals, Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Ningbo Jinding Fastener 
Co. Ltd (the appellants) sought to set aside the judgment of the GC of 29 April 2015, 
Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Ningbo Jinding Fastener v Council 
(T-558/12 and T-559/12), by which the GC dismissed the appellants' actions for 
annulment of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 924/2012 of 4 October 2012 
amending Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China. 
The appellant's crucial ground of appeal concerned the Council's exclusion of certain 
export transactions for the purpose of calculating the dumping margin. According to the 
appellants, the GC's reasoning was vitiated by an error of law and a misinterpretation of 
Article 2(11) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. The GC had reached the conclusion 
that the Council had not committed a manifest error of assessment by excluding from 
the calculation of the dumping margin the product types that did not match any of the 
products produced and sold by an Indian producer and therefore had not infringed 
Article 2(11). According to the GC, the EU institutions were justified in doing this since 
there was an absence of comparable prices. The GC found that the EU institutions were 
right to take this approach since no other method would have allowed for a fairer 
comparison, as long as the calculation was made on the basis of a significant 
representation of the product types under considerations. The appellants disputed this 
finding and claimed that all export sales of the product under consideration are to be 
included in the comparison for the purpose of calculating the dumping margin under 
Article 2(11) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. 
The CJ found that the wording of Article 2(11) refers to "all export transactions to the 
Union" and that the objective pursued by Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation is to 
reflect the full degree of dumping being practiced. Furthermore, with regards to the 
context of Article 2(11) and in light of Articles 1(2) and 1(4), the dumping margin is to 
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be calculated on the basis of the definition of "the product under consideration", as put 
forward by the EU institutions at the time of the investigations is initiated.  
Consequently, the CJ found, in light of the wording, objective and context, Article 2(11) 
could not be interpreted as allowing the exclusion of export transactions relating to 
certain types of the product under consideration from the calculation of the dumping 
margin. On the contrary, according to the CJ all transactions have to be taken into 
account for the purposes of the calculation.  
Essentially, in the light of the foregoing the CJ held that the GC had wrongly found that 
the EU institutions were entitled to exclude export transactions relating to certain types 
of the product under consideration because there were no "comparable prices" for those 
product types. Thus, the CJ annulled the contested regulation in so far it applied to the 
appellants. 
Imports of ferrosilicon originating in Russia – C-239/15 P – RFA International LP v 
European Commission (Appeal) - Judgment of 4 May 2017. 
By its appeal, RFA International LP (RFA) sought to have set aside the judgment of the 
GC of 17 March 2015, RFA International v Commission (T-466/12), by which the GC 
dismissed its action for partial annulment of Commission Decisions concerning its 
applications for a refund of anti-dumping duties paid on imports of ferrosilicon 
originating in Russia. 
RFA essentially submitted that the GC erred in law as regards the allocation of the 
burden of proof concerning the adjustments for calculating the export price under 
Article 2(9) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. 
The CJ stated that it is for the EU institutions to make the adjustments provided for by 
Article 2(9) if the requirements for the application of that provision are met. However, it 
is for the appellant to furnish evidence in support of its claim that the adjustments that 
have been established are incorrect. RFA did not dispute before the GC that the 
requirements for the application of Article 2(9) were met. Therefore, since the said 
article is applicable, the GC did not err in law in finding that it was for RFA to submit 
detailed evidence to show that the level of adjustments made was excessive. 
Furthermore, RFA argued that it should be accepted that the allocation of the burden of 
proof established in the judgment of 16 February 2012, Council and 
Commission v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP (C-191/09 P and C-200/09 P) in 
relation to Article 2(10) is applicable by analogy. The CJ affirmed that it is true, 
according to that judgment, that when the EU institutions consider that it is appropriate 
to apply a downward adjustment of the export price, on the ground that a sales company 
affiliated to a producer carries out functions comparable to those of an agent working on 
a commission basis, it is the responsibility of the EU institutions to adduce at the very 
least consistent evidence showing that that condition is fulfilled. 
Nonetheless, in view of the differences between the adjustments made in connection 
with the construction of the export price under Article 2(9) and those made in the 
context of Article 2(10) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, RFA’s argument 
concerning the application, by analogy, of the allocation of the burden of proof 
established in the judgment of 16 February 2012, Council and Commission v Interpipe 
Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP (C-191/09 P and C-200/09 P) could not call into 
question the conclusion that the GC did not err in law in finding that it was for RFA to 
submit detailed evidence to show that the level of adjustments made was excessive.  
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In conclusion, the CJ dismissed the action for annulment brought by RFA.  
Imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) 
originating in or consigned from China – C-204/16 P and C-205/16 P – SolarWorld 
AG v. Council (Appeal) – Judgment of 9 November 2017. 
This is a summary of the cases C-204/16 P and C-205/16 P. The disputes have the same 
parties and concern essentially the same issues, with the former case concernining anti-
dumping measures and the latter case concerning anti-subsidy measures. By its appeal, 
SolarWorld AG (the applicant) sought to set aside the order of the GC of 1 February 
2016 (SolarWorld and Others vs Council in T-141/14) in so far it dismissed the action 
as inadmissible. The appplicant and Others sought the annulment of Article 3 of Council 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1238/2013 of 2 December 2013 imposing anti-
dumping duties and collecting definitively the provisional duties imposed on import sof 
crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) originating in or 
consigned from the People's Republic of China ('regulation at issue').  
In June 2013, the Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on the 
concerned products. The Commission adopted a decision in August 2013 accepting an 
undertaking offered by a group of cooperating Chinese exporting producers. Subject to 
certain requirements, these companies were exempted from the anti-dumping duties 
under Article 3 of the regulation at issue, which was adopted in December 2013. The 
applicant and others challenged Article 3 of the regulation at issue, claiming inter alia 
that there had been a manifest errors of assessment since the GC had found that Article 
3 of the regulation as issue, which was the sole provision challenged, was not severable 
from the other provisions of that regulation. Thus, the GC dismissed the action as 
inadmissible. 
The applicant raised two grounds of appeal. The first alleged that the GC erred in 
finding that Article 3 of the regulation at issue is not severable from the remainder of 
that regulation. The second alleged infringement of essentially the right to an effective 
remedy under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(the Charter). 
The CJ recalled that the partial annulment of an EU act is only possible if the elements 
whose annulment is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act. In that regard, 
the CJ has previously held that the requirement of severability is not satisfied in the case 
where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance.  
The CJ stated that EU legislature adopted trade defence measures constituting a set or a 
package when adopting the regulation at issue. According to the CJ the purpose was to 
remove the injurious effects on the EU industry while safeguarding the interests of that 
industry. The EU legislature concluded that the Minimum Import Price (MIP) in the 
undertaking would have a positive impact on the European market for the products at 
issue, which according to the CJ appears to have had a significant and separate effect 
from that of the imposition of the duty. In essence, the CJ found that both the imposition 
of anti-dumping duty and the undertaking were key means of achieving the objective 
pursued by the regulation in issue. The annulment of the undertaking would therefore 
necessarily affect the substance of the regulation at issue, according to the CJ. In 
essense, this ground of appeal was therefore rejected. 
Lastly, the CJ essentially found that the fact that the applicant cannot bring an action 
only against a part of the regulation at issue, which cannot be severed, does not infringe 
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its rights under Article 47 of the Charter in so far the applicant can challenge the 
regulation at issue in its entirety before the GC. 
Consequently, the CJ dismissed the appeal. 
Bicycles originating in China - C-61/16 P - European Bicycle Manufacturers 
Association v Giant (Appeal) - Judgment of 14 December 2017. 
The CJ dismissed the appeal brought by the Union industry (EBMA) against the 
judgment of the GC of 26 November 2015 Giant (China) v Council (T-425/13). The GC 
annulled Council Regulation (EU) No 502/2013 of 29 May 2013 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in China following an interim 
review pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation ('regulation at issue') as far as 
the applicant, the Chinese exporting producer Giant Co. Ltd. (Giant), was concerned. 
This case essentially concerned two issues, namely the interpretation of the term 
'necessary information' under Article 18(1) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation and if 
the GC erred in law when it found that the Council had been incorrect to rely on the 
facts available in calculating the export price by applying the said article. 
Definitive anti-dumping duties of 30,6% on imports of bicycles originating in China 
have been in place since 1993. In March 2012 the Commission initiated a full interim 
review of the anti-dumping measures. Giant submitted a Market Economy Treatment 
(MET) claim form for its group companies. The Commission concluded that the Giant 
group was related to two Chinese companies, S.G. and Jinshan Development and 
Construction (Jinshan), and that Giant therefore need to return a MET claim for Jinshan 
and all companies belonging to that company. Giant argued that, since it was only very 
indirectly related to Jinshan through a joint venture and Jinshan was not a producer of 
the product concerned, it was not required to submit a MET claim for that company. 
Without those forms, the Commission indicated that it could draw conclusions on the 
basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic anti-dumping 
Regulation. In June 2013 the Council adopted the regulation at issue in which it found, 
by applying Article 18(1) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, that it was impossible 
to determine an individual margin of dumping for the Giant group.  
The GC upheld Giant's action for annulment of the regulation at issue by finding 
essentially that the EU Institutions failed to make a link between the information that 
had not been provided by Giant, namely an MET claim for the Jinshan Group, and its 
relevance to calculate the export price for the Giant group. EBMA appealed the 
judgment and relied on two grounds. Essentially, EBMA alleged misinterpretation and 
misapplication of Article 18 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. Article 18 provides 
that the EU institutions may rely on available facts to make findings inter alia when an 
interested party does not provide necessary information within the time limits provided 
in the Regulation.  
The CJ found that it follows from the wording, context and objective of Article 18(1) 
that the term 'necessary information' refers to information held by the interested parties 
that the EU institutions ask them to provide in order to reach the appropriate findings in 
an anti-dumping investigation. 
Furthermore, the CJ stated that the GC verified whether the information relating to the 
Jinshan group companies which the EU institutions wished to obtain in order, inter alia, 
to determine Giant's export price, was likely to influence that determination. The GC 
concluded that the information was irrelevant to the calculation of the export price. 
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Thus, under these circumstances and in light of the definition of 'necessary information' 
above, the CJ concluded that the GC did not err in law by finding that the Council 
infringed Article 18(1) when it relied on the facts available to calculate the export price. 
Essentially for these reasons, the CJ dismissed the appeal in its entirety.  
12. ACTIVITIES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
(WTO) 
12.1. Dispute settlement in the field of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and 
safeguards 
12.1.1. Overview of the WTO dispute settlement procedure 
The WTO provides for a rigorous procedure for the settlement of disputes between 
WTO Members concerning the application of the WTO agreements. The procedure is 
divided into two main stages. The first stage, at the level of the WTO Members 
concerned, consists of a bilateral consultation. Upon failure of the consultation to settle 
the dispute, the second stage can be opened by requesting the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body to establish a panel. WTO Members, other than the complaining and defending 
party, with an interest in a given case, can intervene as 'third parties' before the panel. 
The panel issues a report, which can be appealed before the Appellate Body ('AB') (each 
appeal being heard by three members of a permanent seven-member body set up by the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)). Both the panel report and the report by the 
Appellate Body are adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body ('DSB') unless the latter 
rejects the report by unanimity. 
The findings of a panel or Appellate Body report have to be implemented by the WTO 
Member whose measures have been found to be inconsistent with the relevant WTO 
Agreements. If the complaining WTO Member is not satisfied with the way the reports 
are implemented, it can ask for the establishment of a so-called 'implementation panel'. 
Here too, an appeal against the findings of the panel is possible. 
It should be noted that the anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguards measures are 
among the most common subject matters in WTO dispute settlement.  
Regarding the dispute settlement cases against the EU the main developments were the 
following:  
On 5 September 2017, the Appellate Body circulated its report in the case against the 
EU on Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Certain Fatty Alcohols from Indonesia 
(DS442). The Appellate Body essentially upheld the Panel's finding that Indonesia had 
failed to demonstrate that the EU acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
On 6 July 2017, the Panel issued its report in the case against the EU concerning 
Countervailing Measures on Certain Polyethylene Terephthalate from Pakistan 
(DS486). The Panel essentially found that the EU, by finding that the entire amount of 
the remitted duties was a countervailable subsidy under the SCM agreement, acted 
inconsistently with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM agreement. 
On 12 December 2016, the People's Republic of China requested consultations with the 
EU on the provisions of the EU basic anti-dumping Regulation which govern the 
establishment of normal value in relation to imports from China (DS516). A first round 
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of consultations was held on 23 January 2017 and the panel was subsequently 
established on 3 April 2017. 
There were no developments concering Russia's complaint against the EU's Cost 
Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports from 
Russia (DS494). 
The first 3 cases mentioned are described below. 
12.1.2. Dispute settlement procedures against the Union  
European Union – Anti-dumping measures on Imports of Certain Fatty Alcohols 
from Indonesia (DS442) 
The Appellate Body (AB) report was circulated on 5 September 2017. 
The AB upheld the Panel's report which essentially found that Indonesia had not 
demonstrated that the EU acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the Anti-dumping 
agreement ('ADA'). The dispute concerned anti-dumping duties on imports of certain 
fatty alcohols and their blends originating in Indonesia imposed originally by Council 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1138/2011. The duties expired in November 2016, 
but Indonesia nevertheless chose to file the appeal. The core issue of the dispute was 
whether the EU infringed Article 2.4 of the ADA by treating a mark-up paid by an 
Indonesian producer and exporter to its related trading company in Singapore as 
difference affecting price comparability, and therefore making a downward adjustment 
to the export price. The EU had found that the mark-up represented a payment for a 
service for which there was no corresponding pricing component on the domestic side. 
Thus, the EU characterized the mark-up as a commission paid in respect of export sales 
to the EU. Indonesia argued in essence that the mark-up was a simple transfer of profits 
between related parties within a single economic entity ('SEE'). According to Indonesia, 
the existence of such economic entity precludes the EU from making the adjustment by. 
The AB found that there are no differences affecting price comparability that are 
precluded under Article 2.4 of the ADA. Instead, the AB found that the need to make 
due allowances must be assessed in light of the specific circumstances of each case. 
According to the AB, the affiliation between related parties, whether SEE or something 
else, is not capable in principle of precluding adjustments under Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
The AB thus concluded that the EU had sufficient evidentiary basis to treat the mark-up 
as a difference affecting the price comparability.  
European Union – Countervailing Measures on Imports of PET from Pakistan 
(DS486) 
The panel report was circulated on 6 July 2017. 
The Panel found that the EU acted inconsistently with several provisions of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ('SCM Agreement'). The dispute 
concerned countervailing measures by the EU on imports of Certain Polyethylene 
Terephthalate from Pakistan. The Panel found inter alia that the EU acted inconsistent 
with Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement by failing to provide a reasoned and 
adequate explanation for why it found that the entire amount of remitted duties under 
the Pakistani Manufacturing Bond Scheme, which it found to be the financial 
contribution, was in excess of those which have accrued. The Panel found that the EU 
had not provided any basis upon which to depart from the Excess Remissions Principle. 
Therefore, the Panel found that EU acted inconsistently with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM 
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agreement by finding the existence of a subsidy that was contingent on export 
performance. The EU had found that Pakistan, by providing loans through pre-approved 
banks, which were not allowed to charge interested rates above a specified level, 
conferred a countervailable 'benefit' to the exporter. The Panel found that the EU acted 
inconsistently with Article 14(b) of the SCM Agreement by failing to properly identify 
what the exporter would have paid on a comparable commercial loan in calculating the 
benefit conferred. 
The EU notified the Dispute Settlement Body on 30 August 2017 of its decision to 
appeal the Panel's report to the Appellate Body. 
European Union – Measures related to Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516) 
On 12 December 2016, China requested consultations with the EU on the provisions of 
the EU’s basic anti-dumping Regulation which govern the establishment of normal 
value in relation to imports from China (DS516). In its request, China argued that when 
it acceded to the WTO, China and other WTO Members agreed that, for a transitional 
period of fifteen years, China-specific treaty provisions would apply to the 
determination by other Members of certain elements of "price comparability" in anti-
dumping proceedings involving Chinese imports. Specifically, under paragraph 15(a)(ii) 
of the Protocol on the Accession of China, importing WTO Members are, subject to 
certain conditions, exceptionally permitted to use a methodology not based on a strict 
comparison with domestic prices or costs in China. China argues that, from the date of 
expiry of paragraph 15(a)(ii) on 11 December 2016, the European Union is no longer 
entitled to determine normal value on the basis of a special calculation methodology. A 
first round of consultations was held on 23 January 2017. The panel was subsequently 
established on 3 April 2017. The panel members were appointed by the Director 
General of the WTO on 10 July 2017. On 8 December 2017, the Chair of the panel 
informed that the beginning of the panel's work had been delayed as a result of a lack of 
available lawyers in the Secretariat. The panel also informed that it expected to issue its 
final report to the parties not before the second half of 2018. 
It should be noted that, on 12 December 2016, China also requested consultations with 
the USA on the continued application by the US of non-market economy dumping 
calculation methodology in relation to imports from China (DS515). 
12.2. Other WTO activities 
In the course of 2017, intensive negotiations on the fisheries subsidies file were 
conducted in Geneva. These negotiations culminated at the 11
th
 WTO Ministerial 
Conference that took place in December 2017 in Buenos Aires. However, no 
substantive outcome was achieved there. At the same time, WTO members agreed on a 
work programme that will form a basis for further negotiations in view of adopting a 
comprehensive agreement at the next Ministerial Conference in 2019. Members also 
committed to fully respect their notification obligations in the area of fisheries 
subsidies.  
In 2017, the EU submitted a new notification of subsidies in line with its WTO 
obligations covering the years 2015 and 2016. The notification included all subsidies 
granted at EU level as well as subsidies granted by each of the Member States. In 
October 2017, a review of the submission began in the special session of the Subsidies 
and Countervailing Committee which will continue into 2018. In the special Committee, 
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the EU also participated in the continued review of the 2015 subsidy notification at the 
meetings held in April and October 2017.  
In addition, the EU participated in the work of the regular Subsidies and Countervailing 
and Safeguards Committees in April and October 2017. In April, the EU (along with 
Canada, Japan and the US) presented a paper in the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing 
Committee regarding the role of subsidies as a contributor to excess capacity in various 
sectors of economic activity. The EU also organized a seminar on the same issue in 
October 2017 at the WTO and presented the main conclusions of that seminar at the 
October session of the Committee. In addition to these discussions, the problem of poor 
transparency on subsidies by many WTO members was also addressed. 
Moreover, the EU participated actively in the regular work of the WTO Anti-Dumping 
and Safeguards Committees answering questions on EU cases and raising issues of 
concern on trade defence activity by other countries which affect EU exporters.  
In the Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention, in April 2017, the EU made a 
presentation on the EU's legislation and practice in dealing with the circumvention of 
anti-dumping measures. The EU also actively participated in both sessions of the Anti-
dumping Working Group on Implementation (WGI) which discussed standards for 
initiation, the standing test and ensuring effective participation in anti-dumping 
investigations (April 2017) and injury-related issues, as well as the analysis of the 
effects of imports on domestic industry prices and the methodology for analysing 
imports by the domestic industry (October 2017).  For the October session of the WGI, 
the discussant was Mr. Wolfgang Mueller, from the EU's trade defence services. 
13. CONCLUSION 
2017 was a year with intensive trade defence work. The number of investigations 
remained at a high level. The pressure related to industrial overcapacities in China was 
persisting. This reflects again the number of complaints received from EU industry that 
included sufficient evidence to support allegations of injurious dumping or subsidies. At 
the same time, the number of provisional and definitive measures imposed remained at 
the same demanding level as compared to 2016. A further feature of the trade defence 
activity in 2017 is that the vast majority of the new investigations that came up at 
definitive stage in that year resulted in the imposition of definitive measures. Indeed, the 
number of proceedings terminated without the imposition of measures was particularly 
low. Additionally, the number of review investigations initiated increased substantially, 
by 75% over the previous year. As was the case with previous years, the EU took no 
safeguard action. 
2017 stood out in terms of legislative activity. It led to the introduction of a new anti-
dumping methodology for calculating normal value in investigations relating to 
countries where serious market distortions occur, as well as a strengthened anti-subsidy 
instrument. The new regulation was accompanied by the publication of a report on state-
induced market distortions existing in China. Last but not least, 2017 paved the way for 
the modernisation of EU trade defence instruments. Taken together, these amendments 
to the basic Regulations constitute a major overhaul of the EU's trade defence policy 
and instruments for the benefit of its stakeholders. This has served to ensure that the EU 
is equipped with sufficiently robust trade defence instruments to deal with distortions in 
the global economy.  
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ANNEX A 
New investigations initiated 
during the period 1 January – 31 December 2017 













C 251; 02.08.2017, p.5 
New and retreaded tyres for buses or lorries P.R.China, 
 
C 264; 11.08.2017, p.14 
Electric bicycles P.R.China C 353; 20.10.2017, p.19 





C 438; 19.12.2017, p.39 
 
 





New and retreaded tyres for buses or lorries P.R.China C 346; 14.10.2017, p.9  
Electric bicycles P.R.China C 440; 21.12.2017, p.22 
 
 






P.R. China C 296; 07.09.2017, p.16 
AD 
Stainless steel wires 
India C 334; 06.10.2017, p.3 
AD  
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ANNEX B 
A. New investigations initiated by product sector during the period 2013 – 2017 
(excluding the reopenings) 
Product sector 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Chemical and allied 1 2 6 1 5  
Textiles and allied 3 - - - - 
Wood and paper - - - 1 - 
Electronics - - - - - 
Other mechanical engineering - - - - 1 
Iron and Steel 1 9 6 13 - 
Other metals - 3 - - 2 
Other 4 2 2 - 3 
 9 16 14 - - 
Of which anti-dumping 4 14 12 14 9 
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B. New investigations initiated by country of export during the period 2013 – 2017 
(excluding the reopenings) 
Country of origin 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Argentina - - - - - 
Belarus - - - 1 - 
Bosnia Herzegovina - - - - 1  
Brazil - - 1 1 1 
P.R. China 6 6 6 6 5  
Egypt - - - - 1 
India 1 2 2 1 - 
Indonesia 1 - - 0 - 
Iran - - - 1 - 
Georgia - - 1 - - 
Japan - 1 - - - 
Kazakhstan - - - - - 
Korea (Rep. of) - 1 - 2 - 
F.Y.R.O.M. - - - - - 
Mexico - - 1 - - 
Oman - - - - - 
Russia - 2 1 1 1  
Serbia - - - 1 - 
Taiwan - 1 1 - - 
Thailand - - - - - 
Turkey - 2 1 - 1  
Ukraine - - - 1 1 
U.S.A. - 1 - - - 
Vietnam 1 -  - - 
Total  9 16 14 15 11 
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ANNEX C 
Imposition of provisional duties in the course of new investigations  
during the period 1 January – 31 December 2017 
A. Anti-dumping investigations (chronological by date of publication) 
 
Product Country of origin Regulation N° OJ Reference 
Corrosion resistant steels P.R.China 
Commission 
Regulation  
 (EU) 2017/1444 
L 207; 10.08.2017, 
p.1 










B. Anti-subsidy investigations (chronological by date of publication) 
 
Product Country of origin Regulation N° OJ Reference 
None    
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ANNEX D 
New investigations concluded by the imposition of definitive duties 
during the period 1 January – 31 December 2017 
A. Anti-dumping investigations (chronological by date of publication) 
 
Product Country of origin Regulation N° OJ Reference 






L 22; 27.01.2017, 
p.14 
Heavy plate of non-alloy or 




L 50; 28.02.2017, 
p.18 
Hot-rolled flat products of 





L 92; 06.04.2017, 
p.68 
Lightweight thermal paper Rep. Of Korea 
Commission Regulation 
(EU) 2017/763 
L 114; 03.05.2017, 
p.3   
Seamless pipes and tubes of 
iron (other than cast iron) or 
steel (other than stainless 
steel), of circular cross 
section, of an external 





L 121; 12.05.2017, 
p.3   
 
Concrete reinforcement bars 




L 155; 17.06.2017, 
p.6  
Hot-rolled flat products of 
iron, non-alloy or other alloy 
steel 








B. Anti-subsidy investigations (chronological by date of publication) 
 
Product Country of origin Regulation N° OJ Reference 
Hot-rolled flat products of 




 (EU) 2017/969 
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ANNEX E 
New investigations terminated without the imposition of measures 
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2017 
A. Anti-dumping investigations (chronological by date of publication) 
 
Product Country of origin Decision N° OJ Reference 




07.06.2017, p.27  
Hot-rolled flat products of 









B. Anti-subsidy investigations (chronological by date of publication) 
 
Product Country of origin Decision N° OJ Reference 
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ANNEX F 
Expiry reviews initiated or concluded 
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2017 
(chronological by date of publication) 
Initiated 
Product Country of origin OJ Reference 




C 117; 12.04.2017, p.15  AD 
Tartaric acid P.R. China C 122; 19.04.2017, p.8 AD 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or 
steel 
Russia C 214; 04.07.2017, p.9 AD  
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or 
steel 
Ukraine C 214; 04.07.2017, p.9 AD  
Lever arch mechanisms P.R. China C 290; 01.09.2017, p.3 AD 
Aluminium Radiators P.R. China C 377; 09.11.2017, p.11  AD 
Chamois leather P.R. China C 416; 06.12.2017, p.15 AD  
 
 







Sodium gluconate P.R. China Commission 
Regulation (EU) 
2017/94 
L 16; 20.01.2017, p.3 AD 
Aluminium road wheels P.R. China Commission 
Regulation (EU) 
2017/109 
L 18; 24.01.2017, p.1 AD 
High tenacity yarn of 
polyester 
P.R. China Commission 
Regulation (EU) 
2017/325 
L 49; 25.02.2017, p.6 AD 
Solar panels (crystalline 
silicon photovoltaic modules 
and key components)  









L 56; 03.03.2017, p.131 
(AD)  
L 56; 03.03.2017, p.1 
(AS)  
 
Graphite electrode systems India Commission 
Regulation (EU) 
L 64; 10.03.2017, p.46 
(AD)  
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2017/422 L 64; 10.03.2017, p.10 
(AS)  
 
Okoume plywood P.R. China Commission 
Regulation (EU) 
2017/648 
L 92; 06.04.2017, p.48 
AD  
Filament glass fibre products P.R. China Commission 
Regulation (EU) 
2017/724 
L 107; 25.04.2017, p.4  
AD 




L 142; 02.06.2017, p.53  
AD 









Regulation (EU)  
2017/1171 
L 170; 01.07.2017, p.62 
AD  
Coated fine paper 
P.R. China 
Commission 
Regulation (EU)  
2017/1188 
L 171; 04.07.2017, 
p.168 AD  
L 171; 04.07.2017, 




Regulation (EU)  
2017/1759 
L 250; 28.09.2017, p.34 
AD  




Regulation (EU)  
2017/1993 





Regulation (EU)  
2017/2179 
L 307; 23.11.2017, p.25 
 




Regulation (EU)  
2017/2206 
L 314; 30.11.207, p.12 
trichloroisocyanuric acid  P.R. China 
Commission 
Regulation (EU)  
2017/2230 
L 319; 05.12.2017, p.10  
 
 







Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) P.R. China Commission Decision (EU) 
2017/206 
L 32; 07.02.2017, 
p.53 AD  
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ANNEX G 
Interim reviews initiated or concluded 
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2017 
(chronological by date of publication) 
Initiated 
Product 
Country of origin 
(consigned from) 
OJ Reference 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) 
P.R. China C 67; 03.03.2017, p.16 
(AD) 
  C 67; 03.03.2017, p.16 
(AS) 
Ceramic tableware and kitchenware P.R. China C 117; 12.04.2017, p.12  
AD 
Threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of 
malleable cast iron 
P.R. China,  
Thailand 
C 162; 23.05.2017, p.12 
AD 
Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) India C 216; 06.07.2017, p.26 
AS 
Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) India C 216; 06.07.2017, p.30 
AS 
Rainbow trout Turkey C 234; 20.07.2017, p.6 AS 
Ammonium nitrate Russia C 271; 17.08.2017, p.9 AD 



















p.21 AD  
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None    
  










Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) 













p.1 (AS)  
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ANNEX H 
Other reviews initiated or concluded 
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2017 
(chronological by date of publication) 
Initiated 
Product Country of origin OJ Reference 
Tartaric acid 
P.R. China C 296; 07.09.2017, p.16 
AD 
Stainless steel wires 


































Threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of 
malleable cast iron 
P.R. China 
Commission Regulation 
(EU)  2017/1146 
L 166; 
29.06.2017, 
p.23  AD 
Biodiesel 
Argentina, 
















None    
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ANNEX I 
New exporter reviews initiated or concluded 
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2017 
(chronological by date of publication) 












Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) 










p.20   
Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres India Commission Regulation 




Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) 
P.R. China Commission Regulation 




























None    
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Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) 







Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) 
P.R. China Commission Regulation 
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ANNEX J 
Anti-absorption investigations initiated or concluded 
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2017 






None   
 








None    
 








Stainless steel cold-rolled flat 
products 
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ANNEX K 
Anti-circumvention investigations initiated or concluded 
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2017 










Seamless pipes and tubes of stainless 
steel 
P.R. China Commission Regulation 
(EU) 2017/272 
L 40; 17.02.2017, 
p.64 AD  




(EU) 2017/ 1348 L 188; 
20.07.2017, p.1 
AD 
Citric Acid Cambodia 
Commission Regulation 














Aluminium foil P.R. China Commission Regulation 
(EU) 2017/271 
L 40; 17.02.2017, 
p.51 AD  
 
 





























None    
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ANNEX L 
Safeguard investigations initiated and concluded 
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2017 
(chronological by date of publication) 
New investigations initiated 
Product Country of origin OJ Reference 
None    
 
New investigations terminated without imposition of measures 
Product 




None    
 
Issue of licences 
Product 




None    
 
New investigations initiated 
Product Country of origin Date of expiry 
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ANNEX M 
Undertakings accepted or repealed 
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2017 





Decision N° OJ Reference 
None    
 




Decision N° OJ Reference 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) 






























L 71; 16.03.2017, p.5 
 
 
L 142; 02.06.2017, p.43 
 
 
L 201; 02.08.2017, p.3 
 
 
L 218; 24.08.2017, p.10 
 
 
L 230; 06.09.2017, p.11 
 
 
L 241; 20.09.2017, p.21 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) 
(AD + AS) 
 
P.R. China 






L 238; 16.09.2017, p.22 
 





(s) & OJ 
Reference 
OJ Reference 
None    
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ANNEX N 
Measures which expired / lapsed 
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2017 
(chronological by date of publication) 
A. Anti-dumping investigations (chronological by date of publication) 
 
Product 




Stainless steel fasteners and 
parts thereof 




Council Regulation (EU) 
2/2012 (L 5, 07.01.2012, 
p. 1) 
Commission Regulation 
(EU) 502/2012 (L 153, 
14.06.2012, p. 8) 
NoE C 5; 
07.01.2017, 
p.2 
Steel ropes and cables Ukraine, Moldova Council Regulation (EU) 
102/2012 (L36, 
09.02.2012; p. 1) 




B. Anti-subsidy investigations (chronological by date of publication) 
 
Product 
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ANNEX O 
Definitive anti-dumping measures in force on 31 December 2017  
a. Ranked by product (alphabetical) 
Case Country Extension Regulation 
Acesulfame Potassium (ACE-K) P.R. China   
L 125, 21.05.2015, p. 15 
L 287, 31.10.2015, p. 52 
Aluminium foil P.R. China   
L332;18.12.2015, p.63 
Extension (circum.) 
L 40; 17.02.2017, p.51 
Aluminium foil Russia   
L 175, 04.07.2015, p. 14 
L 332; 18.12.2015, p 91 
Aluminium Foil in small rolls P.R. China   
L 251, 18.09.2012, p. 29 
L 69, 13.03.2013, p. 11 
Aluminium radiators P.R. China   
L 124, 11.05.2012, p. 17 
L 310, 09.11.2012, p. 1 
Aluminium road wheels P.R. China   L 18; 24.01.2017, p.1 
Ammonium nitrate Russia   
L 280, 24.09.2014, p. 19 
L41; 18.02.2016, p.13 
Aspartame P.R. China   
L 50; 26.02.2016, p.4 
L 204; 29.07.2016, p.92 
Barium carbonate P.R. China   
L 27; 28.01.2005, p.4 
L189; 18.07.2005. p.15 
L 250; 28.09.2017, p.34 
Bicycles P.R. China   
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L 153, 05.06.2013, p. 17 
Amendment 
L 47; 24.02.2017, p.13 
Bicycles P.R. China Indonesia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 153, 05.06.2013, p. 1 
Bicycles P.R. China Malaysia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 153, 05.06.2013, p. 1 
Bicycles P.R. China Sri Lanka 
Extension (circum.) 
L 153, 05.06.2013, p. 1 
Bicycles P.R. China Tunisia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 153, 05.06.2013, p. 1 
Bicycles P.R. China Cambodia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 122, 19.05.2015, p. 4 
Bicycles P.R. China Pakistan 
Extension (circum.) 
L 122, 19.05.2015, p. 4 
Bicycles P.R. China Philippines 
Extension (circum.) 
L 122, 19.05.2015, p. 4 
Bicycles (parts) P.R. China 
China (bicycle 
parts) 
C 299, 05.09.2014, p. 7 
L 132, 29.05.2015, p. 32 
Amendment 
L 331, 17.12.2015, p.30 
Biodiesel Argentina   
L 141, 28.05.2013, p. 6 
L 315, 26.11.2013, p. 67 
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Case Country Extension Regulation 
Biodiesel Indonesia   
L 141, 28.05.2013, p. 6 
L 315, 26.11.2013, p. 67 
Biodiesel USA   
L 239, 15.09.2015, p. 69 
Amendment 
L 116; 30.04.2016, p.31 
Biodiesel USA Canada L 122; 05.05.2011, p.1 
Bioethanol USA   L 49, 22.02.2013, p. 10 
Ceramic tableware and kitchenware P.R. China   
L 318, 15.11.2012, p. 28 
L 131, 15.05.2013, p. 1 
Amendment 
L 314; 30.11.2017, p.31 
Ceramic tiles P.R. China   
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L 67, 12.03.2015, p. 23 
L 307; 23.11.2017, p.25 
Chamois leather P.R. China   L 334, 06.12.2012, p. 31 
Citric acid P.R. China Malaysia L 10; 15.01.2016, p.3 
Citric acid P.R. China   L 15, 22.01.2015, p. 15 
Citrus fruits P.R. China   
Reopening 
L 49, 22.02.2013, p. 29 
L 354, 11.12.2014, p. 17 
Coated fine paper P.R. China   
L 299; 16.11.2010, p.7 
L 128; 06.05.2011, p.1 
L 171; 04.07.2017, p.168 
cold-rolled flat steel products P.R. China   
L 37;  12.02.2016, p.1 
L 210; 04.08.2016, p.1 
cold-rolled flat steel products Russia   
L 37;  12.02.2016, p.1 
L 210; 04.08.2016, p.1 
Fatty alcohols and their blends Malaysia   
Amendment/confirmation 
(foll. Court ruling) 
L 352, 21.12.2012, p. 1 
Fatty alcohols and their blends Indonesia   
Amendment/confirmation 
(foll. Court ruling) 
L 352, 21.12.2012, p. 1 
Fatty alcohols and their blends India   
Amendment/confirmation 
(foll. Court ruling) 
L 352, 21.12.2012, p. 1 
Ferro-silicon Russia   L 107, 10.04.2014, p. 13 
Ferro-silicon P.R. China   L 107, 10.04.2014, p. 13 
Filament glass fibre products P.R. China   
L 243; 16.09.2010, p.40 
L 67; 15.03.2011, p.1 
L 107; 25.04.2017, p.4 
Grain oriented flat-rolled products of 
silicon-electrical steel USA   
L 120, 13.05.2015, p. 10 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109 
Grain oriented flat-rolled products of 
silicon-electrical steel Russia   
L 120, 13.05.2015, p. 10 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109 
Grain oriented flat-rolled products of 
silicon-electrical steel 
Korea (Rep. 
of)   
L 120, 13.05.2015, p. 10 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109 
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Case Country Extension Regulation 
Grain oriented flat-rolled products of 
silicon-electrical steel Japan   
L 120, 13.05.2015, p. 10 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109 
Grain oriented flat-rolled products of 
silicon-electrical steel P.R. China   
L 120, 13.05.2015, p. 10 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109 
Graphite electrode systems India   L 64; 10.03.2017, p.46 
Hand pallet trucks and their essential 
parts P.R. China Thailand L 151; 11.06.2009, p.1 
Hand pallet trucks and their essential 
parts P.R. China   
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L 112, 24.04.2013, p. 1 
Amendment (newcomer) 
L 265, 05.09.2014, p. 7 
Extension (circum.) 
L 214; 09.08.2016, p.1 
Heavy plates P.R. China   L 50; 28.02.2017, p.18 
High fatigue performance steel concrete 
reinforcement bars P.R. China   
L 23; 29.01.2016, p.16 
L 204; 29.07.2016, p.70 
Hot rolled flat products Ukraine   L 258; 06.10.2017, p.24 
Hot rolled flat products Russia   L 258; 06.10.2017, p.24 
Hot rolled flat products Iran   L 258; 06.10.2017, p.24 
Hot rolled flat products Brazil   L 258; 06.10.2017, p.24 
Hot rolled flat products P.R. China   
L 272; 07.10.2016, p.33 
L 92; 06.04.2017, p.68 
Ironing boards P.R. China   L 338; 20.12.2010, p.22 
Ironing boards P.R. China   
Reopening 
L 297, 26.10.2012, p. 5 
L 198, 23.07.2013, p. 1 
Lever Arch Mechanisms P.R. China   L 238, 04.09.2012, p.5 
Manganese Dioxides South Africa   L 59, 28.02.2014, p. 7 
Melamine P.R. China   
L 298; 15.11.2010, p.10 
L 124; 10.05.2011, p.2 
L 170; 01.07.2017, p.62 
Molybdenum wires P.R. China Malaysia 
Extension (circum.) 
L8, 12.01.2012, p. 22 
Molybdenum wires P.R. China   
Extension (circum.) 
L 243, 12.09.2013, P. 2 
Extension (circum.) 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 100 
L 170; 19.06.2016, p.19 
Monosodium glutamate P.R. China   L 15, 22.01.2015, p. 31 
Monosodium glutamate Indonesia   
L 246, 21.08.2014, p. 1 
L 15, 22.01.2015, p. 54 
Okoumé plywood P.R. China   
L 181; 17.05.2004, p.5 
L 336; 02.11.2004, p.4 
L 92; 06.04.2017, p.48 
Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  P.R. China India 
Extension (circum.) 
L 346, 20.12.2013, p. 20 
Extension (circum.) 
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Case Country Extension Regulation 
L 236, 10.09.2015, p. 1 
Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  P.R. China Indonesia L 346, 20.12.2013, p. 20 
Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  P.R. China Thailand 
Extension (circum.) 
L 11, 16.01.2013, p. 1 
Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  P.R. China Taiwan 
Extension (circum.) 
L 11, 16.01.2013, p. 1 
Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  P.R. China Malaysia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 196, 24.07.2012, p. 1 
Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  P.R. China   
L 204; 09.08.2011, p.1 
Expiry review 
L 288; 07.11.2017, p.4 
Organic coated steel products P.R. China   
L 252, 19.09.2012, p. 33 
L 73, 15.03.2013, p. 1 
Oxalic acid P.R. China   
L 106, 18.04.2012, p. 1 
L 321; 29.11.2016, p.48 
Oxalic acid India   L 106, 18.04.2012, p. 1 
Peroxosulphates (persulphates) P.R. China   L 338, 17.12.2013, p. 11 
Polyester high tenacity filament yarn P.R. China   L 49; 25.02.2017, p.6 
PSC wires and strands P.R. China   
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L 297, 26.10.2012, p.1 
L 139, 05.06.2015, p. 12 
Rebars Belarus   
L 345; 20.12.2016; p.4 
L 155; 17.06.2017, p.6 
Ringbinder mechanisms P.R. China Laos L 7; 12.01.2006, p.1 
Ringbinder mechanisms P.R. China Vietnam L 232; 28.06.2004, p.1 
Ringbinder mechanisms P.R. China   L 122; 12.05.2016, p.1 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or 
steel Ukraine   
L 174, 04.07.2012, p. 5 
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L 238, 04.09.2012, p. 1 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or 
steel Russia   
L 174, 04.07.2012, p. 5 
L 357, 28.12.2012, p. 1 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or 
steel P.R. China   L 322, 08.12.2015, p. 21 
Seamless pipes and tubes of stainless 
steel P.R. China   
L 169; 27.06.2011, p.1 
L 336; 14.12.2011, p.6 
Seamless pipes, of iron or steel, external 
diameter exceeding 406.4 mm P.R. China   
L 305; 12.11.2016, p.1 
L 121; 12.05.2017, p.3 
Silicon metal (silicon) P.R. China Taiwan 
Extension (circum.) 
L 95, 05.04.2013, p. 1 
Silicon metal (silicon) P.R. China Korea (Rep. of) L 13; 15.01.2007, p.1 
Silicon metal (silicon) P.R. China   L 179; 05.07.2016, p.1 
Sodium Cyclamate P.R. China   L 192; 16.07.2016, p.23 
Sodium Cyclamate P.R. China   
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L 124, 11.05.2012, p. 1 
L 192; 16.07.2016, p.49 
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Case Country Extension Regulation 
Sodium Cyclamate Indonesia   L 192; 16.07.2016, p.49 
Sodium gluconate P.R. China   L 16; 20.01.2017, p.3 
Solar glass P.R. China   
L 316, 27.11.2013, p. 8 
L 142, 14.05.2014, p. 1 
Amendment 
L 98, 15.04.2015, p. 6 
Amendment (absorption 
reinvestigation) 
L 215, 14.08.2015, p. 42 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) P.R. China Taiwan 
Extension (circum.) 
L 37; 12.02.2016, p.76 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) P.R. China Malaysia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 37; 12.02.2016, p.76 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) P.R. China   
L 152, 05.06.2013, p. 5 
L 325, 05.12.2013, p. 1 
Amendment 
L 173; 30.06.2016, p.44 
L 56; 03.03.2017, p.131 
Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products Taiwan   
L 79, 25.3.15, p. 23 
L 224, 27.08.2015, p. 10 
Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products P.R. China   
L 79, 25.3.15, p. 23 
L 224, 27.08.2015, p. 10 
Stainless steel tube and pipe butt-
welding fittings Taiwan   L 22; 27.01.2017, p.14 
Stainless steel tube and pipe butt-
welding fittings P.R. China   L 22; 27.01.2017, p.14 
Stainless steel wire India   
L 126, 08.05.2013, p. 1 
L 298, 08.11.2013, p. 1 
Amendment (absorption 
reinvestigation) 
L 228, 02.09.2015, p. 1 
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L 34; 09.02.2017, p.21 
Steel ropes and cables P.R. China Korea (Rep. of) 
L36, 09.02.2012; p. 1 
Amendment (newcomer) 
L 138, 13.05.2014, p. 80 
Amendment 
L 139, 14.05.2014, p.7 
Steel ropes and cables P.R. China Morocco L36, 09.02.2012; p. 1 
Steel ropes and cables P.R. China   L36, 09.02.2012; p. 1 
Sulphanilic acid P.R. China   L 363, 18.02.2014, p. 82 
Sweet corn (prepared or preserved in 
kernels) Thailand   
L 244, 13.09.2013, p. 1 
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L 91, 27.03.2014, p. 1 
Tartaric Acid P.R. China   Amendment ((partial) 
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Case Country Extension Regulation 
interim review) 
L 108, 20.04.2012, p. 1 
L 110, 24.04.2012, p. 3 
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L 182, 13.07.2012, p. 1 
Thermal paper 
Korea (Rep. 
of)   
L 310; 17.11.2016, p.1 
L 114; 03.05.2017, p.3 
Threaded tube or pipe cast fittings of 
malleable cast iron Thailand   
L 318, 15.11.2012, p. 10 
L 129, 14.05.2013, p. 1 
Threaded tube or pipe cast fittings of 
malleable cast iron P.R. China   
L 318, 15.11.2012, p. 10 
L 129, 14.05.2013, p. 1 
Trichloroisocyanuric acid (TCCA) P.R. China   
Amendment (newcomer) 
L 157, 27.05.2014, p. 80 
L 319; 05.12.2017, p.10 
Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel Turkey   
L 203, 31.07.2012, p. 37 
L 27, 29.01.2013, p. 1 
Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel Russia   
L 203, 31.07.2012, p. 37 
L 27, 29.01.2013, p. 1 
Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel P.R. China Philippines L 116; 27.04.2006, p.1 
Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel P.R. China Sri Lanka L 355; 22.11.2004, p.9 
Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel P.R. China Indonesia L 335; 22.11.2004, p.4 
Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel P.R. China Taiwan L 94; 14.04.2000, p.1 
Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel P.R. China   L 282, 28.10.2015, p. 14 
Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel Malaysia   
L 347, 03.12.2014, p. 17 
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L58; 04.03.2016, p.38 
Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel 
Korea (Rep. 
of)   
L 347, 03.12.2014, p. 17 
Amendment ((partial) 
interim review) 
L58; 04.03.2016, p.38 
Tubes and pipes of ductile cast iron India   
L 244, 19.09.2015, p. 25 
L 73; 18.03.2016, p.53 
Tungsten carbide and fused tungsten 
carbide P.R. China   
Initiation 
C 322; 15.12.1988, p.7 
L 395; 31.12.2004, p.56 
L 78; 24.03.2011, p.1 
L 142; 02.06.2017, p.53 
Tungsten electrodes P.R. China   L 150, 04.06.2013, p. 1 
Welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-
alloy steel Russia   L 20, 27.01.2015, p. 6 
Welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-
alloy steel P.R. China   L 20, 27.01.2015, p. 6 
Welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-
alloy steel Belarus   L 20, 27.01.2015, p. 6 
Wire rod P.R. China   L 268, 15.10.2015, p. 9 
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Definitive anti-dumping measures in force on 31 December 2017 
b. Ranked by country (alphabetical) 
 
Country Case Extension Regulation 
Argentina Biodiesel   
L 141, 28.05.2013, p. 6 
L 315, 26.11.2013, p. 67 
Belarus Rebars   
L 345; 20.12.2016; p.4 
L 155; 17.06.2017, p.6 
Belarus 
Welded tubes and pipes of iron or 
non-alloy steel   L 20, 27.01.2015, p. 6 
Brazil Hot rolled flat products   L 258; 06.10.2017, p.24 
India Fatty alcohols and their blends   
Amendment/confirmation 
measures (foll. Court ruling) 
L 352, 21.12.2012, p. 1 
India Graphite electrode systems   L 64; 10.03.2017, p.46 
India Oxalic acid   L 106, 18.04.2012, p. 1 
India Stainless steel wire   
L 126, 08.05.2013, p. 1 
L 298, 08.11.2013, p. 1 
Amendment (absorption 
reinvestigation) 
L 228, 02.09.2015, p. 1 
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 34; 09.02.2017, p.21 
India Tubes and pipes of ductile cast iron   
L 244, 19.09.2015, p. 25 
L 73; 18.03.2016, p.53 
Indonesia Biodiesel   
L 141, 28.05.2013, p. 6 
L 315, 26.11.2013, p. 67 
Indonesia Fatty alcohols and their blends   
Amendment/confirmation 
measures (foll. Court ruling) 
L 352, 21.12.2012, p. 1 
Indonesia Monosodium glutamate   
L 246, 21.08.2014, p. 1 
L 15, 22.01.2015, p. 54 
Indonesia Sodium Cyclamate   L 192; 16.07.2016, p.49 
Iran Hot rolled flat products   L 258; 06.10.2017, p.24 
Japan 
Grain oriented flat-rolled products of 
silicon-electrical steel   
L 120, 13.05.2015, p. 10 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109 
Korea (Rep. 
of) 
Grain oriented flat-rolled products of 
silicon-electrical steel   
L 120, 13.05.2015, p. 10 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109 
Korea (Rep. 
of) Thermal paper   
L 310; 17.11.2016, p.1 
L 114; 03.05.2017, p.3 
Korea (Rep. 
of) Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel   
L 347, 03.12.2014, p. 17 
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L58; 04.03.2016, p.38 
Malaysia Fatty alcohols and their blends   
Amendment/confirmation 
measures (foll. Court ruling) 
L 352, 21.12.2012, p. 1 
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Country Case Extension Regulation 
Malaysia Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel   
L 347, 03.12.2014, p. 17 
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L58; 04.03.2016, p.38 
P.R. China Acesulfame Potassium (ACE-K)   
L 125, 21.05.2015, p. 15 
L 287, 31.10.2015, p. 52 
P.R. China Aluminium foil   
L332;18.12.2015, p.63 
Extension (circum.) 
L 40; 17.02.2017, p.51 
P.R. China Aluminium Foil in small rolls   
L 251, 18.09.2012, p. 29 
L 69, 13.03.2013, p. 11 
P.R. China Aluminium radiators   
L 124, 11.05.2012, p. 17 
L 310, 09.11.2012, p. 1 
P.R. China Aluminium road wheels   L 18; 24.01.2017, p.1 
P.R. China Aspartame   
L 50; 26.02.2016, p.4 
L 204; 29.07.2016, p.92 
P.R. China Barium carbonate   
L 27; 28.01.2005, p.4 
L189; 18.07.2005. p.15 
L 250; 28.09.2017, p.34 
P.R. China Bicycles   
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 153, 05.06.2013, p. 17 
Amendment 
L 47; 24.02.2017, p.13 
P.R. China Bicycles Indonesia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 153, 05.06.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China Bicycles Malaysia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 153, 05.06.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China Bicycles Sri Lanka 
Extension (circum.) 
L 153, 05.06.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China Bicycles Tunisia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 153, 05.06.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China Bicycles Cambodia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 122, 19.05.2015, p. 4 
P.R. China Bicycles Pakistan 
Extension (circum.) 
L 122, 19.05.2015, p. 4 
P.R. China Bicycles Philippines 
Extension (circum.) 
L 122, 19.05.2015, p. 4 
P.R. China Bicycles (parts) 
China (bicycle 
parts) 
C 299, 05.09.2014, p. 7 
L 132, 29.05.2015, p. 32 
Amendment 
L 331, 17.12.2015, p.30 
P.R. China Ceramic tableware and kitchenware   
L 318, 15.11.2012, p. 28 
L 131, 15.05.2013, p. 1 
Amendment 
L 314; 30.11.2017, p.31 
P.R. China Ceramic tiles   
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 67, 12.03.2015, p. 23 
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Country Case Extension Regulation 
L 307; 23.11.2017, p.25 
P.R. China Chamois leather   L 334, 06.12.2012, p. 31 
P.R. China Citric acid Malaysia L 10; 15.01.2016, p.3 
P.R. China Citric acid   L 15, 22.01.2015, p. 15 
P.R. China Citrus fruits   
Reopening 
L 49, 22.02.2013, p. 29 
L 354, 11.12.2014, p. 17 
P.R. China Coated fine paper   
L 299; 16.11.2010, p.7 
L 128; 06.05.2011, p.1 
L 171; 04.07.2017, p.168 
P.R. China cold-rolled flat steel products   
L 37;  12.02.2016, p.1 
L 210; 04.08.2016, p.1 
P.R. China Ferro-silicon   L 107, 10.04.2014, p. 13 
P.R. China Filament glass fibre products   
L 243; 16.09.2010, p.40 
L 67; 15.03.2011, p.1 
L 107; 25.04.2017, p.4 
P.R. China 
Grain oriented flat-rolled products of 
silicon-electrical steel   
L 120, 13.05.2015, p. 10 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109 
P.R. China 
Hand pallet trucks and their essential 
parts Thailand L 151; 11.06.2009, p.1 
P.R. China 
Hand pallet trucks and their essential 
parts   
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 112, 24.04.2013, p. 1 
Amendment (newcomer) 
L 265, 05.09.2014, p. 7 
Extension (circum.) 
L 214; 09.08.2016, p.1 
P.R. China Heavy plates   L 50; 28.02.2017, p.18 
P.R. China 
High fatigue performance steel 
concrete reinforcement bars   
L 23; 29.01.2016, p.16 
L 204; 29.07.2016, p.70 
P.R. China Hot rolled flat products   
L 272; 07.10.2016, p.33 
L 92; 06.04.2017, p.68 
P.R. China Ironing boards   L 338; 20.12.2010, p.22 
P.R. China Ironing boards   
Reopening 
L 297, 26.10.2012, p. 5 
L 198, 23.07.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China Lever Arch Mechanisms   L 238, 04.09.2012, p.5 
P.R. China Melamine   
L 298; 15.11.2010, p.10 
L 124; 10.05.2011, p.2 
L 170; 01.07.2017, p.62 
P.R. China Molybdenum wires Malaysia 
Extension (circum.) 
L8, 12.01.2012, p. 22 
P.R. China Molybdenum wires   
Extension (circum.) 
L 243, 12.09.2013, P. 2 
Extension (circum.) 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 100 
L 170; 19.06.2016, p.19 
P.R. China Monosodium glutamate   L 15, 22.01.2015, p. 31 
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Country Case Extension Regulation 
P.R. China Okoumé plywood   
L 181; 17.05.2004, p.5 
L 336; 02.11.2004, p.4 
L 92; 06.04.2017, p.48 
P.R. China Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  India 
Extension (circum.) 
L 346, 20.12.2013, p. 20 
Extension (circum.) 
L 236, 10.09.2015, p. 1 
P.R. China Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  Indonesia L 346, 20.12.2013, p. 20 
P.R. China Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  Thailand 
Extension (circum.) 
L 11, 16.01.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  Taiwan 
Extension (circum.) 
L 11, 16.01.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  Malaysia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 196, 24.07.2012, p. 1 
P.R. China Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres    
L 204; 09.08.2011, p.1 
Expiry review 
L 288; 07.11.2017, p.4 
P.R. China Organic coated steel products   
L 252, 19.09.2012, p. 33 
L 73, 15.03.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China Oxalic acid   
L 106, 18.04.2012, p. 1 
L 321; 29.11.2016, p.48 
P.R. China Peroxosulphates (persulphates)   L 338, 17.12.2013, p. 11 
P.R. China Polyester high tenacity filament yarn   L 49; 25.02.2017, p.6 
P.R. China PSC wires and strands   
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 297, 26.10.2012, p.1 
L 139, 05.06.2015, p. 12 
P.R. China Ringbinder mechanisms Laos L 7; 12.01.2006, p.1 
P.R. China Ringbinder mechanisms Vietnam L 232; 28.06.2004, p.1 
P.R. China Ringbinder mechanisms   L 122; 12.05.2016, p.1 
P.R. China 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or 
steel   L 322, 08.12.2015, p. 21 
P.R. China 
Seamless pipes and tubes of stainless 
steel   
L 169; 27.06.2011, p.1 
L 336; 14.12.2011, p.6 
P.R. China 
Seamless pipes, of iron or steel, 
external diameter exceeding 406.4 
mm   
L 305; 12.11.2016, p.1 
L 121; 12.05.2017, p.3 
P.R. China Silicon metal (silicon) Taiwan 
Extension (circum.) 
L 95, 05.04.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China Silicon metal (silicon) Korea (Rep. of) L 13; 15.01.2007, p.1 
P.R. China Silicon metal (silicon)   L 179; 05.07.2016, p.1 
P.R. China Sodium Cyclamate   L 192; 16.07.2016, p.23 
P.R. China Sodium Cyclamate   
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 124, 11.05.2012, p. 1 
L 192; 16.07.2016, p.49 
P.R. China Sodium gluconate   L 16; 20.01.2017, p.3 
P.R. China Solar glass   L 316, 27.11.2013, p. 8 
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Country Case Extension Regulation 
L 142, 14.05.2014, p. 1 
Amendment 
L 98, 15.04.2015, p. 6 
Amendment (absorption 
reinvestigation) 
L 215, 14.08.2015, p. 42 
P.R. China 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) Taiwan 
Extension (circum.) 
L 37; 12.02.2016, p.76 
P.R. China 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) Malaysia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 37; 12.02.2016, p.76 
P.R. China 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components)   
L 152, 05.06.2013, p. 5 
L 325, 05.12.2013, p. 1 
Amendment 
L 173; 30.06.2016, p.44 
L 56; 03.03.2017, p.131 
P.R. China 
Stainless steel cold-rolled flat 
products   
L 79, 25.3.15, p. 23 
L 224, 27.08.2015, p. 10 
P.R. China 
Stainless steel tube and pipe butt-
welding fittings   L 22; 27.01.2017, p.14 
P.R. China Steel ropes and cables Korea (Rep. of) 
L36, 09.02.2012; p. 1 
Amendment (newcomer) 
L 138, 13.05.2014, p. 80 
Amendment 
L 139, 14.05.2014, p.7 
P.R. China Steel ropes and cables Morocco L36, 09.02.2012; p. 1 
P.R. China Steel ropes and cables   L36, 09.02.2012; p. 1 
P.R. China Sulphanilic acid   L 363, 18.02.2014, p. 82 
P.R. China Tartaric Acid   
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 108, 20.04.2012, p. 1 
L 110, 24.04.2012, p. 3 
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 182, 13.07.2012, p. 1 
P.R. China 
Threaded tube or pipe cast fittings of 
malleable cast iron   
L 318, 15.11.2012, p. 10 
L 129, 14.05.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China Trichloroisocyanuric acid (TCCA)   
Amendment (newcomer) 
L 157, 27.05.2014, p. 80 
L 319; 05.12.2017, p.10 
P.R. China Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel Philippines L 116; 27.04.2006, p.1 
P.R. China Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel Sri Lanka L 355; 22.11.2004, p.9 
P.R. China Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel Indonesia L 335; 22.11.2004, p.4 
P.R. China Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel Taiwan L 94; 14.04.2000, p.1 
P.R. China Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel   L 282, 28.10.2015, p. 14 
P.R. China 
Tungsten carbide and fused tungsten 
carbide   
Initiation 
C 322; 15.12.1988, p.7 
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Country Case Extension Regulation 
L 395; 31.12.2004, p.56 
L 78; 24.03.2011, p.1 
L 142; 02.06.2017, p.53 
P.R. China Tungsten electrodes   L 150, 04.06.2013, p. 1 
P.R. China 
Welded tubes and pipes of iron or 
non-alloy steel   L 20, 27.01.2015, p. 6 
P.R. China Wire rod   L 268, 15.10.2015, p. 9 
Russia Aluminium foil   
L 175, 04.07.2015, p. 14 
L 332; 18.12.2015, p 91 
Russia Ammonium nitrate   
L 280, 24.09.2014, p. 19 
L41; 18.02.2016, p.13 
Russia cold-rolled flat steel products   
L 37;  12.02.2016, p.1 
L 210; 04.08.2016, p.1 
Russia Ferro-silicon   L 107, 10.04.2014, p. 13 
Russia 
Grain oriented flat-rolled products of 
silicon-electrical steel   
L 120, 13.05.2015, p. 10 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109 
Russia Hot rolled flat products   L 258; 06.10.2017, p.24 
Russia 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or 
steel   
L 174, 04.07.2012, p. 5 
L 357, 28.12.2012, p. 1 
Russia Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel   
L 203, 31.07.2012, p. 37 
L 27, 29.01.2013, p. 1 
Russia 
Welded tubes and pipes of iron or 
non-alloy steel   L 20, 27.01.2015, p. 6 
South Africa Manganese Dioxides   L 59, 28.02.2014, p. 7 
Taiwan 
Stainless steel cold-rolled flat 
products   
L 79, 25.3.15, p. 23 
L 224, 27.08.2015, p. 10 
Taiwan 
Stainless steel tube and pipe butt-
welding fittings   L 22; 27.01.2017, p.14 
Thailand 
Sweet corn (prepared or preserved in 
kernels)   
L 244, 13.09.2013, p. 1 
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 91, 27.03.2014, p. 1 
Thailand 
Threaded tube or pipe cast fittings of 
malleable cast iron   
L 318, 15.11.2012, p. 10 
L 129, 14.05.2013, p. 1 
Turkey Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel   
L 203, 31.07.2012, p. 37 
L 27, 29.01.2013, p. 1 
Ukraine Hot rolled flat products   L 258; 06.10.2017, p.24 
Ukraine 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or 
steel   
L 174, 04.07.2012, p. 5 
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 238, 04.09.2012, p. 1 
USA Biodiesel   
L 239, 15.09.2015, p. 69 
Amendment 
L 116; 30.04.2016, p.31 
USA Biodiesel Canada L 122; 05.05.2011, p.1 
USA Bioethanol   L 49, 22.02.2013, p. 10 
USA 
Grain oriented flat-rolled products of 
silicon-electrical steel   
L 120, 13.05.2015, p. 10 
L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109 
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ANNEX P 
Definitive anti-subsidy measures in force on 31 December 2017  
a. Ranked by product (alphabetical) 
 
Case Country Extension Regulation 
Biodiesel USA   L 73; 18.03.2016, p.1 
Biodiesel USA   
L 126, 08.05.2013, p. 19 
L 240, 07.09.2013, p. 1 
Coated fine paper 
P.R. 
China   
Amendment ((partial) interim 
review) 
L 202, 27.07.2013, p. 2 
L 165; 28.06.2017, p.2 




L 37; 12.02.2016, p.56 
Graphite electrode systems India Malaysia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 37; 12.02.2016, p.56 
Hot rolled flat products 
P.R. 
China   
L 325, 05.12.2013, p. 66 
Amendment 
L 173; 30.06.2016, p.44 
L 56; 03.03.2017, p.131 
Organic coated steel products 
P.R. 
China   L 142, 14.05.2014, p. 23 
Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) India   
L 319, 06.11.2014, p. 1 
L 56, 27.02.2015, p. 12 
Rainbow trout Turkey   L 208, 05.08.2015, p. 10 
Solar glass 
P.R. 
China   L 73, 15.03.2013, p. 16 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon photovoltaic 
modules and key components) 
P.R. 
China   L 146; 09.06.2017, p.17 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon photovoltaic 
modules and key components) 
P.R. 
China   L 64; 10.03.2017, p.10 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon photovoltaic 
modules and key components) 
P.R. 
China   L 367, 23.12.2014, p. 22 
Stainless steel bars India   
L 128; 06.05.2011, p.18 
L 171; 04.07.2017, p.134 
Stainless steel wire India Canada L 122; 05.05.2011, p.1 
Tubes and pipes of ductile cast iron India   
L 239, 15.09.2015, p. 99 
Amendment 
L 116; 30.04.2016, p.27 
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b. Ranked by country (alphabetical) 
Country Case Extension Regulation 
India Graphite electrode systems Malaysia 
Extension (circum.) 
L 37; 12.02.2016, p.56 
India Polyethylene terephthalate (PET)   
L 319, 06.11.2014, p. 1 
L 56, 27.02.2015, p. 12 
India Stainless steel bars   
L 128; 06.05.2011, p.18 
L 171; 04.07.2017, p.134 
India Stainless steel wire Canada L 122; 05.05.2011, p.1 
India Tubes and pipes of ductile cast iron   
L 239, 15.09.2015, p. 99 
Amendment 
L 116; 30.04.2016, p.27 
P.R. China Coated fine paper   
Amendment ((partial) interim review) 
L 202, 27.07.2013, p. 2 
L 165; 28.06.2017, p.2 
P.R. China Filament glass fibre products Taiwan 
Extension (circum.) 
L 37; 12.02.2016, p.56 
P.R. China Hot rolled flat products   
L 325, 05.12.2013, p. 66 
Amendment 
L 173; 30.06.2016, p.44 
L 56; 03.03.2017, p.131 
P.R. China Organic coated steel products   L 142, 14.05.2014, p. 23 
P.R. China Solar glass   L 73, 15.03.2013, p. 16 
P.R. China 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon photovoltaic 
modules and key components)   L 146; 09.06.2017, p.17 
P.R. China 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon photovoltaic 
modules and key components)   L 64; 10.03.2017, p.10 
P.R. China 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon photovoltaic 
modules and key components)   L 367, 23.12.2014, p. 22 
Turkey Rainbow trout   L 208, 05.08.2015, p. 10 
USA Biodiesel   L 73; 18.03.2016, p.1 
USA Biodiesel   
L 126, 08.05.2013, p. 19 
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ANNEX Q 
Undertakings in force on 31 December 2017 
A. Ranked by product (alphabetical) 
Product Origin Measure Decision N° 
OJ 
Reference 
Citric acid P.R. China Undertakings Commission Impl. 






B. Ranked by country (alphabetical) 
Origin Product Measure Decision N° 
OJ 
Reference 
P.R. China Citric acid Undertakings Commission Impl. 
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ANNEX R 
Anti-dumping & anti-subsidy investigations pending on 31 December 2017 
(including cases where provisional measures were imposed) 
A. New investigations (ranked by product – in alphabetical order) 
 
Case Case No AD/AS Country Regulation 
Cast iron articles AD637 AD India C 461; 10.12.2016, p.22 
Cast iron articles AD637 AD P.R. China C 461; 10.12.2016, p.22 
Corrosion resistant steels AD639 AD P.R. China C 459; 09.12.2016, p.17 
electric bicycles AS646 AS P.R. China C 440; 21.12.2017, p.22 
electric bicycles AD643 AD P.R. China C 353; 20.10.2017, p.19 
Ferro-silicon AD642 AD Ukraine C 251; 02.08.2017, p.5 
Ferro-silicon AD642 AD Egypt C 251; 02.08.2017, p.5 
Low carbon ferro-chrome AD638 AD Turkey C 200; 23.06.2017, p.17 
Low carbon ferro-chrome AD638 AD Russia C 200; 23.06.2017, p.17 
Low carbon ferro-chrome AD638 AD P.R. China C 200; 23.06.2017, p.17 
new and retreaded tyres for buses or lorries AS641 AS P.R. China C 346; 14.10.2017, p.9 
new and retreaded tyres for buses or lorries AD640 AD P.R. China C 264; 11.08.2017, p.14 
Silicon metal (silicon) AD645 AD Brazil C 438; 19.12.2017, p.39 
Silicon metal (silicon) AD645 AD 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina C 438; 19.12.2017, p.39 
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B. Review investigations (ranked by product - in alphabetical order)  
 
Case Case No AD/AS Country Regulation 
Aluminium radiators R676 AD P.R. China C 377; 09.11.2017, p.11 
Ammonium nitrate R674 AD Russia C 271; 17.08.2017, p.15 
Ammonium nitrate R669 AD Russia C 271; 17.08.2017, p.9 
Bicycles R662 AD Tunisia L 116; 05.05.2017, p.20 
Ceramic tableware and kitchenware R652 AD P.R. China C 117; 12.04.2017, p.12 
Chamois leather R678 AD P.R. China C 416; 06.12.2017, p.15 
Citric acid R679 AD P.R. China L 329; 13.12.2017, p.39 
Hand pallet trucks and their essential parts R668 AD P.R. China L 188; 20.07.2017, p.1 
Lever Arch Mechanisms R675 AD P.R. China C 290; 01.09.2017, p.3 
Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres  R660 AD India L 226; 01.09.2017, p.1 
Oxalic acid R672 AD India C 117; 12.04.2017, p.15 
Oxalic acid R672 AD P.R. China C 117; 12.04.2017, p.15 
Polyester high tenacity filament yarn R653 AD P.R. China C 384; 18.10.2016, p.15 
Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) R664 AS India C 216; 06.07.2017, p.30 
Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) R663 AS India C 216; 06.07.2017, p.26 
Rainbow trout R667 AS Turkey C 234; 20.07.2017, p.6 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or steel R665 AD Ukraine C 214; 04.07.2017, p.9 
Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or steel R665 AD Russia C 214; 04.07.2017, p.9 
Seamless pipes and tubes of stainless steel R657 AD P.R. China C 461; 10.12.2016, p.12 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) R677 AS Malaysia L 288; 07.11.2017, p.30 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) R677 AD Malaysia L 288; 07.11.2017, p.30 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) R673 AS P.R. China C 67; 03.03.2017, p.16 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) R673 AD P.R. China C 67; 03.03.2017, p.16 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) R659 AS Malaysia L 36; 11.02.2017, p.47 
Solar panels (crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic modules and key 
components) R659 AD Malaysia L 36; 11.02.2017, p.47 
Steel ropes and cables R655 AD P.R. China C 41; 08.02.2017, p.5 
Tartaric Acid R671 AD P.R. China C 122; 19.04.2017, p.8 
Threaded tube or pipe cast fittings of 
malleable cast iron R661 AD Thailand C 162; 23.05.2017, p.12 
Threaded tube or pipe cast fittings of 
malleable cast iron R661 AD P.R. China C 162; 23.05.2017, p.12 
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C. Reopenings (ranked by product - in alphabetical order) 
 
Cases Case No AD/AS Country Regulation 
Seamless pipes and tubes 
of iron or steel AD533a AD P.R. China C 331; 09.09.2016, p.4 
Stainless steel wire AD591a AD India C 334; 06.10.2017, p.3 
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ANNEX S 
Court cases 
 A. Court cases pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and the General Court on 31 December 2017 
 
General Court 
T-431/12 Distillerie Bonollo SpA v Council 
T-487/14 CHEMK v Commission 
T-113/15 RFA International v Commission 
T-462/15 Asia Leader v Commission 
T-607/15 Yieh United Steel (Yusco) v Commission 
T-675/15 Taigang v Commission 
T-211/16 Caviro Distillerie and others v Commission 
T-230/16 C&J Clarks v Commission 
Court of Justice 
C-256/16 Deichmann (preliminary ruling) 
C-301/16 P Commission v Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings Ltd (appeal in T-586/14) 
C-465/16 P Council v Growth Energy and Renewable fuels association (appeal T-276/13) 
C-466/16 P Council v Marquis Energy LLC (appeal T-277/13) 
C-602/16 P  Council v Unitec Bio SÁ, Commission and European 
  Biodiesel Board (appeal T-111/14) 
C-603/16 P Council v PT Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia and PT Wilmar Nabati Indonesia (appeal T-) 
C-604/16 P Council v PT Pelita Agung Agrindustri (appeal T-) 
C-605/16 P Council v PT Ciliandra Perkasa (appeal T-) 
C-606/16 P  Council v PT Musim Mas (appeal T-) 
C-607/16 P  Council v Molino Rio de la Plata SA e.a., Commission and 
  European Biodiesel Board (appeal T-)  
C-608/16P  Council v Cargill S.A.C.I., Commission and European 
  Biodiesel Board (appeal T-) 
C-609/16 P Council v LDC Argentina SA, Commission and European 
  Biodiesel Board (appeal T-) 
C-612/16 C&J Clark International (preliminary ruling) 
C-631/16 X BV (preliminary ruling) 
C-100/17 P Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council (appeal T-) 
C-145/17 P International de Productos Metalicos v Commission (appeal T-) 
C-207/17 Rotho Blaas (preliminary ruling) 
C-236/17 P Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council (appeal T-162/14) 
C-237/17 P Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council (appeal T-163/14) 
C-592/17 Baby Dan (preliminary ruling) 
Case C-
644/17 Eurobolt (preliminary ruling)  
C-363/17 P Equipolymers and Others v Council (appeal T-422/13) 
 EN 111 EN 
T-300/16 Jindal v Commission 
T-301/16 Jindal v Commission 
T-310/16 Foshan Lihua Ceramic Co. Ltd v Commission 
T-364/16 ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava a.s. and Others v Commission 
T-442/16 Šroubárna Ždánice v EU (claim for damages) 
T-631/16 Remag Metallhandel GmbH and Werner Jaschinsky v Commission 
T-654/16 Foshan Lihua Ceramic Co. Ltd v Commission 
T-741/16 Changmao Biochemical Engineering Co. Ltd 
T-749/16 Stemcor v Commission 
T-752/16 NLMK v Commission 
T-753/16 Severstal v Commission 
T-781/16 Puma v Commission 
T-782/16 Timberland v Commission 
T-783/16 C & J Clark v Commission 
T-861/16  C & J Clark International Ltd v Commission 
T-790/16 C & J Clark International Ltd v Commission 
T-154/17 Deichmann v Commission 
T-155/17 Van Haren Schoenen v Commission 
T-204/17 Alfa Laval v Commission 
T-228/17 Zhejiang Jndia Pipeline Industry v Commission 
T-110/17 Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System v Commission 
T-347/17 FLA Europe v Commission 
T-383/17 Hansol paper v Commission 
T-500/17 Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube v Commission 
T-650/17 Jinan Meide v Commission 
T-469/07 DEP Philips Lighting Poland and Philips Lighting v Council 
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B. Judgments, orders or other decisions rendered in 2017 
 
 
Court of Justice 
C-248/15 P Maxcom v City Cycle (appeal T-413/13) 
C-247/15 P Maxcom v Chin Haur (appeal T-412/13) 
C-253/15 P Chin Haur v Commission (appeal T-412/13) 
C-254/15 P City Cycle v Commission (appeal T-413/13) 
C-259/15P Chin Haur Indonesia v Council 
C-260/15P City Cycle Industries v Council 
C-376/15 P Changshu City v Council (appeal T-558/12) 
C-377/15 P Ningbo Jinding v Council (appeal T-559/12) 
C-239/15 P RFAI v Commission (appeal T-466/12) 
C-349/16 T.KUP SAS (preliminary ruling) 
C-156/16 Tigers (preliminary ruling) 
C-204/16P SolarWorld and Others v Council (appeal T-141/14) 
C-205/16P SolarWorld and Others v Council (appeal T-142/14) 
C-61/16 P EBMA (appeal T-425/13 Giant) 
 
General Court 
T-512/09 RENV Rusal Armenal v Council 
T-217/16 IPM v Commission 
T-783/14 SolarWorld AG v Commission 
T-162/14 Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council 
T-160/14 Yingli Energy (China) and Others v Council 
T-158/14 JingAo Solar Co. Ltd and Others v Council 
T-161/14 Yingli Energy (China) and Others v Council 
T-163/14 Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council 
T-157/14 JingAo Solar Co. Ltd and Others v Council 
T-422/13 CPME and Others v Council 
T-442/12 Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Council 
T-67/14 Viraj v Council 
T-152/16 Megasol Energie AG v Commission 
T-435/15 Kolachi Raj Industrial v Commission 
T-460/14 AETMD v Council 
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ANNEX T 
 
Safeguard and surveillance measures in force on 31 December 2017 
A. Safeguard measures 








None    
 
B. Surveillance measures 
 








None    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
